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Business cycle study is one of the major fields in macroeconomics. My dissertation combines
micro evidence and quantitative models to contribute new mechanisms to the understanding of
business cycles. It consists of two chapters that study the roles of supply chain management and
inter-sectoral reallocation in business cycles, respectively. In Chapter 1, I study the role of supply
chain management in amplifying business cycle fluctuations. I incorporate the extensive margin,
i.e., the number of intermediate input varieties into a real business cycle model. Using a dataset
of supply chain relationships among US firms, I first document that increases in the number of
suppliers are correlated with increases in intermediate input expenditures, total factor productivities,
and costs of managing suppliers. Based on these facts, I develop a model in which firms trade off the
productivity benefit (return to variety) of accessing more varieties with the (fixed) cost of managing
these varieties. The extensive margin adjustment introduces a return to scale into production and
amplifies productivity shocks: In my estimated model with multiple industries and a production
network, the effect of industry productivity shocks on GDP fluctuations is one-fourth larger than in a
(conventional) model where the extensive margin is absent. In Chapter 2, I study the business cycles
with resource reallocation between two sectors, the manufacturing and the service sectors through
the lens of land prices and capital investment. I construct the quarterly commercial land price series
using land transaction data in China and document a negative correlation between the land price and
the aggregate investment, as opposed to the positive correlation in the US. With sectoral productivity
processes estimated, a real business cycle model with a manufacturing and a service sector is used
to explain the negative correlation. A positive export (manufacturing good) price shock increases
the demand for tradable manufacturing goods and attracts capital and labor from the non-tradable
service sector, by which only land is used. Aggregate investment rises because the manufacturing
sector is more capital intensive. Land price, on the other hand, falls as the return to land decreases.
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Chapter 1

Supply Chain Management and
Aggregate Fluctuations
1.1

Introduction

In neoclassical models with intermediate inputs (Long Jr. and Plosser, 1983; Acemoglu, Carvalho,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2012; Atalay, 2017; Baqaee, 2018), firms always source inputs from
all suppliers. Over the business cycle, however, firms adjust not only their input expenditures but
also the number of suppliers from which they source. According to the FactSet supply chain dataset,
a median US firm adjusts the number of its suppliers in 71% of the years from 2003 to 2018.
In this paper, I study the adjustment of input variety numbers and incorporate this extensive
margin adjustment (EMA) into a real business cycle model.1 Using a dataset of supply chain
relationships among US firms, I first document that increases in intermediate input expenditures are
correlated with increases in the number of suppliers. Furthermore, I document that increases in the
number of suppliers are correlated with increases in the total factor productivities and the costs of
managing suppliers.
Based on these facts, I develop a real business cycle model in which firms trade-off between the
productivity benefit of more varieties and the cost of managing varieties to adjust on the extensive
margin. The extensive margin and the associated productivity gain introduce a return to scale
into production and amplify productivity shocks. In the estimated model with multiple industries
1. In the data, I use the number of suppliers to measure the number of input varieties.

1

and a production network among them, industry productivity shocks generate a real GDP standard
deviation of 1.88% with EMA, which is one-fourth larger than that without EMA. In other words,
the extensive margin adjustment enables industry productivity shocks to explain a larger share of the
aggregate fluctuation in the data.
My paper is motivated not only by the continuous efforts of economists to explain economic
fluctuations (Ramey, 2016) but also by observations of extensive margin adjustments in the data.
Figure 1.1a shows that Ford adds suppliers when sales value increases and cuts suppliers when sales
value falls. Meanwhile, a similar pattern exists in the number of input varieties (Figure 1.1b).2
When Ford’s sales started to grow in 2010, it introduced a new navigation system supplier (TeleNav)
in addition to the existing supplier (Garmin). With this additional supplier, Ford developed a mapbased navigation system for which Ford charged $ 1,000. As a result, Ford became more productive
in the sense that it produced cars with higher quality. On the other hand, when its sales slowed down
in 2014, Ford abandoned Garmin.
60%

(a) Input suppliers

60%

(b) Input varieties

Sales value
Supplier no.

Sales value
No. of input varieties

40%

40%

20%

20%

0%

0%

-20%

-20%

-40%

-40%
2005

2010

2015

2005

2010

2015

Figure 1.1: Ford’s sales value vs. number of input suppliers / varieties in the US
Note: Y-axes are percentage deviations from the median of each series. Panels (a) and (b) plot Ford’s number of suppliers
and input varieties vs. sales value, respectively. An input variety is defined as a unique sector of level five in the FactSet
hierarchy of sectors. The number of input varieties is calculated as the number of unique varieties to which at least one
product produced by any of its supplier belongs.

It turns out that the case of Ford reflects a general pattern of adjustments in supplier numbers.
By combining the FactSet data on supply chain relationship among US firms with industry-level
2. The numbers of suppliers and input varieties are calculated using the FactSet Revere database. Ford’s (US) sales
values are from Ford’s press release and annual reports at https://media.ford.com.

2

data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), I document the following three facts about
extensive margin adjustments.
First, the number of an industry’s suppliers increases with its intermediate input expenditures.3
I find that a 1% increase in an industry’s intermediate input expenditures is associated with a 0.28%
increase in its number of suppliers. The positive correlation indicates that firms adjust intermediate
input expenditures through both the intensive and the extensive margins.4
Second, an industry’s total factor productivity increases with its number of suppliers. Controlling
for intermediate input expenditures, labor input, and capital stock, a 1% increase in the number of a
customer industry’s input suppliers is associated with a 0.035% increase in its real output. This total
factor productivity gain due to more suppliers is a return to (input) variety in production. The return
to variety can be interpreted as a reduced-form productivity benefit due to a higher quality of output
when more input varieties are used.5 Moreover, I use the Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin methods
to estimate firms’ production functions, which control for unobserved productivity shocks. I find
that a 1% increase in a firm’s total number of suppliers is associated with a 0.06% to 0.09% increase
in its real sales, controlling for intermediate inputs, capital stock, and the number of employees.
Thus, the observed productivity benefit of more suppliers is not because the number of suppliers
proxies unobserved productivity shocks.
Third, the cost of managing suppliers increases with the number of suppliers. I proxy the cost of
a customer industry’s supply chain management with the employment number of purchasing agents
in this industry. I find that a 1% increase in the supply chain management cost of a customer industry
is associated with a 0.27% increase in this industry’s total number of suppliers. In contrast, input
expenditures are not positively correlated with management costs. These two observations together
imply a fixed cost of managing suppliers.
Based on these three facts, l use a real business cycle model featuring the productivity benefit and
management cost of input varieties to study the aggregate effects of extensive margin adjustments. In
this economy, there is a continuum of differentiated firms, each of which produces a unique variety
of goods using inputs from other firms in the economy. When sourcing inputs, a firm chooses both
3. Correlations in this paper are all based on log-differenced regressions and correspond to business cycle variations.
4. Li (2013) finds a similar result for consumption: consumers increase consumption by increasing both the quantity of
each variety and the number of varieties.
5. Indeed, the source of the productivity gain in my paper is not limited to this example. Extensive margin adjustments
with alternative reduced-form productivity gains also amplify industry productivity shocks and aggregate fluctuations.
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the number of input varieties and the quantity of each variety.6 Using more input varieties increases
the productivity of a firm. However, to use each variety, a firm needs to hire one unit of management
labor supplied by the household. The management labor is separated from the production labor and
is elastically supplied, which leads to a supply chain management cost that is increasing and convex
in the number of input varieties.
The trade-off between the return to (input) variety and the cost of managing varieties leads to
extensive margin adjustments, which, in turn, amplify aggregate fluctuations. In booms, firms use
more intermediate inputs, and the increase in input quantity per variety raises the marginal return
to input varieties. As a result, firms pay higher management costs to use more varieties. A larger
variety of inputs, in turn, generates productivity gains and increases output. In busts, the opposite
is true. Intuitively, the extensive margin, together with the return to variety, introduces a return to
scale into production and amplifies productivity shocks, as well as aggregate fluctuations.
How much the aggregate fluctuation is amplified by extensive margin adjustments depends on
the structure of supply chains, in particular, the supply chains among different industries’ firms. As
a result, I introduce multiple industries and the production network into the quantitative model. To
be more specific, the multi-industry real business cycle model has an input-output network among
industries. Within each industry, there is a continuum of differentiated firms, each of which produces
a unique variety of goods using inputs from a set of firms in different industries.
It turns out that the structure of the production network affects the amplification effect of EMAs.
Imagine a vertical economy where manufacturing sources inputs from agriculture, and agriculture
sources inputs from utilities. When manufacturing uses more input varieties from agriculture, its
productivity, and thus its sales, increase. With a higher demand from manufacturing, agriculture
uses more intermediate inputs and thus more input varieties from utilities. In this way, the extensive
margin adjustments on different linkages of the same supply chain complement and reinforce each
other. As a result, the lengths of the supply chains, which depend on the structure of the production
network, affect the size of the amplification effect of EMA.
A multi-industry framework also allows me to match industry-level data to estimate the key
parameters of the model, which is critical to quantifying the effects of extensive margin adjustments
6. I make assumptions to focus on the equilibrium in which the number of chosen varieties matters, rather than the
idiosyncratic features of the varieties.
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on aggregate fluctuations. In particular, I use indirect inference estimation to estimate the curvature
of the disutility function of management labor (in turn, the management cost function) and the input
elasticity of substitution between industries. I also calibrate the return to variety by matching the
model’s steady-state management cost share in total revenue with that in the American Productivity
& Quality Center7 (APQC) survey data. In addition, the calibration of industry productivities, which
are computed as Solow residuals, needs to exclude the productivity gain from EMA. Because EMA
is endogenous and simulated in indirect inference, the industry productivities are calibrated within
the estimation.
With the multi-industry model estimated and calibrated, I quantitatively evaluate EMA’s amplification of aggregate fluctuations. In the baseline model with EMA and the production network,
the real GDP standard deviation is 1.88%, compared to a standard deviation of 1.51% without
EMA. Thus, EMA amplifies the aggregate fluctuation (generated by industry productivity shocks)
by one-fourth, which is about 54% of the contribution of labor inputs (hours). I also find that EMA
amplifies aggregate fluctuations even if the production and management labor markets are unified,
as long as the supply of the homogeneous labor is elastic enough. Finally, I find that shortening the
supply chains in the production network reduces EMA’s amplification effect.

Related literature
This paper is related to four strands of the literature. First, it is related to the literature that studies
amplification mechanisms that allow small variations in productivity to generate large fluctuations
in aggregate outputs. In other words, these mechanisms can account for endogenous variations in
measured TFP (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman, 1988; Kydland and Prescott, 1988; Jaimovich
and Floetotto, 2008; Bai, Rios-Rull, and Storesletten, 2012). This literature focuses on varying
capital and labor utilization and demand shocks. In comparison, my paper studies the choice
of input variety numbers. My paper is closely related to Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), which
finds that the interaction between firms’ entry and exit decisions and markups amplifies exogenous
productivity shocks. They find this interaction to account for 40% of the variation in measured TFP
in the US. Instead of the entry and exit of firms, my paper finds the endogenous input variety choice to
be an amplification mechanism. In terms of modeling, my paper is closely related to the work of Huo
7. www.apqc.org.
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and Rios-Rull (2019), which is an extension of the work of Bai et al. (2012). In Huo and Rios-Rull
(2019), consumers increase the number of consumption varieties as well as the consumption of each
variety when they raise their consumption. My model studies similar adjustments on the production
side, i.e., firms increase the number of input varieties and the quantity of each variety when they use
more intermediate inputs.
This paper is also related to the international trade literature that finds a productivity gain to
an increase in imported intermediate input varieties following the theoretical work by Ethier (1982)
(Feenstra, Madani, Yang, and Liang, 1999; Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl, 2015; Gopinath and Neiman,
2014). Among them, my paper is most related to Gopinath and Neiman (2014) in the sense that we
both emphasize the importance of the within-firm choice of input varieties instead of the entry and
exit of firms. Indeed, the sub-extensive margin in their paper is exactly the extensive margin in my
paper. Compared to their papers, my paper documents a similar productivity gain to a larger number
of domestic intermediate input varieties and studies its implication on business cycle fluctuations.
Third, this paper contributes to a growing literature on the importance of production networks in
aggregating microeconomic shocks into macroeconomic fluctuations (Long Jr. and Plosser, 1983;
Acemoglu et al., 2012; Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr, 2016; Atalay, 2017; Baqaee, 2018; Huo,
Levchenko, and Pandalai-Nayar, 2019). Among them, this paper is related to the work building
on the multi-industry business cycle model by Long Jr. and Plosser (1983). Atalay (2017) and
Baqaee (2018) argue that industry-specific productivity shocks, propagating in production networks,
can generate large aggregate fluctuations. My paper is close to Baqaee (2018), who considers the
entry and exit of firms within industries as a propagation and amplification mechanism. My paper,
in comparison, studies firms’ choice of input variety numbers. The amplification mechanisms in
our papers are similar in spirit but rely on different margins. Also, both the empirical facts and
the quantitative evaluation of the model indicate that firms’ choice of input variety numbers is an
important margin for shock transmission and aggregate fluctuations. In addition, the structure of the
production network greatly determines the size of the amplification effects of the extensive margin
adjustments in my paper. My paper is also related to Atalay (2017), who documents a less-than-unit
input elasticity of substitution between different industries’ goods. He shows that the small elasticity
makes industry-specific shocks substantially more important in generating aggregate fluctuations
than those in unit-elasticity models. Following Atalay (2017), I estimate the elasticity of substitution
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to be less than unity using indirect inference.
Finally, this paper is also related to the recent literature on endogenous supply chains in general
equilibrium models (Oberfield, 2018; Acemoglu and Azar, 2019; Taschereau-Dumouchel, 2019;
Carvalho and Voigtländer, 2015; Zou, 2019; Huneeus, 2018). Among these models, my paper falls
into the category of costly supply chain relationships. In particular, my paper is closely related to
Lim (2018) and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2019), who also study aggregate fluctuations but in a firmlevel endogenous production network. In these two papers, the aggregate fluctuation is dampened
by the option of choosing customers/suppliers through two channels: the substitution between input
varieties and the substitution between production and management labor. In my model, I focus
on the substitution between industries rather than between varieties. The former one is smaller
than the latter one because inputs are more complementary across industries than across firms. In
addition, I allow production and management labor to be elastically supplied in segmented markets,
which relaxes the one-to-one substitution between the two types of labor. Due to these two features,
extensive margin adjustments in my paper amplify rather than dampen aggregate fluctuations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the three facts about
extensive margin adjustments. Section 1.3 develops a real business cycle model with EMAs and
shows how EMAs amplify aggregate fluctuations. Section 1.4 introduces the full model with both
EMAs and a production network. I use a simplified static model to illustrate the role of the production
network in the effects of EMAs on aggregate fluctuations. Section 1.5 discusses the identification
strategy and presents the estimation and simulation results of the full model in Section 1.4. Section
1.6 shows the results in a model with a unified market of production and management labor or with
alternative calibrations of the extensive margin. Section 1.7 concludes.

1.2

Facts about extensive margin adjustments

In this section, I describe the data and present three facts about extensive margin adjustments. First,
a 1% increase in the customer industry’s total intermediate input expenditure is associated with a
0.281% increase in its total number of suppliers. Second, a 1% increase in the customer industry’s
input supplier number is associated with a 0.035% increase in its real output. Third, a 1% increase
in a customer industry’s supply chain management cost is associated with a 0.27% increase in its
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number of suppliers. Fact one indicates that firms adjust intermediate input expenditures through
the number of suppliers. Facts two and three imply the productivity benefit and management cost of
input varieties (suppliers).

1.2.1

Data

Four different datasets are used in the empirical analysis of this section, FactSet Revere, Compustat,
CRSP/Compustat Merged, the BEA Input-Output Tables and Industry Accounts, and the Occupational Employment Statistics by the BLS. FactSet Revere gathers supplier-customer relationship data
among US firms, and Compustat gathers firms’ industry classifications. I use these two datasets to
construct producers’ numbers of suppliers on the industry level. The facts I document are mainly
based on industry-level regressions because the data of input-output network, intermediate input
expenditures, real output, purchasing agents’ employment, and real output are available on the industry level but not on the firm level. I use industry-level intermediate input expenditures, capital
and labor inputs, and real output from the BEA Input-Output Tables and Industry Accounts. I also
construct industry-level employment of purchasing agents from the OES. On the firm level, I rely on
CRSP/Compustat Merged dataset for firms’ real sales, intermediate inputs, capital stock, and labor
input. For all the regressions, I restrict the sample to the period from 2003 to 2016, for which the
supply chain relationship and the industry-level occupational employment data are both available.
Details of the data used are introduced in Appendix A.

1.2.2

Input expenditures and extensive margin adjustments

This section presents the facts that industries/firms adjust their numbers of suppliers together with
intermediate input expenditures and that the extensive margin adjustment is as significant as the
intensive margin. The following fact states the positive correlation between the extensive margin
and the input expenditure.
Fact 1. A customer industry’s number of suppliers (from a supplier industry) increases with its
intermediate input expenditures (on this supplier industry).
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Fact 1 is documented by estimating the following two equations:

d ln(vind,n,t ) = β1 d ln pxvind,n,t + n,t ,

(1.1)


d ln(vind,ns,t ) = β2 d ln pxvind,ns,t + ns,t ,

(1.2)

where vind,ns,t (pxvind,ns,t ) is the number of suppliers (input expenditure) that customer industry n
sources from in industry s in year t, and vind,n,t (pxvind,n,t ) is customer industry n’s total supplier
number (input expenditure). I use the first-order difference to remove the trend in each variable so
that the estimated elasticities correspond to business cycle variations.
Table 1.1 presents the results of regressions 1.1 and 1.2. Column (a) shows that a 1% increase
in the customer industry’s total intermediate input expenditure is associated with a 0.281% increase
in its total number of suppliers. This positive correlation echoes the similar correlation in the case
of Ford in the introduction. Column (b) further shows that this positive correlation holds between
customer-supplier industry pairs. A 1% increase in a customer industry’s input expenditure on a
supplier industry is associated with a 0.206% increase in its number of suppliers from that supplier
industry. Columns (c) and (d) use the customer industry’s real sales and the supplier industry’s
real output price as instruments for the intermediate input expenditure, respectively. The positive
correlation is still significant. This indicates that an increase in the number of suppliers is associated
with an increase in either the customer industry’s sales or the supplier industry’s output price, which
are related to the amplification and reshuffle effects illustrated in Section 1.5, respectively.
The above results show a positive correlation between the number of suppliers and input expenditures on the industry-level. It is important to show this positive correlation is consistent with
firm-level evidence. Without firm-level input expenditure data, I only explore the correlation between a firm’s total sales/costs (denoted by sales f ir m,i,t and cogs f ir m,i,t , respectively) and its total
number of suppliers (denoted by v f ir m,i,t ) by estimating the following two equations:
d ln(v f ir m,i,t ) = β3 d ln(sales f ir m,i,t ) + 3,i,t ,

(1.3)

d ln(v f ir m,i,t ) = β4 d ln(cogs f ir m,i,t ) + 4,i,t .

(1.4)

Table 1.2 present results of firm-level regressions 1.3 and 1.4. A 1% increase in a firm’s sales and
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Table 1.1: Industries’ supplier numbers and input expenditures
(a)
Total Supplier No.
0.281***
(0.108)

pxvind,n,t
pxvind,ns,t
Instrumental V ariable
Observations
R2

195
0.037

(b)
Supplier No.

(c)
Supplier No.

(d)
Supplier No.

0.206***
(0.0525)

0.332***
(0.0748)
salesind,n
1,443

0.218**
(0.101)
pind,s
1,443

1,443
0.011

Note: Data are annual from 2003 to 2016. The dependent variables are customer industries’ total numbers of suppliers
for column (a) and supplier numbers from each industry for columns (b)-(d). pxvind,n,t is the total intermediate input
expenditure of the customer industry, and pxvind,ns,t is the input expenditure on each supplier industry. Columns (c) and
(d) use customer industries’ gross outputs (salesind,n,t ) and supplier industries’ output prices (pind,s ) as instrumental
variables for pxvind,ns,t , respectively. All variables are log-differenced. Input expenditures, gross outputs, and output
prices are deflated by the GDP deflator. Industry and customer-supplier pair fixed effects are controlled in column (a) and
columns (b)-(d), respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.

cost of goods is associated with 0.08% and 0.06% increases in its number of suppliers, respectively.
This positive correlation on the firm-level implies that firms’ adjustments of supplier numbers in
response to input expenditure changes are the forces behind industry-level adjustments.
Table 1.2: Firms’ sales, cost of goods sold, and supplier numbers

VARIABLES
sales f ir m,i,t

(a)
Total Supplier No.
0.0808***
(0.0130)

cogs f ir m,i,t
Observations
R2

14,627
0.003

(b)
Total Supplier No.

0.0608***
(0.0116)
14,628
0.002

Note: Data are annual from 2003 to 2016. The dependent variables are customer firm’s total number of suppliers.
sales f ir m,i,t is customer firm’s net sales, and cogs f ir m,i,t is its total number of suppliers. All variables are logdifferenced. Sales and cost of goods sold are deflated by the GDP deflator. Firm fixed effects are controlled. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

The above industry and firm-level evidence shows that the extensive margin adjusts together with
intermediate input expenditures (or sales) and they move in the same direction. To further compare
the sizes of extensive and intensive margin adjustments, I first decompose customer industry n’s
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input expenditure on the product of industry s as
pxvind,ns,t = pind,s,t xind,ns,t vind,ns,t ,

where pind,s,t is the price of industry s’ output and pind,s,t xind,ns,t is the average input expenditure
that industry n spend on a supplier in industry s. xind,ns,t is therefore the average input quantity that
industry n sources from a supplier in industry s.
I run the following regressions to study the responses of extensive and intensive margins to
changes in customer industries’ real sales:
dlnxvind,n,t = β5 d ln(salesind,n,t ) + 5,n,t ,

(1.5)

dlnvind,n,t = β6 d ln(salesind,n,t ) + 6,n,t ,

(1.6)

dlnxind,n,t = β7 d ln(salesind,n,t ) + 7,n,t ,

(1.7)

where lnvind,n,t , lnxind,n,t , and lnxvind,n,t are the log weighted number of suppliers, input quantity
per supplier, and total input quantity. The construction of these industry-level weighted variables is
described in Appendix A.3. salesind,n,t is customer industry n’s nominal gross output deflated by
the GDP deflator.
Table 1.3 show the results of regressions 1.5 to 1.7. When a customer industry’s real sales
increases by 1%, its weighted input quantity increases by 0.831%. Meanwhile, its extensive and
intensive margins increase by 0.247% and 0.580%, respectively. Thus, 30% of the input quantity
adjustments are on the extensive margin.
Table 1.3: Customer industries’ input quantity, supplier numbers, and sales

VARIABLES
salesind,n,t
Observations
R2

(a)
dlnxvind,n,t
0.831***
(0.0399)
210
0.686

(b)
dlnvind,n,t
0.247***
(0.0904)
210
0.0347

(c)
dlnxind,n,t
0.580***
(0.0975)
210
0.145

Note: Data are annual from 2003 to 2016. The dependent variables are log-differenced customer industries’ weighted
input quantity, weighted supplier numbers, and weighted input quantity per supplier, respectively. salesind,n,t is logdifferenced customer industry n’s nominal gross output deflated by the GDP deflator. Industry fixed effects are controlled.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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1.2.3

Return to more suppliers

Fact 1 shows that customer industries adjust their number of suppliers together with intermediate
input expenditures. The following fact illustrates an incentive for the extensive margin adjustment.
Fact 2. A 1% increase in the customer industry’s input supplier number is associated with a
0.035% increase in its real output.
The productivity gain (loss) due to extensive margin adjustments is documented by estimating customer industry or firm’s total factor productivities with the number of suppliers included.
Estimations on both industry and firm levels are as follows:
d ln qind,n,t = β81 dlnvind,n,t + β82 dlnxvind,n,t + β83 d ln lind,n,t + β84 d ln kind,n,t + 8,n,t ,

(1.8)

d ln sales f ir m,i,t = β91 d ln v f ir m,i,t + β92 d ln xv f ir m,i,t + β93 d ln l f ir m,i,t + β94 d ln k f ir m,i,t + 9,i,t ,

(1.9)

where qind,n,t is industry n’s real output at time t. lnvind,n,t , lnxvind,n,t , lind,n,t , and k ind,n,t
(lnv f ir m,i,t , lnxv f ir m,i,t , l f ir m,i,t , and k f ir m,i,t ) are log industry-level (firm-level) number of suppliers, intermediate input quantity, employment, and capital stock, respectively.
Table 1.4 presents the results of regressions 1.8 and 1.9. Industry-level regression 1.8 (column
a) shows that controlling for capital and labor inputs, a 1% increase in intermediate input quantity
is associated with a 0.34% increase in the real output of the customer industry. What is more, a 1%
increase in the number of suppliers is associated with another 0.035% increase in the real output
even when input quantity is already controlled for.8 Remember that a 1% increase in intermediate
input quantity is associated with a 0.3% increase in the number of suppliers. Thus, a 1% increase in
customer industry’s intermediate input quantity is associated with an extra 0.031% output increase
due to extensive margin adjustments. In Section 1.4, I show that the industry-level productivity gain
is further amplified when industry shocks transmit in the production network and generates large
aggregate fluctuations.
Column (b) replaces the weighted number of suppliers with an unweighted total number, and the
weighted input quantity with the BEA intermediate input quantity index, respectively. The output
8. There might be reserve causality problem here because a higher output incentivizes a firm to increase the number
of suppliers if it leads to higher sales. This endogeneity problem may lead to an over-estimated output gain of more
suppliers. However, I instrument the log-differenced number of suppliers with its one-period lag and compare the IV
estimates with the OLS estimates. The Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimate of β81 is
consistent.
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Table 1.4: Industries’ / firms’ output and numbers of suppliers
VARIABLES
dlnvind,n,t

(a)
Industry’s Ouptut
0.035***
(0.0168)

dlnvind,unweight,n,t
dlnxvind,n,t

d ln kind,n,t

0.335***
(0.0244)
0.321***
(0.0213)
0.292***
(0.0499)
0.202
(0.130)

0.328***
(0.0516)
0.261*
(0.136)

d ln v f ir m,i,t
d ln xv f ir m,i,t
d ln l f ir m,i,t
d ln k f ir m,i,t
Observations
R2

(c)
Firm’s Real Sales

0.0166*
(0.009)

dlnxvind,BE A,n,t
d ln lind,n,t

(b)
Industry’s Ouptut

210
0.714

210
0.734

0.0305***
(0.008)
0.189***
(0.006)
0.439***
(0.0137)
0.007***
(0.0131)
3,983
0.441

Note: Data are annual from 2003 to 2016. The dependent variables are customer industries’ quantity indexes of
gross output and customer firms’ sales deflated by the GDP deflator, respectively. dlnvind,n,t , dlnvind,unweight,n,t ,
dlnxvind,n,t , dlnxvind,BE A,n,t , d ln lind,n,t , and d ln kind,n,t are log-differenced customer industries’ weighted supplier
numbers, unweighted total supplier numbers, weighted input quantity, BEA input quantity index, number of hours,
and fixed asset quantity, respectively. d ln v f ir m,i,t , d ln xv f ir m,i,t , d ln l f ir m,i,t , and d ln k f ir m,i,t are log-differenced
customer firms’ total number of suppliers, real intermediate input, employment, and capital stock, respectively. Firm-level
variables are deflated by their corresponding NAICS industry-level price indexes. Industry and firm fixed effects are
controlled in columns (a) and (b), respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

gain of a 1% increase in supplier numbers becomes smaller and less significant at 0.017%, which
is less than half of the weighted counterpart in column (a). Comparing column (b) to column (a),
I argue that ignoring the production network leads to an under-estimate of the productivity gain of
more suppliers. In column (c), a similar output gain of more suppliers is found on the firm level.
Controlling for the real intermediate input, employment, and capital stock, a 1% increase in customer
firm’s total number of suppliers is associated with a 0.03% increase in its real sales.
To rule out the possibility that the coefficient of supplier number is significant because it proxies
firms’ unobserved productivity, I estimate firms’ production functions using the Olley-Pakes (Olley
and Pakes, 1996) and Levinsohn-Petrin (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) methods. In particular, I
assume that the number of suppliers is decided after observing the productivity shocks. Details of
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Table 1.5: Estimation of firms’ production function

VARIABLES
ln v f ir m,i,t
ln xv f ir m,i,t
ln l f ir m,i,t
ln k f ir m,i,t

(a)
Olley-Pakes with exit
Firm’s Real Sales

(b)
Olley-Pakes without exit
Firm’s Real Sales

(c)
Levinsohn-Petrin with exit
Firm’s Real Sales

0.0878***
(0.0121)
0.259***
(0.0137)
0.593***
(0.0230)
0.111***
(0.0418)

0.0878***
(0.0113)
0.259***
(0.0156)
0.593***
(0.0241)
0.0471
(0.0338)

0.0629***
(0.0105)

0.581***
(0.0211)
0.212***
(0.0326)

Note: Data are annual from 2003 to 2018. The dependent variables are customer firms’ sales deflated by the BEA
NAICS industry-level gross output price index. ln v f ir m,i,t , ln xv f ir m,i,t , ln l f ir m,i,t , and ln k f ir m,i,t are log customer
firms’ total number of suppliers, real intermediate input, employment, and capital stock, respectively. Firm-level variables
are deflated by their corresponding BEA NAICS industry-level price indexes. Year fixed effects and four-digit NAICS
industry-level dummies are controlled. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.

the methods I use are described in Appendix A.4.
Column (a) of Table 1.5 shows the results of production function estimation using Olley-Pake
with firms’ exit considered. The coefficient of firms’ supplier numbers is larger than in the OLS
estimation. A 1% increase in a firm’s total number of suppliers is associated with a 0.09% increase
in its real sales. Column (b) ignores firms’ exits, and the coefficient value of supplier numbers does
not change. In column (c), the Levinsohn-Petrin method is used with firms’ exit considered. The
coefficient of firms’ supplier numbers is also larger than in the OLS estimation. A 1% increase in a
firm’s total number of suppliers is associated with a 0.06% increase in its real sales. Thus, I conclude
that there is a productivity benefit of sourcing from more suppliers.
I argue that the output gain of more suppliers is most likely a productivity gain due to the return
to variety in production. There are alternative motivations behind extensive margin adjustments,
e.g., capacity constraint, risk control, and increasing competition among suppliers. However, in
Appendix B, I argue that these incentives may exist, but are not consistent with the evidence in the
data.
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1.2.4

Extensive margin adjustments and supply chain management costs

In Section 2.3, I show that a larger number of suppliers increases output due to the return to variety,
which is the benefit of extensive margin adjustments. In this section, I study the cost of such
adjustments by estimating the following equations:
d3 ln(vind,n,t ) = β12 d3 ln(purch_empind,n,t ) + 12,n,t
d3 ln(purch_empind,n,t ) = β131 d3 ln(vind,n,t ) + β132 d3 ln(pxvind,n,t ) + 13,n,t

(1.10)

(1.11)

where d3.xt = xt − xt−3 for any variable x. purch_empind,n,t is industry n’s employment of purchasing agents.
As mentioned in Appendix A.2, the OES survey data is collected over a three-year cycle, and
employment estimates for any year include employment information in the past two and a half years.
Thus, I use third-order differenced variables in regressions.
Table 1.6: Supplier number and employment of purchasing agents

VARIABLES
purch_empind,n,t

(a)
Total Supplier No.
0.272***
(0.0946)

vind,n,t
pxvind,n,t
R2
Observations

0.048
165

(b)
Purchasing Agents Emp.

0.220***
(0.0684)
-0.259*
(0.143)
0.073
165

Note: Data are annual from 2003 to 2016. The dependent variables are an industry’s number of suppliers and employment
of purchasing agents, respectively. vind,n,t is the industry’s total number of suppliers, pxvind,n,t is the total intermediate
input expenditures. All variables are log and third-order differenced. Input expenditures are deflated using the GDP
deflator. Industry fixed effects are controlled. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Fact 3. A 1% increase in a customer industry’s supply chain management cost is associated
with a 0.27% increase in its number of suppliers.
Fact 3 is a direct observation of the regression results of 1.10 and 1.11 in Table 1.6. Column (a)
shows that a 1% increase in a customer industry’s employment of purchasing agents, the proxy for
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supply chain management cost, is associated with a 0.27% increase in its total number of suppliers.
On the other hand, column (b) shows that the management cost is negatively and insignificantly
correlated with the extensive margin adjustment. Columns (a) and (b) indicate that the supply chain
management cost is positively correlated with the extensive margin but not the intensive margin
adjustment. These observations motivate me to assume a fixed cost of managing suppliers in the
model.

1.3

A model with extensive margin adjustments

In this section, I present a real business model with adjustments in the number of input varieties (the
extensive margin). I illustrate how the extensive margin adjustments amplify productivity shocks
and the aggregate fluctuations in real GDP. In this economy, there are two types of agents, the firms
(producers) and households. First, I describe the problems of producers and households. Then, I
describe the timing of the model and define the equilibrium. Finally, I solve the model and illustrate
how extensive margin adjustments amplify aggregate fluctuations.

1.3.1

Firm producers and the number of input varieties

On the production side, there is a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms with a unit measure.
Each firm produces a unique and differentiated variety i. A firm produces gross output q with
production labor l and management labor lmng supplied by the household, and composite intermediate input X composed of inputs from other firms. The management labor lmng is used by firms
to manage suppliers. The output of a firm is used for consumption as well as intermediate inputs.
Thus, a firm is both a customer and a supplier of intermediate inputs.
The production function of firm i is
qi = Z Xiα li1−α,

(1.12)

where Z is the productivity shared by all firms in the economy. Long-run intermediate input and
labor cost shares are equal to α and 1 − α, respectively.
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The composite intermediate input Xi is a CES aggregator of inputs from other firms,

Xi =

∫
m∈Vi

ϕ

vi xi (m)

γ−1
γ

γ
! γ−1

dm

,

(1.13)

where xi (m) is the input quantity that firm i sources from firm m, which is defined as the intensive
margin. Vi ⊆ [0,1] is the set of input varieties used by firm i, which is defined as the extensive
margin. Denote the number of varieties in Vi by vi . The elasticity of substitution between different
varieties is γ and γ > 1.
With the extensive margin, the productivity of a firm depends on the overall productivity, as
well as how many input varieties it uses. The productivity gain of more input varieties arises when
differentiated inputs in set Vi are combined. I follow Ethier (1982) to use this production technology.
In particular, I use ϕ to control the extent of this return to input variety in production. The return to
variety exists in a standard CES aggregator where the extensive margin Vi is endogenous and ϕ = 0.
On the other hand, when ϕ = −1/γ, the return to variety is zero. I assume ϕ > −1/γ in this paper due
to the documented return to variety in Fact 2. This return to input variety in production may arise
from the “exploitation of the division of labor,” as argued by Ethier (1982), or from an improved
quality when more input varieties are combined.
To maintain the sourcing relationship with each variety/supplier, a customer firm must employ
one unit of management labor lmng , the wage of which is wmng . In particular, I assume management
and production labor markets are segmented. This assumption is based on the observation from the
OES data that purchasing agents’ wages are significantly higher than the average across all industries.
Under the timing assumption 2, this management cost is a fixed cost decided before choosing
intermediate input quantity. A monopolistic competitive firm i in industry n solves the following
profit maximization problem
πi = max (pi − mci )qi (pi ) − wmng vi
pi ,li ,Vi
{xi (m)} m

(1.14)

where qi (pi ) is firm i’s demand given price pi . Under the monopolistically competitive assumption
−γ

of Assumption 2, qi = pi D̃i . D̃i , is a function of aggregate consumption, intermediate inputs, and
their prices, and its form under the random selection assumption of Assumption 3, D̃, is given in
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Appendix A.3. The firm sets its output price pi . It is worth notice that the number of varieties used,
vi is determined when the set of varieties used, Vi is determined. The marginal cost of production
mci is derived by solving the cost minimization problem
∫

pm xi (m)dm + wli + wmng vi

min

li ,Vi
{xi (m)} m

m∈Vi

Z Xiα li1−α ≥ qi ,

s.t.

(1.15)

where wt is the wage of production labor.
Assumption 1. A firm takes as given the prices and quantities chosen by other firms, as well as the
wages of both production and management labor in the economy.
Under Assumption 1, given the input variety choices Vi , the marginal cost of firm i is
mci = Z −1

∫

ϕγ 1−γ

Vi

vi pm dm

α
 1−γ

w 1−α · α−α (1 − α)α−1 .

(1.16)

Equation 1.16 shows that firm i’s marginal cost depends on not only the prices of the inputs but
also the number of input varieties it uses. Using more input varieties increases the productivity and
lows the marginal cost.

1.3.2

Households

On the household side, there is a representative household who consumes an aggregate consumption
good composed of goods produced by all firms. The representative household incurs only disutility
from supplying management labor, and her problem is:9

max

c,L mng , L

s.t.



η
log C − Lmng
∫

1

P C =wL +
πi di + wmng Lmng
0
γ
 ∫ 1 γ−1  γ−1
γ
C=
ci di
C

(1.17)

0

9. I assume that consumption and composite intermediate input goods share the same elasticity of substitution when
aggregating different varieties. Under Assumption 2, γ does not matter for consumption because all varieties are used
the same quantity.
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where the price of the aggregate consumption good is
P =
C

∫

1

1−γ

pi

di

1
 1−γ

(1.18)

0

I further assume total production labor supply is fixed and L = L̄ = 1. Prices are normalized so
that the wage of production labor w = 1. Denote the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s budget
constraint as λ. λ =

η(γ−1)(1−α)
η(γ−αγ+α)−(1+ϕγ)α

is a constant, which is pinned down by w = 1.

Here I use a Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman preference for consumption and management labor. In this model, the total wage income is equal to the fixed total expenditure on consumption.
As a result, households will not adjust the supply of overall management labors if I use the log
and additively separable utility function. To make the extensive margin adjust, I must provide
the representative household with incentives to adjust the overall management labor supply. With
Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman utility, management labor is paid in units of the aggregate consumption. As a result, even though the consumption expenditure stays fixed, overall management
labor supply fluctuates with the price of aggregate consumption.

1.3.3

Timing assumption and the equilibrium

With the problems of different agents introduced above, I describe the timing assumption and the
equilibrium definition in this section.
Assumption 2. (Timing) In each period t, there are two stages:
Stage 1: Given expected prices, each customer firm i selects the input varieties to use Vi (thus
the number of input varieties vi ). And the supply chain forms.
Stage 2: Given the supply chain, firms in Vi compete monopolistically and post prices. Customer
firm i chooses input quantity {xi (m)}m according to the monopolistic competitive demand schedules
and produce. The household supplies labor and consumes, and goods and labor markets clear.
Assumption 2 indicates that customer firms choose input varieties before they decide input
quantity used from each variety. As a result, the supply chain management cost is a fixed cost. I use
a fixed cost form because in Section 1.2.4, I show that supply chain management costs are positively
correlated with the number of input suppliers but not input expenditures. Under Assumption 2 (and
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Assumption 3 to avoid hold-up problems), firms’ prices are constant markups over the marginal
costs, i.e.,

pi =

γ
mci
γ −1

∀ i.

(1.19)

Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a competitive equilibrium can be defined as follows

Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is composed of firms’ output prices pi i , consumption
good price PC , and the wages of production and management labors w and wmng ; allocations



C, L, Lmng , xi (m) i,m , and Vi ,ci ,li ,qi i such that:

1. Given consumption good price and wages, C, L, Lmng solve the representative household’s
problem in equation 1.17.
2.


Given other firms’ prices and the wages, xi (m)

i,m


, and Vi ,ci ,li ,qi

i

and pi solve firm’s

problem in equation 1.15 ∀ i.
3. The market of each firm’s goods clears, i.e., ∀ i, qi = ci +
∫1
4. Production labor market clears, i.e., L = 0 li di.

∫1
0

5. Supply chain management labor markets clear, i.e., Lmng =

1{i ∈ Vm }xm (i)dm.
∫1
0

vi di.

In this paper, the extensive margin I focus on is the number of input varieties. Thus, I study
the equilibrium where all firms are symmetric, i.e., they choose the same input quantities, number
of input varieties, and labor, and post the same price. The following assumption guarantees the
existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium.
Assumption 3. In stage 1: each customer firm i randomly selects input varieties from all firms.

Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium which satisfies
equilibrium definition 1, and all firms behave symmetrically such that,
1. Firms choose the same input quantity and number of varieties, price, and production and
management labor, i.e., xi (m) = x ∀ i,m ∈ Vi and vi = v, pi = p, li = l ∀ i.
2.

The consumption good producer uses the same quantity of goods from each firm, i.e.,

ci = c ∀ i.
Proposition 1 defines an equilibrium where firms are symmetric. From now on, any equilibrium
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in this section refers to this symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the extensive margin
degenerates from the set of input varieties V to the number of input varieties v.

1.3.4

Extensive margin adjustments and aggregate fluctuations

Before I discuss the relationship between extensive margin adjustments and aggregate fluctuations,
the following proposition helps understand how the extensive margin adjusts.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, ∀n,s ∈ S and in the (symmetric) equilibrium, the number
of input varieties used satisfies
1 + ϕγ
pxv = PC ηv η .
γ −1

(1.20)

Proposition 2 shows that the number of input varieties used by each firm increases with its
input expenditure. This positive co-movement between input expenditure and the number of input
varieties echoes the positive correlation in Fact 1. The following optimality conditions with respect
to firms’ input variety and quantity choices help to understand this co-movement.

x:
v:

px =

(1 + ϕ)αpqX −1 v

(1+ϕ)γ
γ −1
αpqX −1 v γ−1 x,
γ
(1+ϕ)γ
γ−1 −1

x − px = wmng .

(1.21)
(1.22)

Further more, the optimality condition of the representative household with respect to the
management labor supply yields
PC ηv η−1 = wmng .

(1.23)

In equilibrium, Lmng = v. As a result, equations 1.21 to 1.23 combine to prove proposition 3.
The left and right-hand sides of equation 1.22 are the return and cost of input varieties, respectively. The marginal return to variety is

1+ϕγ
γ−1 px,

which is the increase in sales due to an additional

variety given the same intermediate input expenditure. PC ηv η−1 is the marginal (management) cost
of variety.

1+ϕγ
γ−1

controls the size of the return to variety and px equals to marginal productivity

of each variety. The marginal return to variety can be understood by studying equation 1.22. The
left-hand side of equation 1.22 shows the marginal return to variety, which is the difference between
the output gain from an additional variety and the expenditure on this variety. The expenditure on
the variety is equal to the marginal productivity of a current variety according to equation 1.21.
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The output gain from an additional variety is higher than the marginal productivity of a current
variety, even though they are symmetric. This difference is due to the productivity gain of more
input varieties and is equal to

1+ϕγ
γ−1 px.

With the above proposition showing how the extensive margin adjusts, the following proposition
illustrates how it enters the aggregate output Q = q and the GDP.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 to 3 and in the (symmetric) equilibrium, the aggregate output
and consumption in the economy, Q = q and C can be represented as functions of only the productivity
Z,
1

Q =Z

1−α−α

1+ϕγ
η(γ−1)

· constantq ,

(1.24)

1

1+ϕγ
γ − 1  1−α−α η(γ−1)
C = 1−α
Z
· constantq ,
γ

where constantq =



1+ϕγ
α η(γ−1)

1+ϕγ 
 α η(γ−1)

γ−1
γ α

α

!

(1.25)

1
1−α−α

1+ϕγ
η(γ−1)

.

In this economy without investment, aggregate consumption is the GDP. Equation 1.24 shows
that without extensive margin adjustments (i.e., ϕ = −1/γ or η → ∞), a one percent increase in the
productivity boosts aggregate output and the GDP by

1
1−α

percents. The industry productivity shock

is amplified here through intermediate inputs. Higher productivity lowers its marginal cost not only
directly but also indirectly through a lower intermediate input price, which equals the output price.
With extensive margin adjustments, the productivity shock is further amplified. This additional
1+ϕγ
amplification enters the aggregate output Q as −α η(γ−1)
in the denominator. The size of the

amplification effect is mainly determined by the ratio between the parameters governing the return
to variety

1+ϕγ
γ−1

and the marginal cost of input varieties η. There is an α here because the extensive

margin takes effect through the intermediate input price. Although both amplification effects appear
in the denominator, the reasons behind them are different. In response to a positive productivity
shock, the expansion in input varieties increases the productivity of the producer, lowers its marginal
cost and price, and increases its sales. A rising sales, in turn, leads to even larger extensive margin
adjustments and a further increase in productivity. This positive feedback is the reason why the
amplification effect of extensive margin adjustments enters the output Q in the denominator.
Because the GDP is a constant share of the aggregate output, I conclude that the aggregate
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fluctuations of the GDP due to fluctuations in the productivity are amplified by extensive margin
adjustments.

1.4

A multi-industry model with EMAs and production networks

In this section, I present a multi-industry real business model with adjustments in the number of input
varieties (extensive margin). I introduce multiple industries and a production network into the model
for two reasons: First, I show in Sections 1.4.4 to 1.4.6 that the structure of the production network
affects the amplification effect of EMAs on aggregate fluctuations; Second, the multi-industry model
provides industry-level variations to match the observed data for the estimation of key parameters in
Sections 1.5 and 1.6. As a result, the quantitative effects of EMAs in these two sections rely on the
multi-industry framework.
In this economy, there are three types of agents, the firms (producers), the households, and the
capital and consumption goods producers. First, I describe the problem of the producers, who choose
the number of input varieties. Second, I introduce the problems of the households and capital and
consumption goods producers. Third, I describe the timing of the model and define the equilibrium.
Finally, I use the optimality condition with respect to input variety numbers to discuss the trade-off
between the benefit and the cost of extensive margin adjustments.

1.4.1

Firm producers and the number of input varieties

On the production side, there are N industries in the economy. Each industry has a continuum of
monopolistic competitive firms with a unit measure. Firm i in industry n produces a unique and
differentiated variety (n,i). Denote the set of industries by S = {1,2,..., N }. The input-output linkages
among industries form a production network.
A firm produces gross output q with capital k rented from the household, production labor l and
management labor {lmng,n }n supplied by the household, and composite intermediate input X composed of inputs from different firms. The management labor is industry-specific and labeled lmng,n
for industry-n firms. The output of a firm is used for consumption, investment, and intermediate
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inputs. The production function of firm i in industry n at time t is
α

α

x,n
k,n
qn,i,t = Zn,t Xn,i,t
k n,i,t
ln,i,tx , n

1−α

−αk , n

(1.26)

where Zn,t is the industry-specific productivity shared by all firms in industry n. Long-run capital
and intermediate input cost shares are industry-specific, and equal to αk,n and αx,n for each industry
n, respectively. Long-run labor cost share is 1 − αk,n − αx,n .
The composite intermediate input Xn,i,t is produced using inputs from firms in all industrys.
And the extensive margin enters the model only through the composite intermediate input. The
aggregation of different inputs follows a nested Dixit-Stiglitz form:
"
Xn,i,t =

Õ
s ∈S

∫

ωns

γ s −1
ϕs
vn,i,s,t
xn,i,s,t (m) γ s dm

x −1) #  x
! γ(γs (−1)
 −1
s

x

x

(1.27)

m∈Vn, i , s , t

where xn,i,s,t (m) is the input quantity that firm i in industry n sources from firm m in industry s, or
the intensive margin. Vn,i,s,t ⊆ [0,1] is the set of industry s varieties that firm i in industry n uses,
or the extensive margin. Denote the number of varieties in Vn,i,s,t by vn,i,s,t . The parameter x
is the elasticity of substitution between different industries’ goods in the production of composite
intermediate inputs. Within each industry s, the elasticity of substitution between different varieties
is γs and γs > 1. The parameter ωns indicates the importance of industry s good in the production
of the composite intermediate input of firms in industry n. The parameter which governs the
extent of return to variety, ϕs , is industry-specific. As in Section 1.3.1, I assume ϕs > −1/γs due
to the documented Fact 2. I also assume the markets of different industries’ management labors
are segmented because the OES data shows a large dispersion in purchasing agents’ wages across
industries. As a result, the wage of the management labor is industry-specific and equals wmng,n,t
for industry n.
Denote x ∗ the value of any variable x when the model is evaluated at the point where the industry
productivities are set equal to 1. In the estimation and simulation of Sections 1.5 and 1.6, I use
"
Xn,i,t =

Õ
s ∈S

ωns

∫
m∈Vn, i , s , t

 
 γ s −1
n,i,s,t ϕ s xn,i,s,t (m) γ s
dm
∗
∗
vn,i,s
xn,i,s
(m)

v
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x −1) #  x
! γ(γs (−1)
 −1
s

x

x

(1.28)

so that {ωns }n,s are the long-run shares of industry s goods in the intermediate input of industry n
Í
firms, and s ∈S ωns = 1 ∀n ∈ S.
Under the timing assumption 4, a monopolistic competitive firm i in industry n solves the
following profit maximization problem
πn,i,t =

max

pn, i , t ,k n, i , t ,ln,i , t ,Vn, i , s , t
{x n, i , s , t (m)} s , m

(pn,i,t − mcn,i,t )qn,i,t (pn,i,t ) − wmng,n,t

Õ

vn,i,s,t

(1.29)

s

where qn,i,t (pn,i,t ) is firm ni’s demand given price pn,i,t . Under the monopolistically competitive
−γ

n
assumption of Assumption 4, qn,i,t = pn,i,t
D̃n,i,t , where D̃n,i,t , is a function of aggregate consump-

tion, intermediate inputs, and their prices, and its form under the random selection assumption of
Assumption 5, D̃n,t , is given in Appendix A.3. The firm sets its output price pn,i,t . The marginal
cost of production mcn,i,t is derived by solving the cost minimization problem
Õ∫

min

k n, i , t ,ln, i , t
s ∈S
Vn, i , s , t
{x n,i , s , t (m)} s , m

m∈Vn, i , s , t

α

α

x,n
k,n
Zn,t Xn,i,t
k n,i,t
ln,i,tx , n

s.t.

1−α

ps,m,t xn,i,s,t (m)dm + (rt + δn )PtK k n,i,t + wt ln,i,t + wmng,n,t

Õ

vn,i,s,t

s

−αk , n

≥ qn,i,t ,

(1.30)

where rt is the net capital rental rate. δn is the industry-specific capital depreciation rate of industry
n, and wt is the wage of production labor. A firm in industry n rents capital at rate rt + δn from the
household. And the (net) capital rental rate the household charges is rt .
Under Assumption 1, given the input variety choices {Vn,i,s,t }n,i,s,t , the marginal cost of firm i
in industry n is
"
−1
mcn,i,t = Zn,t

Õ

x
ωns

s ∈S

∫
Vn, i , s , t

ϕ s γs
1−γ
vn,i,s,t
ps,m,ts dm

x
 1−
1−γ

s

x,n
# α1−
x

(rt + δn )PtK

 αk , n

1−αx , n −αk , n

wt

cstmc ,

(1.31)

−α

where cstmc,n = αx,nx , n αk,nk , n (1 − αx,n − αk,n )αx , n +αk , n −1 .
−α

1.4.2

Consumption and capital good producers, and the household

The above section introduces firm producers. In this section, I first describe the production of
consumption and capital goods. In the economy, there are a continuum of identical and perfectly
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competitive consumption good producers and a continuum of identical and perfectly competitive
capital good producers, both with unit measure. The cost minimization problems of the representative
consumption good producer and the representative capital good producer are
Õ∫

min

{cs ,i , t } s , i

s.t.

∫

ξsC

{k s ,i , t } s , i

"
Õ

s.t.

ξsK

1

! γγ s−1  c −1 #   c−1

γ s −1
γs

s

c

c

≥ CtP ,

cs,i,t di

(1.32)

0

s ∈S

min

ps,i,t cs,i,t di

s ∈S 0

"
Õ

1

Õ∫

1

P
ps,i,t k s,i,t
di

s ∈S 0

∫

1

P
k s,i,t

 γγs −1
s

! γγ s−1  k −1 #   k−1
s

k

k

≥ KtP ,

di

(1.33)

0

s ∈S

P
where cs,i,t and k s,i,t
are the quantity of goods that the consumption and capital producer use from

firm i in industry s at t, respectively. CtP and KtP are the consumption and capital goods produced,
respectively. Unlike the composite intermediate input, the consumption/capital good producer uses
all input varieties i ∈ [0,1] in each industry. The parameter c and k are the elasticities of substitution
between different industries’ goods in the production of consumption and capital goods, respectively.
The composite intermediate input, the consumption good, and the capital good have the same withinindustry elasticity of substitution γs for inputs from industry s. The parameters ξsC and ξsK indicate
the importances of industry s good in the production of the consumption and the capital goods,
respectively. In the estimation and simulation of Sections 1.5 and 1.6, I use
"
Õ

CtP =

ξsC

"
KtP

=

s ∈S

ξsK

∫
0

! γγ s−1  c −1 #   c−1

1

cs,i,t  γγs −1
s di
∗
cs,i

1

k s,i,t  γγs −1
s di
∗
k s,i

0

s ∈S

Õ

∫

s

c

c

,
! γγ s−1  k −1 #   k−1
s

k

k

,

(1.34)

so that {ξsC }s and {ξsK }s are the long-run shares of different industries’ goods in the production of
Í
Í
the consumption and the capital goods, and s ∈S ξsC = 1, s ∈S ξsK = 1.
On the consumer side, a representative household chooses the consumption C, production labor
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supply L, management labor supply {Lmng,n }n , and the capital stock K in the economy.
!
Lt (st )1+ L Õ η
t
max
E
β log Ct (s ) − ψ
−
Lmng,n,t (s )
1 + L
Ct (s t ),Kt +1 (s t ),Lt (s t )
n∈S
t=0


PtC (st )Ct (st ) + PtK (st ) Kt+1 (st ) − Kt (st ) ≤ wt (st )Lt (st ) + rt (st )PtK (st )Kt (st )
Õ
Õ∫ 1
t
t
+
wmng,n,t (s )Lmng,n,t (s ) +
πn,i,t (st )di ∀t and st .
∞
Õ

s.t.

t

t



(1.35)

n∈S 0

n∈S

The entire economy is faced with industry productivity shocks and st denotes the stochastic state of
the economy. Consumption and capital goods are purchased from their producers with prices PtC
and PtK , and
"
PtC

Õ

=


ξsC c

∫

PtK =

Õ


K  k

ξs

∫

c
 1−
1−γ

# 1−1

c

s

,

(1.36)

1

1−γ
ps,i,ts di

1− k
 1−γ

# 1−1

k

s

.

(1.37)

0

s ∈S

1.4.3

1−γ
ps,i,ts di

0

s ∈S

"

1

Timing assumption and the equilibrium

The following assumption is a multi-industry version of Assumption 2. With this timing assumption,
I define the equilibrium of this multi-industry model in this section.
Assumption 4. (Timing) In each period t, there are two stages:
Stage 1: Given expected prices, each customer firm i in industry n selects the input varieties to
use {Vn,i,s,t }s (thus the number of input varieties {vn,i,s,t }s ). And the production network forms.
Stage 2: Given the production network, firms in Vn,i,s compete monopolistically, and post prices.
Customer firm i chooses input quantity {xn,i,s (m)}s,m according to the monopolistic competitive
demand schedules. Households, consumption producers, and capital producers make decisions and
markets clear.
Under Assumption 4 (and Assumption 5 to avoid hold-up problems), firms’ prices are constant
markups over the marginal costs, i.e.,

pn,i,t =

γn
mcn,i,t ,
γn − 1
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(1.38)

and the markups are industry-specific.
My paper share the same findings with Baqaee and Farhi (2019) and Pasten, Schoenle, and Weber
(2019) that in frictional economies, sales are not a sufficient statistic for the industry’s contribution to
aggregate fluctuations as the Hulten’s theorem states (Hulten, 1978). In addition to the monopolistic
competition in their papers, costly extensive margin adjustments are another friction which breaks
the Hulten’s theorem in my model.
Under Assumptions 1 and 4, a competitive equilibrium resembling Definition 1 is presented in
Appendix C.1. Similar to Section 1.3, I study the equilibrium where all firms within an industry are
symmetric, i.e., they choose the same input quantities, number of input varieties, labor and capital
inputs, and post the same price. The following assumption guarantees the existence and uniqueness
of such an equilibrium.
Assumption 5. In stage 1: each customer firm i in industry n randomly selects input varieties from
an industry s, ∀s.

Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5, there is a symmetric equilibrium which satisfies
equilibrium definition 1, and all firms within an industry behave symmetrically such that ∀ t and st ,
1. Firms within an industry choose the same input quantity and number of varieties, price, production and management labor, and capital input, i.e., xn,i,s,t (m)(st ) = xns,t (st ) ∀n, i, s & m ∈ Vn,i,s,t ;
and vn,i,s,t (st ) = vns,t (st ) ∀n & i; pn,i,t (st ) = pn,t (st ), ln,i,t (st ) = ln,t (st ), k n,i,t (st ) = k n,t (st ) ∀n and i.
2. The consumption good producer uses the same quantity of goods from each firm in an industry
P (s t ) = k P (s t ) ∀n and i.
n, so does the capital good producer, i.e., cn,i,t (st ) = cn,t (st ), k n,i,t
n,t

Proposition 4 defines an equilibrium where firms within each industry are symmetric. From
now on, any equilibrium of the multi-industry model refers to this symmetric equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, the extensive margin degenerates from the set of input varieties {Vns,t }n,s,t to the
number of input varieties {vns,t }n,s,t .
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5 and in the (symmetric) equilibrium, and normalize
the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint in household’s problem 1.35 to be βt in each
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period t. ∀n,s ∈ S, the number of input varieties used satisfies
Õ
 η−1
1 + ϕs γs
ps,t xns,t vns,t = η
vns,t
vns,t .
γs − 1
s

(1.39)

Similar to Proposition 3, Proposition 5 shows that the number of input varieties industry n uses
from industry s increases with industry n’s input expenditure on industry s, which echoes the positive
correlation of industry-level evidence in Fact 1.

1.4.4

EMAs and aggregate fluctuations in a simplified multi-industry model

The above sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.3 describe a full multi-sector model for estimation and computation in
Sections 1.5 and 1.6. In the next sections 1.4.4 to 1.4.6, I use a simplified model to illustrate the role
of the production network in the effects of extensive margin adjustments on aggregate fluctuations.
This simplified model is a multi-industry version of the “one-sector” model in Section 1.3. In
each industry, there is only one representative firm producing a continuum of differentiated varieties
with a unit measure. Varieties within an industry are assumed to be symmetric like in Proposition 4.
I assume that the representative firm of industry n chooses price pn as if it is faced with monopolistic
competition. The resulting “markup” over marginal cost is γ/(γ − 1). Firms use intermediate inputs
and labor to produce and do not use capital to produce. It follows that the simplified model is static.
The industry n representative firm chooses the number of varieties vns from each industry s, as well
as the input quantity xns to use from each of these varieties. vns and xns are still the extensive
and intensive margins as in the full model, respectively. There are still the return to input varieties
Í
controlled by {ϕs }s and the supply chain management cost wmng,n vns .
s

I follow the Section 1.3 model to use a Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman preference here for a
similar reason, i.e., to allow the overall management labor supply to fluctuate with the price of
aggregate consumption even when with constant consumption expenditure. Details of the model are
described in Appendix C.2.
Using the simplified model, I start the analysis of the role of production networks with the
following lemma to illustrate how extensive margin adjustments affect the prices of the composite
intermediate inputs, {Φn }n .
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Lemma 1. The percentage deviation of industry n’s composite intermediate input price from the
steady state can be represented as
Φ̂n =

Õ
s

1
Mn
C
ω
ens p̂s −
p
n qn − P̂
1 − x 1 − Mn
|{z}
|
{z
}
Reshu f f le

(1.40)

Ampli f ication

where

Í

ens
sω

= 1 and


ω
ens =

ωns 1 −

1 − Mn

Mn =

Õ
s

and Bn =

Í ωns (1+ϕs γ)
s

γ−1

, An = 1 + η−1
Bn

(1+ϕ s γ) (1− x )−(η−1)Mn /B n
(γ−1)+(1+ϕ s γ)(1− x )

Í
s

ωns

> 0,

1 + (1+ϕsγ−1
γ)(1− x ) An


,

(1.41)
(1.42)

ω ns (1+ϕ s γ)
(γ−1)+(1+ϕ s γ)(1− x ) .

Lemma 1 shows that extensive margin adjustments have two effects on the composite intermediate
input price in a production network, the amplification and the reshuffle effects. First, extensive margin
adjustments amplify industry productivity shocks through the changes in sales, which can be seen
in equation 1.40 with 0 < Mn < 1. The intuition is as follows. A positive productivity shock to
an industry transmits in the production network and lowers the marginal costs and prices of most
industries. As a result, the household demands more of these industry goods, which increases their
sales as well as intermediate input expenditures. These industries, in turn, use more input varieties
due to a rising return to variety, which moves up along the increasing marginal (management) cost
curve. Because an expansion in input varieties makes the customer industries more productive, their
composite intermediate input prices decrease.
In addition to the amplification effect, extensive margin adjustments also have a reshuffle effect
in the production network. Following a positive productivity shock to industry s, its price decreases,
and customer industries spend less on inputs from industry s because the elasticity of substitution
x < 1. As a result, customer industries use more input varieties from other industries relative to
industry s. Due to the return to variety, extensive margin adjustments reduce the productivity of
inputs from industry s relative to other industries. Thus, extensive margin adjustments essentially
reshuffle the effects of different supplier industries’ productivity shocks on the prices of customer
industries. This reshuffle effect is reflected in the transformation of the intermediate input weight
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matrix from {ωns }n,s into {ω
ens }n,s .
Lemma 1 shows how extensive margin adjustments affect the intermediate input prices {Φn }n
in the production network. The following proposition further illustrates how the adjustments affect
aggregate fluctuations.
Proposition 6. The impact of industry k’s productivity on the real GDP is


 −1
0
d ln(C)
e
= T(ξ C ) I − α
Ω
|{z}
d ln(Zk )
Reshu f f le

 e d ln(p1 q1 ) 
 M1 d ln(Z ) 
k



!
d
ln(p
q
)
2
2
 M

e
 2 d ln(Zk ) 
ek + α 
 ,
..


.






eN d ln(p N q N ) 
M
d
ln(Z
)
k


|
{z
}

(1.43)

Ampli f ication


  −1
 
Mn
1
C 0 e
C )0 I −α Ω
e = {ω
e −1 M
e1, M
e2,..., M
eN 0 ,
∀n,
Ω
e
}
,
T
=
I
−α(ξ
where ξ C = [ξ1C ,ξ2C ,...,ξ N
] , Mn = 1−
ns
ns
1−Mn
and ek is a N × 1 column vector with k-th entry equal to 1 and other entries equal to 0. I is an
identity matrix of dimension N × N.
Proposition 6 shows that extensive margin adjustments affect real GDP also through the amÍ e d ln(pn qn )
plification and the reshuffle effects. The amplification effect appears as α l M
n d ln(Zk ) , and is
positive for most industries n. A positive productivity shock to industry k increases the sales of most
industries n, and thus positive

d ln(pn qn )
d ln(Zk ) .

en > 0, extensive margin adjustments add to the
Given that M

rise in real GDP in response to the positive shock. As a result, with extensive margin adjustments,
industry productivity shocks generate larger aggregate fluctuations than without the adjustments.

e −1 , which is a generalThe reshuffle effect, on the other hand, works through the matrix I − αΩ
ized version of the Leontief inverse mentioned in Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2012). This generalization allows for monopolistic competition, non-unit elasticity of substitution,
and extensive margin adjustments. It captures how an industry productivity shock affects the real
GDP directly by changing the price of the shocked industry and indirectly through the propagation to
other industries. Notice that when the return to variety in an industry s is large (i.e., large ϕs ) compared to other industries, there are larger extensive margin adjustments in this industry than in others.
Í
Í
Then, ω
ens > ωns and s0 ,s ω
ens0 < s0 ,s ωns0 . This indicates that the effect of the productivity shock
to industry s is reshuffled to other supplier industries by extensive margin adjustments.
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When the disutility of management labor supply is infinitely large, i.e., η → ∞, or the return to
e = Ω and M
en = 0 ∀ n. In this case, both the amplification and reshuffle
variety is zero (ϕ = −1/γ), Ω
effects disappear.

1.4.5

A simple illustration of the role of production networks

In the above section, I discuss the mechanism of the amplification effect. In this section, I further
use a simple example to illustrate how extensive margin adjustments and the amplification effect
depend on the structure of the production network. To illustrate the role of the production network,
I compare a horizontal economy with a vertical one.
(a) Horizontal

(b) Vertical

Figure 1.2: Horizontal vs. vertical economies
Note: Panels (a) and (b) plot a horizontal and a vertical economy, respectively. In both economies, the household (HH)
consumes only industry 1’s goods. In the horizontal economy, industry 1 uses intermediate inputs from both industries 2
and 3 with equal weights. Industries 2 and 3 use labor to produce. In the vertical economy, industry 1 uses inputs only
from industry 2. And industry 2 uses inputs only from industry 3. Industry 3 uses labor to produce.

Figure 1.2 plots a horizontal (panel 1.2a) and a vertical economy (panel 1.2b). In both economies,
the representative household (HH) only consumes industry 1’s goods. I still assume that wage w = 1,
and labor supply is fixed at 1. Then, the PC C is still a constant.
In the horizontal economy, industry 1 sources half of its intermediate inputs from industry 2 and
the other half from industry 3. Industries 2 and 3 use labor to produce. In the vertical economy,
industry 1 sources all of its intermediate inputs from industry 2, and industry 2 sources all of its
intermediate inputs from industry 3. Industry 3 uses labor to produce.
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d lnC =
d lnC

=


d ln Z2 + d ln Z3
η(γ−1)


1
d ln Z2 + d ln Z3
2

1
1
2 1− 1



1− η(γ−1)

Horizontal

(1.44)

V ertical

(1.45)

Equations 1.44 and 1.45 show the responses of real GDP to industry 2 and 3’s productivity
shocks Z2 and Z3 in the horizontal and vertical economies, respectively. The amplification effects of
1
2
extensive margin adjustments enter the responses of real GDP as η(γ−1)
and η(γ−1)
in the denominator,

respectively. The amplification effect is larger in the vertical economy than in the horizontal one due
to the following reason: In the vertical economy, extensive margin exists in two linkages, one between
industries 1 and 2, and the other between industries 2 and 3; and extensive margin adjustments in
the two linkages are complementary. When industry 1 uses more variety from industry 2, its
productivity increases, and thus the sales. As a result, industry 2’s sales increases due to a higher
input demand from industry 1. In turn, industry 2 sources from more varieties in industry 3 and
becomes more productive. This productivity gain of industry 2 due to more input varieties further
lowers the cost and price of industry 1 and boosts the sales of industry 1. As a result, industry 1 uses
even more varieties from industry 2. This complementarity between extensive margin adjustments
on different linkages along the same supply chain reinforces each other. Consequently, the longer a
supply chain is, the larger the amplification effect of extensive margin adjustments is.10 To be more
precise, the amplification effect depends on the lengths of supply chains adjusted by the density of
the linkages. Industries can be highly connected. However, if the intermediate input flows between
some industries are extremely small, those linkages are as if broken. It follows that the amplification
effects along supply chains with less dense linkages are smaller than those with the same lengths but
denser linkages. With that said, the production network structure is important for the amplification
effect of extensive margin adjustments.
What is also worth notice is that in the vertical economy above, the production network is not
amplifying productivity shocks. A 1% increase in industry 3’s productivity leads to the same 1%
increase in GDP. Without extensive margin adjustments, industry productivity shocks propagate in
10. When industries are defined infinitely fine, the supply chain becomes infinitely long. However, the smaller the
industry is, the fewer input varieties it has, and the less flexible it can adjust the number of input varieties. Thus, the
amplification effect of extensive margin adjustment is still finite.
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the production network by changing the marginal costs and prices of connected industries. In a
vertical economy where only the most downstream industry 1 supplies consumption goods, a shock
to industry 3 affects the marginal cost of industry 1 and thus the price of consumption by the same size
of the shock itself. In contrast, extensive margin adjustments affect the productivity and marginal
costs of industries along the supply chain. Even if the production network does not amplify industry
productivity shocks directly, it affects the extensive margin adjustments triggered by productivity
shocks. As a result, the production network structure still affects aggregate fluctuations indirectly
through extensive margin adjustments. From another angle, industry productivity shocks propagate
in the network from upstream to downstream while the effect of extensive margin adjustments
propagates in the opposite direction, i.e., from downstream to upstream. Thus, the production
network propagates industry productivity shocks and affects extensive margin adjustments in different
ways, although in both ways, it amplifies aggregate fluctuations.

1.4.6

Back-of-the-envelope calculation

Sections 1.4.4 to 1.4.5 show how extensive margin adjustments affect the transmission of industry
productivity shocks in the production network and the aggregate fluctuations. The sizes of these
aggregate effects depend on the sizes of extensive margin adjustments and the return to variety and
the production network structure.
In this section, I use some back-of-the-envelope calculation results to illustrate the roles of
different parameters (including the network structure) in the aggregate effects of extensive margin
adjustments. Compared to the quantitative analysis of the full model in Sections 1.5 and 1.6, this
simple calculation allows me to explicitly separate the amplification effect and the reshuffle effect. It
also allows for a wider range of values for the parameter x because some combinations of parameter
values lead to violation of the Blanchard-Kuhn conditions when simulating the full model with
capital. I also set c = 1 to focus on the substitution in the production network, which is not far from
the 0.8 in the full model. I rely on the parameter values calibrated and estimated in the baseline
model of Sections 1.5 and 1.6. In particular, I use the medians of calibrated γs and αs there as
the values of γ and α in the simplified model, respectively. Then, the labor income share of an
industry in the simplified model is the sum of the labor and capital income shares in the full model.
In the calibration of the full model, the heterogeneity in industry-level returns to variety is purely
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determined by the heterogeneity in industry markups. To maintain the heterogeneity in the returns
to variety in the simplified model in which industries share the same markup, I artificially adjust
the values of {ϕs }s so that the industry-level returns to variety

1+ϕ s γ
γ−1

are the same as those in the

full model. I use the input weight matrix calibrated to the data as in the full model. I also simulate
industry productivities using the persistencies of industry productivities and the covariance matrix
of productivity shocks calibrated in the full model. In the back-of-the-envelope calculation, I ignore
the second-order effects of extensive margin adjustments on prices.
Table 1.7: Standard deviation of real GDP under different model settings and parameter values
(a)
Baseline

(b)
Return to variety ↑

(c)
Substitution ↑

(d)
Artificial network

Parameters
Elasticit y o f substitution
Median return to variet y

0.175
0.224

0.175
0.298

2.0
0.224

0.175
0.240

Results
With E M A
Without
 EMA
With E M A without E M A
Reshu f f le e f f ect onl y

1.077%
0.991%
1.087
0.992%

1.109%
0.991%
1.119
0.993%

1.081%
0.991%
1.090
0.992%

1.044%
0.971%
1.076
0.971%

Note: The table shows the standard deviation of log real GDP. Baseline parameter values are based on the calibration
 1+ϕ γ
and estimation of the baseline full model in Sections 1.5 and 1.6. Median return to variety is the median of γ−1s s .
“With E M A” is the model with extensive margin adjustments; “Without E M A” is the model in which the extensive
margin is fixed in simulation. “With E M A without E M A” is the ratio between the real GDP standard deviations of the
models with and without extensive margin adjustments. “Reshu f f le e f f ect onl y" is the model without the amplification
en = 0 ∀ n. From columns (a) to (d), I compare the baseline model with models with a higher return to variety,
effect, i.e., M
a higher elasticity of substitution across industries, and an artificial economy in which a downstream industry concentrates
99% of its input expenditure on one upstream industry, respectively.

Table 1.7 compares the real GDP standard deviations under different settings or parameter values.
Columns (a) to (d) show the baseline model, the models with a higher return to variety, a higher
elasticity of substitution across industries, and an artificial network, respectively. In the artificial
network, I use the order of Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting, Mining, Utilities, Construction,
Manufacturing, Wholesale trade, Retail trade, Transportation and warehousing, Information, Finance
and insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing, Professional and business services, Educational
services, Health care and social assistance, Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and
food services, and Other services, except government, and Government, where the former of any two
adjacent industries spend 99% of its input expenditures on the latter industry. Government spends
99% of its input expenditures on Agriculture. Other entries in the input weight matrix are adjusted
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vert
such that the input weight matrix of the artificial network, {ωns
0 }ns satisfy
0

Í

vert
v er t ,0.99 ω 0
ω ns
ns

=1∀n

00

vert
vert
vert
vert
and ωns
0 /ω 00 = ωns0 /ωns00 ∀ n,s ,s s.t. ω 0 , 0.99 and ω 00 , 0.99. For each of these settings,
ns
ns
ns

I compare the real GDP standard deviations of models with extensive margin adjustments, with the
extensive margin fixed, and in which the amplification effect is set to zero.
In the baseline setting (column a), the real GDP standard deviation is 1.077% with extensive margin adjustments. Compared to the 1% without extensive margin adjustments, aggregate fluctuations
en = 0 ∀ n, the real
are amplified by the adjustments. If I mute the amplification effect by setting M
GDP standard deviation is 1% and close to that without extensive margin adjustments. Indeed, this
is true for all settings from columns (a) to (d). Thus, I conclude that the reshuffle effect is negligible
for the aggregate, although it matters for co-movements between industries’ outputs. In column

sγ
from 0.224 to 0.298. The standard deviation
(b), I increase the median return to variety 1+ϕ
γ−1
without extensive margin adjustments remains the same because the extensive margin does not move
around. In contrast, the standard deviation of real GDP with extensive margin adjustments increases
to 1.11%. This is because a higher return to variety not only incentivizes larger extensive margin
adjustments but also generates more productivity gain or loss. As a result, aggregate fluctuations
increase with the return to variety. On the other hand, if the elasticity of substitution across industries
increases from 0.175 to 2 as in column (c), the reshuffle effect does not change. The amplification
effect is slightly larger, resulting in a standard deviation of 1.081%. The reason is that the elasticity
of substitution matters for the co-movements between the outputs of different industries, but most of
the output movements of individual industries are offset by each other when aggregated to the real
GDP. Lastly, in an artificial network (column d), the transmission of industry shocks changes, and
the standard deviation of real GDP without extensive margin adjustments becomes 0.97%. More
importantly, the size of the amplification effect of extensive margin adjustments also changes. The
real GDP standard deviation with extensive margin adjustments is now only 1.076 times that without
the adjustments.

1.5

Estimation and simulation results

In this section, I estimate and simulate the full multi-industry model in Section 1.4. First, I introduce
the identification strategy of the key parameters. Second, I display the impulse responses of real GDP
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and industry-level outputs and prices to a Mining’s productivity shock to illustrate how extensive
margin adjustments affect shock transmission and aggregate fluctuations. I also show that EMA
amplifies aggregate fluctuations: The real GDP standard deviation is 1.88% with EMA and 1.51%
without EMA. Third, I show that the return to variety and the curvature of the management cost
function significantly affect the amplification by EMA. Fourth, I show that the amplification effect
of EMA is smaller in production networks with shorter (weighted) supply chains.
I estimate the model according to the indirect inference algorithm introduced in Appendix D.
In the baseline model with extensive margin adjustments, the estimated intermediate input elasticity
of substitution between industries x is 0.175. The curvature of the supply chain management cost
function (i.e., the disutility function of management labor) η is estimated to be 3.71. I also calibrate
AR(1) industry productivity processes during the estimation. I use the second-order perturbation to
simulate the full model with calibrated and estimated parameters (including the industry productivity
processes). The reason for second-order perturbation is to improve the approximation accuracy because the non-linearity generated by a small elasticity of substitution is non-negligible. In particular,
I pruned the approximation to avoid explosive sample paths following Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and
Sims (2008).11 In some of the alternative model settings, I re-estimate the model before simulation.

1.5.1

Identification of key parameters

The key parameters to identify in this model are those governing the return to variety, the curvature of
the supply chain management cost function, and the input elasticity of substitution across industries.
In particular, I estimate key parameters using indirect inference following Gourieroux, Monfort,
and Renault (1993) and Smith Jr. (1993). The detailed indirect inference method is described in
Appendix D. The calibration of other parameters is described in Appendix E.
In the simplified model of Section 1.4, I find extensive margin adjustments amplify the aggregate
fluctuation by almost 50%, and the amplification effect is mainly determined by the ratio between the
parameters governing the return to variety

1+ϕ s γs
γs −1

and the curvature of the supply chain management

cost η. The back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the input elasticity of substitution across
industries x also matters for the amplification effect. As a result, these three key parameters are the
11. For a review of the perturbation and pruning methods, see Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Schorfheide
(2016).
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focus of the identification strategy.
When input expenditures increase, return to variety increases, and firms pay higher management
costs for more input varieties. As a result, I rely on the responses of input supplier numbers to
changes in input expenditures to identify the curvature of the supply chain management cost η, (i.e.,
the curvature of the disutility function of management labor). To implement it, sum up both sides
of equation 1.39 by supplier industry s and take log-difference , we have

d ln

1+ϕ s γs
γs −1
Í 1+ϕs0 γs0
0
s
s γ 0 −1
s

Õ


Õ

vns,t
ps,t xns,t vns,t = ηd ln

(1.46)

s

Equation 1.46 states that in response to a 1% increase in the weighted input expenditures, the total
number of input varieties of the customer industry increases by η1 %. Ideally, the coefficient of the
Í


Í
1+ϕ s γs Í 1+ϕ s 0 γs 0
0
regression of d ln s vns,t on d ln
identifies η. However,
s γs −1 / s γ 0 −1 ps,t xns,t vns,t
s

the weights governed by the return to variety,

s γs
{ 1+ϕ
γs −1 }s

are among the key parameters to be

identified. Thus, the identification of η depends on the identification of the return to varieties. As a
Í


Í
result, I instead regress d ln s vns,t on d ln
p
x
v
to identify η in indirect inference
s,t
ns,t
ns,t
s
estimation. I can do this because indirect inference estimation tolerates the mis-specification of the
regressions in the auxiliary model, the details of which are introduced in Appendix D.
s γs
On the other hand, the identification of the return to variety, { 1+ϕ
γs −1 }s also depends on η. The

intuition behind the identification is that a larger return to variety relative to the marginal management
cost incentivizes firms to use more varieties. In turn, firms pay higher supply chain management
costs and the share of the management costs in the sales is larger. To see this, sum up both sides
of equation 1.39 by supplier industry s and then by customer industry n, divide by total sales in the
economy, reorganize, and focus on the steady state, we have:

Õ
n

p∗ q ∗
Í n∗ n ∗
p 0q 0
0 n n
n

αx (γn − 1) Õ
γn

!

ωns

s

1 + ϕs γs
=
(γs − 1)η

Í Í
n

Í
n

s vns,t

η
(1.47)

p∗n qn∗

The left-hand side of equation 1.47 is the ratio between the return to variety

1+ϕ s γs
γs −1

and man-

agement cost curvature η weighted by intermediate input weight ωns , which is further multiplied
by the steady-state share of each industry’s input expenditures in the economy-wise total sales. The
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right-hand side is the steady-state share of economy-wise supply chain management costs in total
sales, which is observed in the data. To be more specific, APQC12 surveys around 2,000 firms in
America about the share of supply chain management costs in their revenues. The average share of
the costs directly related to managing input suppliers in firms’ revenues is about 3%. I rely on this
number to identify the return to variety. Lacking information on industry-specific return to variety,
I assume ϕs γs = ϕγ. I choose the value of ϕγ. Then ϕs = 1/γs ∀ s and the industry-level returns to
variety are determined by industry-level markups.
The identification of the intermediate input elasticity of substitution across industries follows
Atalay (2017). The response of intermediate input shares to changes in supplier industries’ relative
price identifies the elasticity. To implement it, I rely to the following equation constructed from the
optimality condition with respect to the input quantity,

 p x v
s,t ns,t ns,t
= (1 − x )d ln(ps,t ) − (1 − x )d ln(Φn,t )
d ln Í
ps0 ,t xns0 ,t vns0 ,t
s

0

+

(1 − ϕs γs )(x − 1)
d ln(vns,t ).
(γs − 1)

(1.48)

The extensive margin leads to two deviations from Atalay (2017). First, the composite intermediate
input price Φn,t includes the extensive margin. Second, the extensive margin d ln(vn,s,t ) affects the
supplier industry’s effective productivity as an input, and thus the share of this industry s goods in
the intermediate inputs of the customer industry n. Due to these two deviations, the identification of
x is also affected by the other two key parameters which determine extensive margin adjustments.

1.5.2

Extensive margin adjustments and shock transmission

Figure 1.3 plots the impulse response function of the real GDP in response to a 1% positive
productivity shock to the Mining industry in period t = 1. Productivities of other industries in all
periods are set to their steady-state values. In the baseline model with extensive margin adjustments,
real GDP increases by 0.27% in period t = 1. Without extensive margin adjustments, real GDP still
increases, but only by 0.2%.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 further show how extensive margin adjustments amplify industry produc12. www.apqc.org
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Figure 1.3: IRFs of real GDP to a positive productivity shock to Mining
Notes: Impulse responses are deviations of the real GDP from the steady state in response to a 1% positive Mining’s
productivity shock. Productivities of other industries in all periods are kept at their steady-state values. "With E M A" is
the simulation result with baseline parameter values and extensive margin adjustments. "Without E M A" is the simulation
result with baseline parameter and steady-state values, but without extensive margin adjustments. The calculation uses
the supply chain management cost data from APQC.
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Figure 1.4: IRFs of Manufacturing’s price and output to a positive productivity shock to Mining
Notes: Impulse responses are deviations of Manufacturing’s price (left panel) and output (right panel) from the steady
state in response to a 1% positive Mining’s productivity shock. Productivities of other industries in all periods are kept
at their steady-state values. "With E M A" is the simulation result with baseline parameter values and extensive margin
adjustments. "Without E M A" is the simulation result with baseline parameter and steady-state values, but without
extensive margin adjustments. The calculation uses the supply chain management cost data from APQC.
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Figure 1.5: IRFs of Manufacturing’s sales and variety no. to a positive productivity shock to Mining
Notes: Impulse responses are deviations of Manufacturing’s sales (left panel) and its number of input varieties in the
Utilities industry (right panel) from the steady state in response to a 1% positive Mining’s productivity shock. Productivities
of other industries in all periods are kept at their steady-state values. "With E M A" is the simulation result with baseline
parameter values and extensive margin adjustments. The calculation uses the supply chain management cost data from
APQC.

tivity shocks. Following a 1% positive productivity shock to the Mining industry in period t = 1,
Manufacturing’s marginal cost increases, and thus its price decreases as in the left panel of Figure
1.4. As a result, Manufacturing’s sales and thus output increase as in the right panel of Figure
1.4. Comparing the two lines with and without extensive margin adjustments, we can see that
the adjustments add to the decrease in Manufacturing’s price and the increase in its output. Due
to the rising sales following the positive shock, Manufacturing firms purchase more intermediate
inputs. A larger intermediate input expenditure raises the return to input variety, which incentivizes
firms to use more varieties. This expansion of input varieties, in turn, boosts the productivity of
manufacturing firms, resulting in an extra decrease in price and an extra increase in output. This
additional increase in output due to extensive margin adjustments is the amplification effect.
On the other hand, Figure 1.6 shows the reshuffle effect of extensive margin adjustments.
Following a 1% positive productivity shock to the Mining industry in period t = 1, Mining firms
see a decline in their prices. Because the input elasticity of substitution x is smaller than one,
Manufacturing firms increase the expenditures on inputs from the Utilities industry relative to the
Mining industry. This shift of intermediate input shares from Mining to Utilities is illustrated by the
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Figure 1.6: IRFs of Manufacturing’s input shares and variety no. to a positive productivity shock
to Mining
Notes: Impulse responses are deviations of Manufacturing’s input shares and the number of input varieties (in Mining and
Utilities) from the steady state in response to a 1% positive Mining’s productivity shock. The extensive margin is allowed
to adjust. Productivities of other industries in all periods are kept at their steady-state values. The calculation uses the
supply chain management cost data from APQC.

top two graphs in Figure 1.6. It follows that the return to Utilities varieties increases relative to the
return to Mining varieties. As a result, Manufacturing firms use more Utilities varieties and fewer
Mining varieties, which is shown in the bottom two plots in Figure 1.6. This means that extensive
margin adjustments make Mining inputs less productive while Utilities inputs more productive.
In other words, the adjustments reshuffle the positive Mining’s productivity shock to the Utilities
industry.

1.5.3

Extensive margin adjustments and aggregate fluctuations

The above impulse responses illustrate how extensive margin adjustments affect the transmission of
industry productivity shocks and real GDP. In this section, I study the aggregate fluctuations of real
GDP.
Table 1.8 compares the real GDP standard deviations under various settings.13 In the baseline
13. For both Tables 1.8 and 1.10, I simulate the model for 5,000 periods and use the real GDP series from periods 2,501
to 4,500. I calculate the standard deviation of hp-filtered real GDP to avoid medium- frequency fluctuations.
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Table 1.8: Real GDP standard deviations under different settings
(a)
Baseline
With E M A
Without E M A
Without E M A with E M A

1.88%
1.51%
0.81

(b)
Inelastic Labor

(c)
Artificial network

0.86%
0.46

2.12%
1.58%
0.74

Note: Real GDP is GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. Standard deviation is that of hp-filtered log real GDP. Column
(a) shows simulation results using the parameter values calibrated and estimated as in Section 1.5.1. Column (b) is based
on column (a) and simulated with inelastic production labor supply (Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to 10−6 ).
Column (c) uses an artificial production network structure as described in Section 1.4.4 in simulation. “With E M A” is the
model with extensive
 margin adjustments; “Without E M A” is the model simulated without extensive margin adjustments.
“Without E M A with E M A” is the ratio between the real GDP standard deviations
 of the models without and with
extensive margin adjustments for columns (a) and (c). In column (b), “Without E M A with E M A” is the ratio between
the real GDP standard deviations of the model with inelastic labor supply and without extensive margin adjustments and
the baseline model with extensive margin adjustments. Calculation uses the supply chain management cost data from
APQC.

model of column (a), the input elasticity of substitution between different industries and the curvature
of the supply chain management cost are estimated to be 0.175 and 3.71, respectively. With extensive
margin adjustments, the standard deviation of real GDP is 1.88%. If the number of input varieties is
kept at their steady-state values, the real GDP standard deviation is only 0.81 of that with extensive
margin adjustments. Thus, extensive margin adjustments amplify aggregate fluctuations.
To get a sense of how large the amplification is, I compare the baseline model to a model
with an inelastic supply of production labor. Column (b) uses the same industry productivities,
and parameter values as in column (a) expect that the production labor supply is almost inelastic
( L = 107 ). Business cycle accounting says the fluctuations in labor input explain a large share
of aggregate fluctuations in real GDP. Thus as expected, fixing (production) labor supply reduces
the real GDP standard deviation to only 0.46 of that in the baseline model with extensive margin
adjustments. As a result, extensive margin adjustments account for 0.19 of the baseline aggregate
fluctuation, which is about 54% of that due to fluctuations in (production) labor supply.
Column (c) in Table 1.8 shows that the production network structure matters for the size of
the amplification. In an artificial production network, aggregate fluctuations become larger in both
models with and without extensive margin adjustments.14 More importantly, the real GDP standard
deviation without extensive margin adjustments is now 0.74 of that with the adjustments, which is
14. {ϕs }s are recalibrated to keep the steady-state supply chain management cost share at the baseline value.
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smaller than the 0.81 in the baseline model. The production network structure affects not only the
transmission of industry shocks but also how extensive margin adjustments on different linkages
complement and reinforce each other.

1.5.4

Return to variety, management costs, and aggregate fluctuations
Table 1.9: Real GDP standard deviations and the return to variety
Management cost share
in total revenue
Parameters
Median return to variet y

(a)
1.5%

(b)
3%

(c)
6%

0.112

0.224

0.446

Results
Real GDP with E M A
Real GDP
 w/o E M A
With E M A without E M A

1.67%
1.51%
1.11

1.88%
1.51%
1.24

2.59%
1.51%
1.44

Note: Real GDP is GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. Standard deviation is that of hp-filtered log real GDP. Column (b)
shows simulation results using the baseline parameter values calibrated and estimated as in Section 1.5.1, in which the
economy-wise share of supply chain management costs in total sales is 3%. Columns (a) and (c) are the results using the
baseline parameter values except that the returns to variety are calibrated such that the economy-wise share of supply chain
1+ϕ s γs
}s .
management costs in total sales are 1.5% and 6%, respectively. The median return to variety is the median of { γs −1
“With E M A” is the model with extensive
margin
adjustments;
“Without
E
M
A”
is
the
model
simulated
without
extensive

margin adjustments. “With E M A without E M A” is the ratio between the real GDP standard deviations of the models
with and without extensive margin adjustments. Calculation uses the supply chain management cost data from APQC.

Table 1.9 compares the standard deviations of real GDP under different returns to variety. By
changing the supply chain management cost share (in total revenue) from the baseline 3% to 1.5%
and 6%, the median returns to variety vary from 0.112 to 0.446.15 When the return to variety
increases to 0.446, firms adjust their number of varieties by the same percentages as in the baseline
model. The same adjustments of input varieties, however, generate larger movements in productivity
with a larger return to variety. As a result, real GDP standard deviation increases from 1.88%
to 2.59%, which is 1.44 times that without extensive margin adjustments. In comparison, when
the management cost share decreases to 1.5%, extensive margin adjustments increase aggregate
fluctuations by a smaller amount of 1.11 times that without the adjustments.
On the other hand, Table 1.10 shows how the cost of managing input varieties affects aggregate
fluctuations. Keeping the return to variety at its baseline value, when the curvature of supply chain
15. In comparison, with a standard CES production function with ϕ = 0, the median return to variety in my model is 0.2.
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Table 1.10: Real GDP standard deviations and the curvature of management cost function

Curvature of management cost function

(a)
2

(b)
3.71

(c)
6

Real GDP with E M A
Real GDP
 w/o E M A
With E M A without E M A

2.44%
1.51%
1.61

1.88%
1.51%
1.24

1.72%
1.51%
1.14

Note: Real GDP is GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. Standard deviation is that of hp-filtered log real GDP. Column
(b) shows simulation results using the baseline parameter values calibrated and estimated as in Sections 1.5.1, in which
the curvature of management cost function is 3.71. Columns (a) and (c) are the results using the baseline parameter
values except that the curvature of management cost function are 2 and 6, respectively. “With E M A” is the model
with extensive margin adjustments; “Without E M A” is the model simulated without extensive margin adjustments.
“With E M A without E M A” is the ratio between the real GDP standard deviations of the models with and without
extensive margin adjustments. Calculation uses the supply chain management cost data from APQC.

management cost function (i.e., the curvature of the disutility of management labor) increases from
2 to 3.71, and then 6, the real GDP standard deviation decreases from 2.44% to 1.72%. Because
varying the management cost curvature does not affect the results of models without extensive
margin adjustments. All the decrease in aggregate fluctuations due to a rising marginal management
cost is due to dampened amplification effects. Extensive margin adjustments amplify aggregate
fluctuations by three-fifths when the curvature of the cost function is 2, while the amplification effect
reduces to less than one-seventh when the curvature is 6. Combining Tables 1.9 and 1.10, we see
that both the return to input variety and cost of managing them significantly affect the amplification
effect of extensive margin adjustments and thus the aggregate fluctuation.
Table 1.11: Real GDP standard deviations and input elasticity of substitution

Input elasticity of substitution

(a)
0.175

(b)
0.8

(c)
2

Real GDP with E M A
Real GDP
 w/o E M A
With E M A without E M A

1.88%
1.51%
1.24

1.90%
1.53%
1.24

1.95%
1.56%
1.25

Note: Real GDP is GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. Standard deviation is that of hp-filtered log real GDP. Column
(b) shows simulation results using the baseline parameter values calibrated and estimated as in Section 1.5.1, in which
the intermediate input elasticity of substitution is 0.175. Columns (a) and (c) are the results using the baseline parameter
values except that the intermediate input elasticity of substitution are 0.8 and 2, respectively. “With E M A” is the model
with extensive margin adjustments; “Without E M A” is the model simulated without extensive margin adjustments.
“With E M A without E M A” is the ratio between the real GDP standard deviations of the models with and without
extensive margin adjustments. Calculation uses the supply chain management cost data from APQC.

In contrast, Table 1.11 shows that aggregate fluctuations are affected little by the intermediate
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input elasticity of substitution and the curvature of supply chain management cost function if the
parameters including industry productivity processes are at their baseline values. From columns
(a) to (c), an increase of input elasticity from the baseline 0.175 to 0.8 and 2 raises the aggregate
fluctuations in both models with and without extensive margin adjustments. However, changes are
not as large as those when the return to variety changes. Real GDP standard deviation increases from
1.88% to 1.95% when the elasticity becomes 2 instead of 0.175. More importantly, the amplification
effect of extensive margin adjustments moves little from 1.24 to 1.25. This is because although the
elasticity of substitution affects the output co-movements among different industries, the changes in
industry-level outputs offset each other when aggregated.

1.5.5

The role of the production network structure in amplification

Column (c) of Table 1.8 shows that the production network structure matters for how large extensive
margin adjustments can amplify aggregate fluctuations. In this section, I use two designed networks
to look further into the role of the network structure in amplification.
Table 1.12: Real GDP standard deviations in different production network structures

Real GDP with E M A
Real GDP
 w/o E M A
With E M A without E M A

(a)
Baseline

(b)
Shortened
Network

(c)
Exchange Mfg.
and Retail

1.88%
1.51%
1.24

1.14%
1.03%
1.10

1.54%
1.31%
1.18

Note: Real GDP is GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. Standard deviation is that of hp-filtered log real GDP. Column
(a) shows simulation results using the baseline parameter values calibrated and estimated as in Section 1.5.1. Columns
(b) and (c) are the results if the intermediate input share of Manufacturing is set to 10e-6 and if Manufacturing and
Retail’s input shares are exchanged, respectively. Other parameters are set to their baseline values. “Without E M A” is
the model simulated without extensive margin adjustments. “With E M A without E M A” is the ratio between the real
GDP standard deviations of the models with and without extensive margin adjustments. Calculation uses the supply chain
management cost data from APQC.

Table 1.12 compares the real GDP standard deviations in the baseline model (column a) with
those in two alternative production networks. Column (b) reduces the intermediate input share
of Manufacturing to 10e-6, while proportionally increases its capital and labor input shares. This
decrease in intermediate input share is essentially shortening the production network. The result
says that the amplification of aggregate fluctuations due to extensive margin adjustments decreases
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from the baseline 0.24 to only 0.1. Notice that Manufacturing accounts for much less than half
of the total sales or value-added in the economy. However, cutting its upstream supply chains
reduces the amplification effect of EMA by more than half for the following reason. First, in the
production network, the lengths of different industries’ supply chains depend on Manufacturing’s
supply chain. When Manufacturing loses its upstream suppliers, those industries which source from
Manufacturing also see their supply chains shortened. As I discussed in Section 1.4.4, a shortened
supply chain reduces the reinforcement of extensive margin adjustments on different linkages of the
supply chain. As a result, the amplification effect decreases.
Column (c), on the other hand, exchange the intermediate, capital, and labor cost shares of
Manufacturing and Retail. The intermediate input cost shares of Manufacturing and Retail are
71% and 43%, and their shares in the aggregate consumption are 16% and 11%, respectively. As
a result, exchanging their intermediate input shares essentially reduces the weighted numbers of
supply chains in the economy. Following a similar logic above, we should expect the amplification
effect of extensive margin adjustments to decrease, which is confirmed by a drop in the amplification
effect from 0.24 to 0.18 in column (c).

1.6

A unified labor market and alternative extensive margin calibration

In this section, I present the results in a model with a unified labor market or with alternative
extensive margin calibration. First, I show that EMA can amplify aggregate fluctuations even if the
production and management labor markets are unified, as long as the labor supply is elastic enough.
Second, I show that calibrating and estimating the model without EMA or with alternative measures
change the amplification effect of EMA.

1.6.1

A unified labor market and Frisch elasticity of labor supply

A major deviation of my paper from the literature of the production network with costly linkages is
segmented markets of production and management labors. In this section, I check whether extensive
margin adjustments still amplify aggregate fluctuations when there is a unified market of both
production and management labor. In this economy, extensive margin adjustments depend not only
on the curvature of the management cost function but also on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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When the labor supply is inelastic as in Lim (2018) and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2019), we should
expect the adjustments in supply chain relationships to be smaller than those with high elasticity of
labor supply.
In this model with a unified labor market, the problem of firm i in industry n becomes
πn,i,t =

max

pn, i , t ,k n,i , t ,ln, i , t ,Vn,i , s , t
{x n,i , s , t (m)} s , m

(pn,i,t − mcn,i,t )qn,i,t − wt

Õ

η

vn,i,s,t ,

(1.49)
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and the labor market clearing condition becomes
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s ∈S

In particular, I allow the management cost function to have a separate curvature than the Frisch
elasticity of substitution to match the response of input supplier numbers to input expenditures in
the data.
Table 1.13 shows the real GDP standard deviations in a unified labor market and with different
Frisch elasticity of labor supply. I experiment with three values of Frisch elasticity: 0.001, 1, and
2. I set Frisch elasticity to 0.001 to approximate the inelastic labor supply as in Lim (2018) and
Taschereau-Dumouchel (2019). 1 and 2 are two values between 0.75 and 3, the former of which was
suggested by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) and the latter matches the inter-temporal
substitution elasticity found by macroeconomists (Prescott, 2006). Whenever I change the elasticity
of labor supply, I treat the model as a new one and recalibrate and re-estimate the model. When
the labor supply elasticity decreases from 2 to 0.001, real GDP standard deviation decreases a lot
from 1.74% to 0.84% (with extensive margin adjustments). This decrease is consistent with the
fact that labor input fluctuations explain a large share of aggregate fluctuations. When labor supply
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Table 1.13: Real GDP standard deviations in a unified labor market

Frisch elasticity of labor supply
Parameters
Median return to variet y
Curvature o f management cost f unction
Results
Real GDP with E M A
Real GDP
 w/o E M A
With E M A without E M A

(a)
0.001

(b)
1

(c)
2

0.159
2.6

0.188
3.1

0.200
3.3

0.840%
0.836%
1.00

1.367%
1.264%
1.08

1.737%
1.511%
1.15

Note: Real GDP is GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. Standard deviation is that of hp-filtered log real GDP. Production
and management labors used by all industries are in a unified market. Models are re-calibrated and re-estimated. From
columns (a) to (c), the Frisch elasticities of labor supply are 0.001, 1, and 2, respectively. “With E M A” is the model
with extensive margin adjustments; “Without E M A” is the model simulated without extensive margin adjustments.
“With E M A without E M A” is the ratio between the real GDP standard deviations of the models with and without
extensive margin adjustments. Calculation uses the supply chain management cost data from APQC.

becomes less and less elastic, aggregate fluctuations become smaller and smaller. More importantly,
the elasticity of labor supply also controls the amount of labor used for managing input varieties.
As a result, a less inelastic labor supply leads to less adjustment in the extensive margin and thus a
smaller amplification of industry productivity shocks by extensive margin adjustments. When labor
supply is almost inelastic, extensive margin hardly adjust and amplify aggregate fluctuations. The
real GDP standard deviation is almost the same with and without extensive margin adjustments.16
On the other hand, when we increase the Frisch elasticity to 2, the conventional number used in
macroeconomics, extensive margin adjustments still amplify aggregate fluctuations by more than
one-seventh even though the labor market is unified. This indicates that relaxing the assumption
of either a unified labor market or inelastic labor supply leads to the amplification of aggregate
fluctuations by extensive margin adjustments.
Another takeaway from the above model with a unified labor market is the reason why allowing
an additional margin to adjust leads to a seemingly negative consequence, i.e., a larger aggregate
fluctuation. In bad times, the marginal productivity of labor is low. Due to the disutility of labor
supply, households would rather stay at home than work. As a result, increasing unemployment
indeed maximizes households’ utility. Similarly, during busts, cutting supply chain relationships
16. Notice that the re-estimated ratio of the return and cost of input varieties does not change much with labor supply
elasticity because the supply chain management cost share in total revenue is kept at the baseline value of 3%.
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leads to a further decrease in productivity and output. However, it is optimal for the household to
reduce the supply of management labor because of the low marginal productivity compared to the
disutility of labor supply. Thus, allowing the extensive margin adjustments in inputs results in larger
aggregate fluctuations, but higher welfare.

1.6.2

Alternative ways of calibration and estimation

The above sections discuss the importance of extensive margin adjustments on aggregate fluctuations
assuming that we take into consideration the extensive margin when calibrating and estimating the
model. However, the alternative possibility is that we entirely ignore the extensive margin and
estimate the model without extensive margin or use the intermediate input measures by the BEA.
The following table compares the aggregate fluctuations under these alternative settings.
Table 1.14: Real GDP standard deviations with alternative estimation and intermediate input
measure
(a)
Baseline

(b)
Ignore EMA

(c)
BEA intermediate
input measure

Parameters
Input elasticit y o f substitution
Curvature o f management cost f unction

0.175
3.71

0.176
3.70

0.185
3.62

Results
Real GDP with E M A
Real GDP w/o
 EMA
Without E M A with E M A

1.88%
1.51%
0.81

1.40%
0.74

1.04%
0.55

Note: Real GDP is GDP deflated by the GDP deflator. Standard deviation is that of hp-filtered log real GDP. Column
(a) shows simulation results using the baseline parameter values calibrated and estimated as in Section 1.5.1. Columns
(b) and (c) are the results when the model is calibrated and estimated without extensive margin and using the BEA
intermediate inputmeasures, respectively. “Without E M A” is the model simulated without extensive margin adjustments.
“Without E M A with E M A” is the ratio between the real GDP standard deviations of the models without extensive
margin adjustments in different settings and the baseline model with extensive margin adjustments. Calculation uses the
supply chain management cost data from APQC.

Table 1.14 shows the real GDP standard deviations in the baseline model (column a) and in
models calibrated and estimated without extensive margin and with the BEA intermediate input
measures, respectively. We can see that ignoring the extensive margin during the estimation stage
leads to a lower real GDP standard deviation than in a model where the parameters are estimated
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with extensive margin, but extensive margin adjustments are shut down during simulation.17 If I
use the BEA intermediate input measures in the calibration of industry productivity processes, the
real GDP standard deviation is even smaller at 0.55 of that in the baseline model. Because the BEA
intermediate input measures use Fisher indexes, the contribution of a supplier industry’s input to the
productivity of the producer is proportional to the share of inputs that the producer sources from the
supplier industry (as if using the Cobb–Douglas function). When input elasticity of substitution is
less than one, different industries’ inputs are more complementary than in a Cobb–Douglas function.
Thus, changes in the inputs from a supplier industry generate larger fluctuations in productivity when
the elasticity of substitution is less than one. In the data, this extra movement in the productivities
of intermediate inputs makes calibrated industry-level total factor productivities more volatile. As
a result, the baseline model generates a larger aggregate fluctuation than that in a model calibrated
using the BEA intermediate input measures.
To summarize, I estimate and simulate the full model in this section and study how extensive
margin adjustments affect shock transmission and amplify aggregate fluctuations. The size of the
return to variety, the marginal cost of managing suppliers, and the production network structure
all matter for the size of the amplification. Moreover, the amplification effect of extensive margin
adjustments exists even if production and management labor are in a unified labor market as long
as the labor supply is elastic enough. Extensive margin adjustments explain a large share of the
aggregate fluctuation generated by industry productivity shocks, which is around half of that due to
the fluctuations in labor input.

1.7

Conclusion

The business cycle literature has been studying mechanisms that amplify small variations in productivity to generate large aggregate fluctuations. In this paper, I show how producers’ choices of input
variety numbers amplify productivity shocks and aggregate fluctuations. I rely on both micro-level
empirical evidence and quantitative analysis of a multi-industry real business cycle model to explore
17. The industry productivity shocks are less volatile in a model estimated and calibrated without the extensive margin
than in the baseline model. However, this is because in the data, industry-level productivity shocks are negatively
correlated with intermediate inputs. Assumptions like sticky-price are needed to generate this negative correlation (e.g.
Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, 2006). I follow the production network literature not to include these mechanisms. As a
result, I take the difference between the real GDP standard deviations with and without extensive margin adjustments
under the same baseline parameter values as the amplification effect of extensive margin adjustments.
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the effects of extensive margin adjustments.
First, I document three facts about the number of input suppliers using firm-level supply chain
relationship data among US firms. These facts indicate a return to more input varieties and a
cost of managing varieties. Second, based on the empirical findings, I develop a real business
cycle model with firms’ choices of input variety numbers in addition to input quantities. The
model shows that extensive margin adjustments amplify productivity shocks and thus the aggregate
fluctuation. Finally, I extend the model to a multi-industry environment with a production network
for estimation using industry-level data and simulation. I estimate the multi-industry model using
indirect inference. Simulation of the model shows that with extensive margin adjustments, industry
productivity shocks generate a real GDP standard deviation of 1.88%, which is one-fourth larger than
that in a conventional model with fixed numbers of input varieties. I also find that the production
network structure not only affects the transmission of shocks but also decides how extensive margin
adjustments on different linkages of the supply chain complement and reinforce each other.
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Chapter 2

Land Price, Export Shocks, and
Investment in China: A Tale of Two
Sectors
2.1

Introduction

The relationships between real estate prices, investment, and macroeconomic fluctuations have been
frequently discussed since the 2008 crisis. It is widely recognized that a collapse of the real estate
market led to the great recession. Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) study the influence of real estate prices
on macroeconomic fluctuations through the positive correlation between land price and capital
investment they documented (Figure 2.1a). They argue that the positive correlation is generated by
a collateral constraint with the land as the collateral. This collateral constraint propagates shocks
and amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations. In China, on the other hand, land price and capital
investment negatively co-move (Figure 2.1b). What leads to this negative co-movement in China as
opposed to the positive one in the US, and how is it related to macroeconomic fluctuations?
In this paper, I construct the quarterly commercial land price series using land transaction data
and document the negative correlation between (commercial) land price and investment on the
aggregate and province levels.18 I also find the negative correlation to be related to movements in
the ratio of manufacturing’s GDP to service’, as well as changes in China’s export values. Based on
18. The land transaction data is jointly collected by Tianheng Tu and me from www.landchina.com.
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(b) Land price and investment in China

(a) Land price and investment in the US
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Figure 2.1: Real land price and investment in the US and China
Notes: Panel (a) plots the log real land price and investment in the US documented by Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). The
shaded bars mark the NBER recession dates. Panel (b) plots the log real commercial land price and investment in China
documented in this chapter. Both commercial land price and investment are hp-filtered.

these facts, I build and simulate a real business cycle model with two sectors—the manufacturing
and the service. In this model, the commercial land is only used by the service sector, while the
manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive than the service. A negative export shock to the
tradable manufacturing sector leads to the reallocation of labor from the manufacturing to the nontradable service sector. This reallocation, in turn, results in a rise in land prices due to a higher
marginal return to land, and a fall in the aggregate capital investment because the service sector is
less capital intensive.
My paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between the real estate market and
investment (Liu et al., 2013; Gan, 2007; Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2012). In their papers, real
estate shocks affect (corporate) investment through a collateral channel. In the presence of financial
frictions, firms use real estate assets as collaterals to borrow for investment. A positive real estate
shock raises the collateral values and in turn, boosts corporate investments, and vice versa. In my
paper, the negative correlation between land price and investment originates from the institutional
friction in China, i.e., the transformation of commercial lands to industrial lands is restricted by the
government. This institutional friction prevents land from reallocating between sectors together with
capital and labor, which results in the negative co-movement between land prices and investment.
My paper is also related to the literature studying the negative correlation between land prices and
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investment in China. These papers document the negative correlation on the micro-level (e.g., Chen,
Liu, Xiong, and Zhou, 2016; Han and Lu, 2017). Chen, Liu, Xiong, and Zhou (2016) combine the
land transaction data with publicly listed firms’ financial data and find that increases in (commercial)
land price discourage firms’ non-land investment. In their paper, they distinguish land investment
from non-land investment, and find a negative relationship between the commercial land price and
firms’ non-land investment. Their non-land investment corresponds to the (capital) investment in
my paper. 19 They explain this negative correlation with two channels. The first one is a speculation
channel in line with Miao and Wang (2015) and Chen and Wen (2017): Encouraged by a rising
land price (or expectation), firms reallocate resources from core businesses (capital investment)
to land purchases, leading to a negative correlation between the land price and investment. The
second channel they argue is a crowding out channel, which is also associated with misallocation of
resources: Due to the credit rationing policy in China, banks lend more to land-holders, who tend to
be less productive state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Compared to their papers, my paper documents
the negative correlation between the land price and investment on the aggregate level. And I argue
that the negative correlation is due to (efficient) reallocation of resources between the manufacturing
and the service sectors.
My paper contributes to the literature on explaining China’s business cycle patterns using multisector models. Storesletten, Zhao, and Zilibotti (2019) use a model with a traditional agriculture,
a modern agriculture, and a manufacturing sector to explain the uncorrelatedness between the
aggregate employment and GDP in China. Yao and Zhu (2020) use a model with an agriculture and
a non-agriculture sector to explain the same uncorrelatedness. They study the reallocation of labor
between agriculture and non-agriculture sectors while my paper focuses on the reallocation of labor
and capital between the manufacturing and the service sectors.
My paper also contributes to the literature on estimating China’s sectoral total factor productivities (TFPs). Sectoral TFPs are important in my paper because they also lead to the reallocation
of resources across sectors. Most previous works estimate aggregate or manufacturing (industrial)
TFPs (Zhang and Shi, 2003; Dong and Liang, 2013; Bai and Zhang, 2015; Li and Zhu, 2005; Chen,
2011), which reflects the focus of macroeconomic research on China, i.e., the manufacturing sector
19. Residential and industrial land prices do not discourage non-land investment. This is one of the reasons why I focus on
commercial land prices in my paper. Also, industrial land price is often intentionally depressed by local governments
to attract investment.
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and the misallocation within it (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011; Chang, Chen, Waggoner,
and Zha, 2016; Hsieh and Song, 2016). One reason for this focus is the availability of both micro
and macro data for the manufacturing instead of the service sector. However, at a point when
manufacturing shrinks to less than 33% of the total GDP while the service sector accounts for more
than 50%, the service sector is also worth study. Cheng (2003), Yang (2008), and Chen (2011) study
service sector’s TFP in China. However, they do not look at the counterpart manufacturing TFP at
the same time, and their TFP series are in annual frequency. Because China’s macro time series
is short, I need quarterly data to derive useful results. Thus, I construct the quarterly fixed asset
investment (FAI) for both the manufacturing and the service sectors, based on which I compute the
factor income shares and TFPs for both sectors.
Finally, my paper is related to recent works on China’s real estate and land prices. Fang, Gu,
Xiong, and Zhou (2016) use a comprehensive dataset of mortgage loans issued by major Chinese
commercial banks to evaluate the risk in China’s housing market. Cai, Wang, and Zhang (2016)
studies the implementation of land use regulations in urban China, particularly the floor-to-area ratio
(FAR) regulations. Glaeser, Huang, Ma, and Shleifer (2017) compare the housing booms in China
and in the US from various aspects. They conclude that whether the housing market in China crashes
or not depends on how the Chinese government reacts. Du and Peiser (2014) study the supply side
of land. In particular, they focus on the land hoarding behavior of China’s local governments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the construction of China’s quarterly
(commercial) land price series. In this section, I document the negative correlation between land
price and investment, and show this negative correlation is associated with movements in China’s
export value. Section 2.3 describes the baseline real business cycle model with two sectors. Section
1.2.4 describes the calibration of the model and discusses the results, including possible explanations
for unmatched moments. In Section 2.4, I extend the model to include two different types of capital
adjustment costs and briefly discuss their effects. Section 2.5 concludes the paper.

2.2

Land price, investment, and export in China

In this section, the negative correlation between real (commercial) land price and investment is
documented. First, I introduce the quarterly land price series of China based on land transactions
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from 2005 to 2015, the capital investment series, as well as the export value data. Second, I show
that the real land price and capital investment are negatively correlated both in the aggregate and at
the province level. Third, I show this negative correlation may be caused by a third factor, the export
demand from the outside world.

2.2.1

Data

Since 2004, the Ministry of Land and Resources of China (MLR) publishes quarterly commercial land
prices of 35 major cities. However, these prices are much higher than the transaction-based nationwide average (more than four times the prices I find in nation-wide transactions) and doubled suddenly
in 2008. In the third quarter of 2008, the MLR expanded the number of land price monitoring cities
from 35 to 105. Nonetheless, the prices published are still higher than the transaction-based national
average, and the data series is too short for business cycle analysis. Besides the official data, the
Wharton/NUS/Tsinghua Chinese Residential Land Price Indexes (CRLPI) reports real residential
land price indexes with high quality (Wu, Gyourko, and Deng, 2012). Their price indexes, however,
again cover only 35 major cities and are of residential lands.
As a result, I construct the quarterly commercial land prices using data from www.landchina.com,
a public online land transaction database. This database is so far the most frequently used and
complete record of land transactions in China. I hand-collect more than 64,470 land transactions
in 2,708 counties from 2005 to 2016 online. I calculate the price of each transaction as the ratio of
its land transaction value to its area. This land price is further deflated and seasonally adjusted to
construct the quarterly commercial land price.
To understand the negative correlation between the land price and the capital investment, I use
real capital investment series and export value indexes in the empirical evidence. Details of these
data series are described in Appendix G.

2.2.2

Land price and investment in China

Table 2.1 shows that real land price and aggregate real investment move in opposite directions in
China. A one percent increase in real land price is associated with a 0.0898 percent decrease in
aggregate real investment (column a). The result is robust to controlling for the crisis dummy
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from 2009 to 2011, during which the four trillion yuan stimulus package was used by the Chinese
government in response to the 2008 crisis (column b).
Table 2.1: Real land price and investment in China

Dependent Variables
Land price

(a)
Investment

(b)
Investment

-0.0898**
(0.0347)

-0.0931***
(0.0246)
0.0555***
(0.00897)

40
0.150

40
0.582

Crisis dummy

Observations
R-squared

Notes: Data are quarterly from 2006 to 2015. The dependent variables are investment (real capital formation). Land price
is the commercial land price deflated by the GDP deflator. Crisis dummy is equal to 1 from 2009Q1 to 2011Q4 and 0
otherwise. Both investment and land price are logged and hp-filtered. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

2.2.3

Export, sectoral shares, land price, and investment

In Table 2.2, regression results reveal the relationships among export value, service employment
share, land price, and investment. Columns (a) and (b) show that a one percent increase in the
service employment share is associated with an 11.8 percent increase in real commercial land price
and a 1.8 percent decrease in real aggregate investment. A one percent increase in the real export
value index, on the other hand, is associated with a 4.3 percent decrease in the service employment
share, indicated by column (c). Finally, columns (d) and (e) show that the direct correlation between
the real export value and the real investment is positive, while the correlation between the export
value and the land price is negative.
Combining these results, I argue that an increase in the real export value leads to increased
demand for manufacturing (industrial) goods20 and decreased demand for services. As a result,
resources such as labor move towards the manufacturing sector from the service sector. Because the
commercial land is mainly used by the service sector, decreased demand for service goods reduces
the return to land, and thus the price of land. On the other hand, because the manufacturing sector
is more capital intensive, higher demand for manufacturing goods results in an increase in aggregate
20. Manufacturing is the major part of the industrial sector, accounting for 80% of the total industrial GDP.
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capital investment, and vice versa when the export value decreases.
In my story, a higher capital income share in the manufacturing than in the service sector is an
important assumption. In addition, the TFP processes of the manufacturing and the service sectors
can themselves generate a similar result and can interact with the effect of a change in the export
value. Thus, it is important to calibrate/estimate the capital income shares of the two sectors and
their TFP processes, which I describe in the next section.
Table 2.2: Export, service employment, land price, and investment in China
Dependent Variables

Service emp share

(a)
Land price

(b)
Investment

11.82***
(3.744)

-1.800***
(0.652)

E xport value
Crisis dummy1
Crisis dummy2

Observations
R-squared

0.0488
(0.0710)
-0.222**
(0.0987)

0.0654***
(0.0104)

40
0.247

40
0.520

(c)
Service emp
share

(d)
Investment

(e)
Land price

-0.0428***
(0.0112)

0.157*
(0.0848)
0.0620***
(0.0141)
0.0242
(0.0231)

-0.951**
(0.431)

-0.247**
(0.112)

40
0.471

40
0.116

40
0.278

Notes: Data are quarterly from 2006 to 2015. The dependent variables are investment (real gross capital formation),
real commercial land price land price, and the share of service employment in the total employment of service and
manufacturing service emp share. Land price is deflated by the GDP deflator. E xport value is the export value
deflated by the GDP deflator. Crisis dummy1 is equal to 1 from 2009Q1 to 2011Q4 and 0 otherwise. Crisis dummy2
equal to 1 from 2009Q1 to 2010Q4 and 0 otherwise to control for the unexpected land price drop in crisis. Investment,
land price, and export value are logged. All variables are hp-filtered. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 2.3 further shows that the negative correlation between land price and investment also exists
at the province level. Furthermore, export values and the share of manufacturing in production are
still associated with the negative correlation. Column (a) shows that a one percent increase in land
price is associated with a -0.078 percent decrease in investment, close to that in the aggregate.
Columns (b) and (c) show that a one percent increase in the share of manufacturing in total GDP (of
service and manufacturing) is associated with a 0.5 percent increase in investment, and a -1.9 percent
decrease in the land price. At the same time, columns (d) and (e) find that a one percent increase in
real export values is associated with 0.04 and 0.09 percent increases in manufacturing’s GDP and
FAI shares, respectively. Columns (b) to (d) together indicate that rising export values are associated
with a larger share of manufacturing in production, which in turn, relates to a rise in investment
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Table 2.3: Land price, investment, manufacturing share, and export by province
VARIABLES
Land price

(a)
Investment

(b)
Land price

(c)
Investment

-0.567*
(0.345)

0.523***
(0.305)

(e)
Share M an,F AI

(f)
Land price

-0.0777**
(0.0333)

Share M an,GD P
E xport value

Observations
R-squared
No. of province

(d)
Share M an,GD P

290
0.919
30

290
0.531
30

341
0.908
31

-3.393***
(0.518)
0.0467***
(0.0119)

0.0855*
(0.0493)

341
0.561
31

341
0.310
31

290
30

Notes: Data are annual from 2006 to 2015 at the province level. The dependent variables are investment (real gross
capital formation), real commercial land price land price, the share of manufacturing GDP in the total GDP of service
and manufacturing share M an,GD P , and the share of manufacturing fixed asset investment (FAI) in the total FAI of
service and manufacturing share M an,F AI . E xport value is the export value deflated by the GDP deflator. Column (f)
instruments manufacturing’s GDP share with the export value. All variables are logged. Year fixed effects are controlled.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

and a fall in the land price. Column (f) instruments manufacturing’s GDP share with export values
and the negative correlation between land price and manufacturing’s GDP share becomes even more
significant.

2.3

A real business cycle model with two sectors

In this section, I present an RBC model with two sectors, the manufacturing and the service sector, to
explain the negative co-movement between real (commercial) land price and investment documented
in the previous section.

2.3.1

Model environment

The model economy is composed of one representative household and two representative firms, one
in the service sector (labeled as sector 1) and the other in the manufacturing sector (labeled as sector
2). The representative household lives for infinite periods and consumes manufacturing goods x,
service goods n, and imported goods f . Manufacturing and imported goods are fully tradable, and
service goods are fully non-tradable. Labor l is supplied by the household, who also decides the
investment I and land supply L. The preference of the representative household is given by the
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period utility function
(

h

b(x a f 1−a )−µ + (1 − b)n−µ

u(x, f ,n,l) =

i − µ1

) 1−γ
(T − l)ω

1−γ

,

(2.1)

where 1/γ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in aggregate consumption, which is represented in the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) form of x, n, and f . The elasticity of
substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods is 1/(1 + µ), and the expenditure share of
manufacturing goods in tradable goods is given by a. Leisure also enters utility, and ω governs the
labor supply elasticity. T = 24 is the maximum hours that can be supplied as labor l.
The representative firms of the two sectors employ labor li=1,2 , rent capital Ki=1,2 from the
representative household, and maximize one-period profit. Both labor and capital are fully mobile
across sectors. The manufacturing firm’s problem is given by
max Px z2 K2α2 l21−α2 − rK K2 − wl2,
K2 ,l2

(2.2)

where z2 is the exogenous productivity process of the manufacturing sector and Px is the exogenous
manufacturing/export good price. rK and w are the interest rate of capital and the wage. Capital
income share is given by α2 . Imported good is used as the numeraire.
Besides capital and labor, the service firm rents land Ld from the household. Given the exogenous
productivity process z1 and endogenous service good price Pn , its static problem is
max Pn z1 K1α1 l11−α1

K1 ,l1 ,L d

φ

1−φ

Ld

− rK K1 − wl1 − rL Ld ,

(2.3)

where the land income share is 1 − φ and the share of capital income in the total income of capital
and labor is α1 . rL is the land rental rate.
Denote S = {z1, z2, Px } as the collection of exogenous states revealed at the beginning of each
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period, the Bellman equation of the representative household is
U(S, L,K, k) =
s.t.

maxx,n, f ,l,L0 ,k 0 (1 − β)u(x, f ,n,l) + βES0 |S U(S 0, L 0,K 0, k 0)
f + Px x + PL (L 0 − L) + Pn n + k 0 − (1 − δ)K = wl + rK k + rL L + TL ,

(2.4)

K 0 = G(S,K).
where β is the discount factor and PL is the nominal price of land. TL is the lump-sum transfer by
the government by selling land to the household. I assume that the land stock sold by the government
is a constant L̄. As a result, PL (L 0 − L) = TL = 0 in equilibrium. G(.,.) is the law of motion for
aggregate capital.
The exogenous states S are governed by the following processes
log(z10 )

= ρ1 log(z1 ) + σ1 1,

(2.5)

log(z20 )

= ρ1 log(z2 ) + σ2 2,

(2.6)

log(Px0 ) = ρx log(Px ) + σx x .

(2.7)

where 1, 2, x are exogenous shocks and 0 < | ρi | < 1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, x}. Each of 1, 2, x follows a
N(0,1) distribution and they can be correlated contemporaneously.
Service goods is non-tradable, so its market clearing condition is
n = z1 K1α1 l11−α1

φ

Ld .
1−φ

(2.8)

Manufacturing goods, on the other hand, not only supply the domestic consumption x, but also get
traded for imported goods x̄ = f . Finally, capital investment also comes fully from manufacturing
goods. I further assume the current account surplus is always zero. So when its market clears,
Px x + Px x̄ + K 0 − (1 − δ)K = Px z2 K2α2 l21−α2 ,
where f = Px x̄.
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(2.9)

Capital and labor market clearing yields
K1 + K2 = K,

(2.10)

l1 + l2 = l.

(2.11)

Government sells land to the representative household, who then rents the land to the service
firm. So we have two market clearing conditions for land.

2.3.2

Ld = L,

(2.12)

L = L̄.

(2.13)

Equilibrium definition and characterization

With the model environment and market clearing conditions introduced above, I can define the
recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) of this economy as
Definition 2. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a value function U(S, Px , L,K, k) and policy
functions x(S, L,K, k), n(S, L,K, k), f (S, L,K, k), l(S, L,K, k), L 0(S, L,K, k), k 0(S, L,K, k) for the representative household, and {Ki (S, L,K, k)}i=1,2 , {li (S, L,K, k)}i=1,2 , and Ld (S, L,K, k) for the firms,
and prices (Pn,w,rk ,rL , PL ) such that:
1. Given S and (Pn,w,rk ,rL , PL ), U solves the household Bellman equation (2.8) and x, f , n, l, K 0, L 0
are the optimal policy functions.
2.

Given S and (w,rk ,rL ), K1, l1, Ld satisfies the service firm’s FOC, and K2, l2 satisfies the

manufacturing firm’s FOC.
3. All goods and factor markets clear, i.e., equations 2.9 to 2.13 hold.
4. The law of motion for capital is consistent with household’s capital choice policy function, i.e.
k 0(S, L,K,K) = G(S,K)

(2.14)

Denote λ as the multiplier for the representative household’s budget constraint (equation 2.8)
and
o 1−γ
n
− 1
,
M = (1 − β) b(x a f 1−a )−µ + (1 − b)n−µ µ (T − l)ω
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(2.15)

then the household’s first order conditions are

x:
n:
l:
f:
K0 :
L0 :



Mab f (a−1)µ x −aµ−1 = λPx b(x a f 1−a )−µ + (1 − b)n−µ ,


M(1 − b)n−µ−1 = λPn b(x a f 1−a )−µ + (1 − b)n−µ ,

(2.16)

Mω = λw(T − l),


M(1 − a)b f (a−1)µ−1 x −aµ = λ b(x a f 1−a )−µ + (1 − b)n−µ ,

 0
λ = βES0 |S λ 0 r K + 1 − δ ,
 0
0
λPL = βES0 |S λ 0 r L + P L .

(2.18)

(2.17)

(2.19)
(2.20)
(2.21)

Representative firms’ first order conditions are

(2.23)

L:


φ
r K = Pn z1 φα1 K1−1 K1α1 l11−α1 L 1−φ ,

φ
w = Pn z1 φ(1 − α1 )l1−1 K1α1 l11−α1 L 1−φ ,
φ

r L = Pn z1 (1 − φ) K1α1 l11−α1 L −φ ,

K2 :

r K = Px z2 α2 K2α2 −1 l21−α2 ,

(2.25)

l2 :

w = Px z2 (1 − α2 )K2α2 l2−α2 .

(2.26)

K1 :
l:

(2.22)

(2.24)

Finally, I define the aggregate price level as
"
PA = b

2.4

1
1+µ



µ

 1+µ
µ
1
Pxa
1+µ P 1+µ
+
(1
−
b)
n
a a (1 − a)1−a

# µ+1
µ
.

(2.27)

Calibration and baseline model results

After I describe the model and define the equilibrium, calibration is introduced in this section,
including that of sector-level capital income shares and TFP processes. The simulation of the
baseline model indicates a negative correlation between real commercial land price and investment
following a positive export price shock. In particular, I provide explanations for unmatched moments,
some of which are based on China’s institutional background.
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2.4.1

Calibration

Preferences.

The discount factor β is set to 0.99 to match the quarterly real lending rate of 1%.

Ostry and Reinhart (1992) estimate five Asian developing countries’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is robustly around 0.8. γ is chosen to match 1/γ = 0.8. Mendoza (1995) estimates
the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, which is 1/(µ + 1) = 0.74 for
industrialized countries. Ostry and Reinhart (1992), on the other hand, find that more industrialized
developing countries have a lower elasticity of substitution. China, unlike the other developing countries, is highly industrialized. So I choose µ = 0.35 for China. The upper bound of labor supply T is
set to 24 (hours per day). The parameter governing the utility of leisure, ω is chosen such that in the
steady state, 85 percent of time T is spent on working, i.e., lss /T = 0.85. The share of income spent
on service goods, b is chosen such that the steady-state ratio of manufacturing good consumption to
service good consumption matches the average ratio found in 2005-2012 Input-Output Tables. The
share of manufacturing good consumption in manufacturing’s output, a is set to match the average
ratio in 2005-2012 Input-Output Tables.

Technologies.

Capital depreciation rate δ is chosen as 0.25 such that the annual depreciation rate is

10 percent as in most literature. Parameters for TFP and export price processes {ρi=1, 2, x , σi=1, 2, x }
are estimated as introduced in Section 1.2.4. So are the factor income shares αi=1, 2 and φ. Steady
state export price Px, ss is set to 1 as in Mendoza (1995). The calibrated values of all parameters
can be found in Table 2.4.

Capital income shares and quarterly TFP processes

Capital income shares and quarterly TFP

processes of both sectors, especially the covariance matrix of shocks to the industrial sector’s TFP
and the export price are critical to the results. Thus, a reliable way to calibrate or estimate the
capital income shares, as well as sector-level TFPs, is needed. In China, there is more available data
for the industrial sector than manufacturing, and the production of manufacturing goods is close to
that of industrial goods. As a result, I calibrate the TFPs and factor income shares of the industrial
sector and use them for the manufacturing sector. The largest strand of literature on China’s TFPs
focuses on the aggregate level (Zhang and Shi, 2003; Guo and Jia, 2005; Li and Zeng, 2009; Dong
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Table 2.4: Calibrated parameter values
Parameters
β
γ
µ
T
ω
a
b
δ
ρx
σx
ρ1
ρ2
σ1
σ2
σ2, x
Steady state Px
α1
α2
φ

Values
0.99
1.25
0.35
24
0.111
0.94
0.519
0.025
0.798
0.0097
0.868
0.662
0.0167
0.0152
0.0563
1
0.345
0.658
0.772

Comments
Matches the quarterly real lending rate between 2005 and 2015.
Ostry and Reinhart (1992) estimation for Asian developing countries.
Mendoza(1995) for industrialized countries.
24 hours per day.
Steady state l/T = 0.85 as in Mendoza(1995).
f acturing goods consumption
Steady state M anu
matches that in the data.
M anu f acturing sector out put
M anu f acturing Goods Consumption
Steady state
matches that in the data.
Ser vice Goods Consumption
Corresponds to an annual depreciation rate of 10%.
AR(1) coefficient of log real export price index.
AR(1) standard error of log real export price index.
TFP processes estimated by me.
TFP processes estimated by me.
TFP processes estimated by me.
TFP processes estimated by me.
TFP processes estimated by me.
Following Mendoza(1995).
ation o f employee
Matches service Remuner
given φ.
V alue added
Remuner ation o f employee
Matches manufacturing
.
V alue added
Factor income shares estimated by me.

and Liang, 2013; Bai and Zhang, 2015). On the other hand, there are a few papers on sector-level
TFPs. Li and Zhu (2005) and Chen (2011) calculate the TFPs of sub-industrial sectors. Cheng
(2003), Yang (2008), and Chen (2011) study the service or sub-industrial TFPs. However, only a
few papers look into the relationship between industrial and service TFPs in China using comparable
data. An early paper by Guo (1992) simultaneously calculates the TFPs of the primary (agriculture),
secondary (industrial and construction), and tertiary (broad definition of service) industries. Ren
and Sun (2009) use the Input-Output Tables published every three to five years to construct the
sector-level TFPs at a lower frequency. However, none of these works provide quarterly TFP series,
not to mention comparable quarterly industrial and service TFP processes.
In order to calculate quarterly TFP series, quarterly capital stock and employment series of
industrial and service sectors are needed. Due to the limited availability of data in China, assumptions
are made along the road. Details about the construction of sector-level quarterly TFP series are
described in Appendix H.
I seasonally adjust and hp-filter the sector-level quarterly TFP series and fit the cyclical part of
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each process independently using the AR(1) process. I do the same with the real export value series,
which I use as a proxy for the export price because no price data are available. The residuals of
the AR(1) processes of the industrial sector TFP and the real export value have a coefficient matrix
equal to
"

1.0000 0.0563

#
.

0.0563 1.0000

2.4.2

Quantitative results

Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 compare some of the Chinese sample’s moments with those from the
simulation of the baseline model. The signs of simulated correlations of interest are all consistent
with those in the sample. The correlation between log real investment and land price is −0.073 in
the baseline model, compared to −0.42 in the sample. Real land price is negatively correlated with
the export price in the model as in the data, although the correlation is less negative in the model
(−0.43 vs. −0.63). The export price co-moves with real investment both in the model and in the data,
though the correlation is higher in the model. One of the reasons is that I assume all manufacturing
goods to be exportable.
Table 2.5: Model’s standard deviations and correlations (baseline model)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.0144
0.0268
0.0403
0.0199
0.0117

Simulated correlation
with real investment
-0.071
0.963
-0.0725
0.454

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.998
0.198
-0.0725
-0.434

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land
income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks to log
export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log sectoral
TFPs is σe1 , e2 = 0 .

In terms of standard deviations, model-simulated series have higher standard deviations than
those in the data except for the real land price. This can still be explained by my assumption
of a fully tradable manufacturing sector. Despite their absolute sizes, the relative sizes of real
service output, real manufacturing output, and real investment are similar in the model as in the
data ({0.0144, 0.0268, 0.0403} in the model vs. {0.0078, 0.0194, 0.0218} in the data). The only
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Table 2.6: Sample’s standard deviations and correlations: China 2005:1-2015:4
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Standard
deviations
0.0078
0.0194
0.0218
0.153
0.0134

Correlation with
real investment
0.185
0.476
-0.416
0.260

Correlation with
real land price
-0.109
-0.232
-0.416
-0.628

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. Samples during crisis, i.e., 2009:1-2010:4 are dropped.

exception, the real land price, has a much higher standard deviation in the data. This can be partially
blamed on a transaction-based land price series, which experiences a large variation in quarterly
characteristics of land transacted.
Real Land Price
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Figure 2.2: IRFs to an export price shock in the baseline model: I
Notes: The shock is a one standard-deviation shock. Variables are in percentage changes from their trends except for the
service employment ratio, which is in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the
land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505.

Figure 2.2 plots impulse responses of different variables to a one standard deviation shock on the
export price. A positive export price shock increases real aggregate investment and lowers real land
prices. Opposite responses of sectoral outputs reveal the source of the negative correlation between
investment and land price. A higher export price raises the demand for manufacturing goods and
attracts resources from the service sector to the manufacturing sector, which is indicated by the
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Figure 2.3: IRFs to an export price shock in the baseline model: II
Notes: The shock is a one standard-deviation shock. Variables are in percentage changes from their trends except for the
service employment ratio, which is in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.2666,
the land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505.

falling service employment share. Thus, manufacturing output rises while service output drops.
The demand for capital, which is more intensive in the manufacturing sector, increases, and so does
the aggregate investment. In contrast, the demand for commercial land, which is used only by the
service sector contracts. As a result, real land price declines.
Following an export price shock, the nominal return to the land and the nominal land price indeed
move up slightly thanks to a higher export price, which pushes up all the prices in the economy,
including the nominal wage and interest rate (Figure 2.3). However, aggregate price moves up by
even more. As a result, real land price falls. Service good consumption decreases as expected
because more resources are re-allocated to the manufacturing sector. What’s a little bit surprising is
that imported good consumption does not increase much, even though fewer manufacturing goods
are consumed. A higher relative price of export goods can partially explain it. A rising investment
due to a larger manufacturing sector is the other reason.
Figure 2.4 shows that a service sector TFP shock does not explain the negative correlation between
land price and investment. A negative service sector TFP shock decreases not only the service sector
output but also the demand for manufacturing goods. This negative effect on manufacturing goods
is due to both an income effect and the complementarity between service and manufacturing goods.
69

Real Land Price

Real Investment

Real Service Output

Real Industrial Output

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0

0

0

0

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

0

20

40

0

Service Employment Ratio

20

40

0

Nominal Return to Land

20

40

0

Nominal Land Price

0.01

0.01

0.01

0

0

0

0

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

20

40

0

20

40

0

20

40

40

Aggregate Price

0.01

0

20

0

20

40

Figure 2.4: The role of service TFP shock in the baseline model
Notes: Solid black (dashed blue) for the IRFs to a one standard-deviation export price (negative
service TFP) shock. Variables are in percentage changes from their trends except for the service
employment ratio, which is in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is
α1 ∗ φ = 0.2666, the land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ =
0.505.
The latter is due to the elasticity of substitution between service and non-service goods smaller
than one. Consequently, investment in the manufacturing sector and the aggregate investment both
decline in addition to the drop in the real land price.
Thus, it can be concluded that the export price (or at most the manufacturing TFP, which has a
similar role to export price in the model) generates the negative correlation between real land price
and real investment, while the service sector TFP cannot.

2.4.3

Discussion on unmatched moments

As noticed, there are several moments unmatched. The correlations between real service/manufacturing
outputs and the real land price are both positive in the model (0.998 and 0.198) while both negative
in the data (−0.109 and −0.232). In addition, the real service output and the investment co-move
in the data with a correlation of 0.185 rather than a negative one as in the model (−0.071). The
correlation between real manufacturing output and real investment is also much lower in the data
(0.476) than in the model (0.963).
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To figure out why these moments are not matched, I deviate from the baseline parameter values to
see whether results can be improved. Table 2.7 (Table 2.8) changes the correlation between sectoral
TFP shocks from 0 to −0.3 (0.3). As expected, with a correlation of −0.3, real investment/export
price and land price are more negatively correlated, and the correlations are closer to those in the data.
However, the correlation between real service output and investment becomes even more negative
in the model rather than positive in the data. On the other hand, if instead I assume positively
correlated sectoral TFPs, real service output and investment can move in the same direction, but the
correlations of interest, i.e., those between real investment/export price and land price become less
negative (−0.403) or even positive (0.0494).
Table 2.7: Model’s standard deviations and correlations with real sectoral outputs (baseline model,
negatively correlated sectoral TFPs)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.0153
0.0233
0.0360
0.0214
0.0117

Simulated correlation
with real investment
-0.207
0.943
-0.203
0.414

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.998
0.133
-0.203
-0.472

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.2666, land
income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks to log
export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log sectoral
TFPs is σe1 , e2 = −0.3 ∗ σ1 ∗ σ2 .

Table 2.8: Model’s standard deviations and correlations with real sectoral outputs (baseline model,
positively correlated sectoral TFPs)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.0134
0.0298
0.0442
0.0183
0.0117

Simulated correlation
with real investment
0.0536
0.976
0.0494
0.507

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.998
0.265
0.0494
-0.403

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.2666, the land
income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks to log
export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log sectoral
TFPs is σe1 , e2 = 0.3 ∗ σ1 ∗ σ2 .

Next, I experiment with a higher capital income share in the service sector. When doing so, I
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leave the labor income shares of both sectors unchanged because the calibration of them deserves
larger confidence. As a result, a larger capital income share (0.4) corresponds to a smaller land
income share of the service sector (0.0948). Expectations are that real service output becomes more
correlated with aggregate investment because the service sector demands higher investment now. In
addition, shifting from the manufacturing sector to the service sector is not supposed to result in an
as large decrease in aggregate investment as before due to a smaller gap between capital intensities
in the two sectors. However, simulated results shown in Table 2.9 are quite surprising. The results
are similar to those with negatively correlated TFP shocks, i.e., smaller real investment/export price
and land price correlations but more negative real service output and investment correlation. These
results have the same problems with those from negatively correlated TFP shocks. We can have either
closer service output and investment correlation to the data or closer real investment/export price
and land price correlations, but not both. And the unexpected results here can only be understood if
we look at the service sector output share in the steady state. The share shrinks from 0.466 to 0.382
with a larger capital income share. A smaller service sector means that this sector, as well as returns
to factors intensively used by it, are impacted more by the export (manufacturing) good price. As a
result, though real investment does not increase as much as before following an export price shock,
land price decreases more (Figure 2.5).
Table 2.9: Model’s standard deviations and correlations with real sectoral outputs (baseline model,
higher capital income share in service)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.01329
0.02318
0.03606
0.01913
0.01169

Simulated correlation
with real investment
-0.2
0.9567
-0.2045
0.4353

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.9955
0.0866
-0.2045
-0.5239

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.4, the land
income share is 1 − φ = 0.0948, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks to log
export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log sectoral
TFPs is σe1 , e2 = 0 .

Changing key parameter values does not help much with the unmatched moments. Thus, there
must be some missing structures leading to negatively correlated land price and sectoral outputs.
Considering the fact that my model tells a totally demand-side story of the land, the supply-side
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Figure 2.5: IRFs to an export price shock in the baseline model with larger service capital income
share
Notes: Solid black (dashed blue) for the IRFs to a one standard-deviation export price (negative service TFP) shock.
Variables in percentage change from trend except for service employment ratio, which is in absolute value. The capital
income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.4, the land income share is 1 − φ = 0.0948, and the labor income share is
(1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505

effect, which is specific to China and Chinese institutions, can help with the results.
Land in China is owned by the state (government), central or local, who only sells or allocates
the use rights of land to developers. In 2002, the Ministry of National Land and Resources required
all land for private development (e.g., business, tourism, entertainment, and commodity house) to be
sold through public auctions after August 31, 2004. As a result, the government can greatly impact
the supply of land and has the incentive to adjust land supply when needed, just as it does to the
investment. When GDP growth slows down, the government can intentionally support real estate
prices because it accounts for a large share of GDP and is used as collateral by many firms. For
example, in October 2008, the central government used a bunch of policy instruments to support real
estate prices. One important and effective way is to reduce the supply of land to boost land and real
estate price. Besides this, the government can use even more direct policy tools such as executive
orders or informal conversations with real estate developers to temporarily prevent real estate price
from falling.21 This effect can alone explain why the outputs of both sectors are negatively correlated
with real land prices. Vice versa, when housing prices grow too fast along with the economy, the
21. This information came from private conversations with local real estate developers.
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central government implements various policies including higher downpayment ratios or purchasing
restriction policies to curb the soaring prices.22 And the correlation being larger (less negative) for
the service sector is consistent with my baseline model. In addition, this channel also makes real
investment/export price and land price correlations more negative and closer to those in the data.
On the other hand, the unmatched real output and investment correlations can be blamed on
another effective and frequently used countercyclical policy tool by the Chinese government, the
government-led investment. One famous example is the four trillion yuan stimulus package in
response to the 2008 financial crisis. When the economy slows down, government-led investment
protects the aggregate investment from dumping, which disconnects real investment and real manufacturing output to some extent (0.476 in the data vs. 0.963 in the model). The positive correlation
between service output and investment can be partially explained by the land supply policy and the
composition of stimulus packages. When there is a negative shock to the export sector, resources
are supposed to move to the service sector by market forces in my model. However, the stimulus
packages by the Chinese government are mostly used on public infrastructure development and
manufacturing projects. Together with the land/real estate prices supported by the government, the
service sector is harmed, and its output cannot increase much. As a result, real service output cannot
be negatively correlated with the real aggregate investment as predicted by the model.

2.5

Models with capital adjustment costs

In the baseline model, the negative correlation between real investment and land price results from
the re-allocation of factors between the two sectors. A natural question arises whether the result
is robust to barriers to the re-allocation. In this section, I deviate from the baseline model and
study two different economies with capital adjustment costs. The first economy includes sectoral
adjustment costs, i.e., costs of capital stock adjustments within each sector. On the other hand,
the second economy features inter-sectoral capital adjustment costs. I first introduce the modified
models, followed by the calibration of adjustment cost parameters.23 Then, quantitative results are
shown and discussed.
22. More details about the Chinese government’s intervention on real estate and land prices are introduced in Fang, Gu,
Xiong, and Zhou (2016) and Glaeser, Huang, Ma, and Shleifer (2017).
23. Other parameters are calibrated either according to the literature or to match steady-state values similar to those in the
baseline model.
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In the baseline model, only aggregate capital K is pre-determined and sectoral demand for capital
within each period pins down K1 and K2 . With capital adjustment costs, however, both K1 and K2
are pre-determined by the representative household. Accordingly, investment in each sector, I1 and
I2 are
I1 = K10 − (1 − δ)K1,

(2.28)

I2 = K20 − (1 − δ)K2 .

(2.29)


I define sectoral capital adjustment costs as ψi ∗ (Ii − δKi )2 /2

i=1,2

. The budget constraint of

the household is
f + Px x + PL (L 0 − L) + Pn n + I1 + I2 + ψ21 (I1 − δK1 )2
+ ψ22 (I2 − δK2 )2 = wl + r1 K1 + r2 K2 + rL L + T,

(2.30)

and the market clearing condition for the manufacturing good market is
Px x + Px x̄ + I1 + I2 + ψ21 (I1 − δK1 )2
+ ψ22 (I2 − δK2 )2 = Px z2 K2α2 l21−α2 .

(2.31)

Replace equations 2.4 and 2.9 with equations 2.30 and 2.31, a new equilibrium for this economy
can be defined similar to that in Definition 2. Due to the page limit, I skip the definition here. The
parameters governing the size of capital adjustment costs, ψi=1,2 , are vital but hard to calibrate. The
calibration of them will be discussed later in this section.
In terms of the inter-sectoral capital adjustment cost, I define it to be symmetric in the two
sectors. The cost is a function of the log ratio of sectoral capital stocks. Denote r1 and r2 the interest
rates of capitals in the two sectors, and the budget constraint of the household is
f + Px x + PL (L 0 − L) + Pn n + I1 + I2 +
ψ
2

log(K10 ) − log(K20 ) − log(K1 ) + log(K2 )
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2

= wl + r1 K1 + r2 K2 + rL L + TL ,

(2.32)

and this correpsonds to a manufacturing good market clearing condition
Px z2 K2α2 l21−α2 = Px x + Px x̄ + I1 + I2 +
ψ
2


log(K10 ) − log(K20 ) − log(K1 + log(K2 ))2 .

(2.33)

Similarly, equations 2.30 and 2.31 in place of equations 2.4 and 2.9 give rise to a new economy
with a inter-sectoral capital adjustment cost and an equilibrium can be defined. It is not easy to
calibrate ψ for this economy due to lack of convincing capital stock data and sectoral GDPs affected
by institutional forces. Thus, I choose ψ = 5000 such that investment is lumpy enough, which can
be seen from the impulse responses.
The baseline parameter values for ψi=1,2 are set to 0.0037. I calibrate them to match the standard
deviation of log real investment in the model with that in the data. This is one of the conditions based
on which Mendoza (1991) sets the values. The other condition is that the ψi=1,2 values produce an
average adjustment cost of about 0.1 percent of GDP. In my model, however, this ratio is only 0.01
percent. One explanation is that my model has another layer of friction besides the classical friction
in his model, which is the inter-sectoral friction. And firms tend to adjust capital less frequently.
Table 2.10 shows the simulated moments with baseline parameter values. None of the moments
except those related to export price resemble the data. Further analysis of the impulse response
functions helps understand why these moments are unmatched.
Table 2.10: Model’s standard deviations and correlations with real sectoral outputs (model with
sectoral capital adjustment costs, ψi=1,2 = 0.0037)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.0171
0.0194
0.0218
0.0215
0.0117

Simulated correlation
with real investment
-0.676
-0.546
0.392
0.197

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.413
0.554
0.392
-0.443

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land
income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks to log
export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log sectoral
TFPs is σe1 , e2 = 0.3 ∗ σ1 ∗ σ2 . Capital adjustment cost parameters are set to ψ1 = ψ2 = 0.0037.

Figure 2.6 displays the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to the export price
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Figure 2.6: IRFs to an export price shock in the model with sectoral capital adjustment costs,
ψi=1,2 = 0.0037
Notes: Solid black (dashed blue) for the IRFs to a one standard-deviation export price shock in the baseline (sectoral
capital adjustment cost) model. Variables in percentage change from trend except for service employment ratio, which is
in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228,
and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. Capital adjustment cost parameters are ψi=1,2 = 0.0037.

(dashed blue line). Surprisingly, in contrast to that in the baseline model, a positive export price
shock increases the real land price and decreases real investment. To understand this, the effect
of a rising export price is divided into an income effect and a production (investment) substitution
effect. The income effect induces the household to consume more, especially more service goods.
The parameter 1/(1 + µ) = 1/1.35 < 1 I choose indicates that service and manufacturing goods
are complementary. The production substitution effect, on the other hand, attracts resources from
the manufacturing to the service sector as in the baseline model. With capital adjustment costs,
the incentive to re-allocate investment is suppressed. As a result, the income effect dominates the
production substitution effect, and real land price rises while real investment falls. Combined with
the co-movement between real land price and investment following the service TFP shock as in Figure
2.7, the correlation between the two is positive (0.392). In addition, when income effect dominates,
outputs of both sectors are negatively correlated with real investment (−0.676 and −0.546). And the
negative correlations can be explained again by the government intervention.
A model is an abstract of the world, and the small share of capital adjustment costs in the GDP
further indicates that a lot is missing about the investment. Thus, it is risky to choose ψi=1,2 only
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Figure 2.7: The role of service TFP shock in the model with sectoral capital adjustment costs,
ψi=1,2 = 0.0037
Notes: Solid black (dashed blue) for the IRFs to a one standard-deviation negative service TFP shock in the baseline
(sectoral capital adjustment cost) model. Variables in percentage change from trend except for service employment ratio,
which is in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land income share is
1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. Capital adjustment cost parameters are ψi=1,2 = 0.0037.

to match the standard deviation of log real investment in the data. So I vary the size of sectoral
adjustment costs to see whether some of the unmatched moments can be revised. Table 2.11 and
Table 2.12 show the moments of the sectoral adjustment cost model with ψi=1,2 equal to 0.025 and
0.0001, respectively. Table 2.11 looks similar to Table 2.10. When sectoral adjustment costs are
high enough at 0.025, real investment and land price become negatively correlated again as in Table
2.11.24 Just as when ψi=1,2 = 0.0037, the income effect dominates, and real land price rises while
investment falls after a positive export shock (Figure 2.8). This effect is large enough with ψ = 0.025
that even the effect of service TFP shocks is dominated, and a negative correlation between real land
price and investment emerges in Table 2.11. Although a large adjustment cost parameter generates
the negative correlation of my interest, too negative correlations between outputs and investment
(−0.888 and −0.817) due to the large income effect are not acceptable.
It is also interesting that ψi=1,2 = 0.0037 and ψi=1,2 = 0.025 lead to similar standard deviations
of log real investment. In other words, the sectoral adjustment cost parameter is not well identified.
When the adjustment cost parameter is small, firms adjust investment more frequently and less
24. 0.025 is equal to that estimated by Craine (1975) and close to that used by Mendoza (1991).
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dramatically. On the other hand, a large adjustment cost parameter discourages firms from frequent
investment adjustment. However, abrupt changes in investment when needed increase the standard
deviation of real investment.
Table 2.11: Model’s standard deviations and correlations (model with sectoral capital adjustment
costs, ψi=1,2 = 0.025)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.0206
0.0235
0.0325
0.0249
0.0117

Simulated correlation
with real investment
-0.888
-0.817
-0.169
0.301

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.603
0.703
-0.169
-0.563

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the
land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks
to log export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log
sectoral TFPs is σe1 , e2 = 0.3 ∗ σ1 ∗ σ2 . Capital adjustment cost parameters are set to ψ1 = ψ2 = 0.025.

Table 2.12: Model’s standard deviations and correlations (model with sectoral capital adjustment
costs, ψi=1,2 = 0.0001)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.0132
0.0251
0.0336
0.0185
0.0117

Simulated correlation
with real investment
0.370
0.967
0.364
0.412

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.998
0.587
0.364
-0.244

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land
income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks to log
export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log sectoral
TFPs is σe1 , e2 = 0.3 ∗ σ1 ∗ σ2 . Capital adjustment cost parameters are set to ψ1 = ψ2 = 0.0001.

Table 2.12 also looks similar to Tables 2.10 and 2.11. Further investigation into Figure 2.9
reveals that with low adjustment costs (0.0001), the real land price still drops, and real investment
still rises following a positive export price shock. However, this effect is smaller than that in the
baseline model and dominated by the effect of service TFP shocks. Consequently, moments are
unmatched in Table 2.12 just as in Table 2.10.
With inter-sectoral capital adjustment costs, Table 2.13 and Figure 2.10 are similar to Table 2.12
and Figure 2.9, respectively. This is because the inter-sectoral adjustment cost only prevents capital
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Figure 2.8: IRFs to an export price shock in the model with inter-sectoral capital adjustment costs,
ψi=1,2 = 0.025
Notes: Solid black (dashed blue) for the IRFs to a one standard-deviation export price shock in the baseline (sectoral
capital adjustment cost) model. Variables in percentage change from trend except for service employment ratio, which is
in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228,
and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. Capital adjustment cost parameters are ψi=1,2 = 0.025.

from moving across sectors but not adjusting within sectors. Such a small cost is comparable to
ψi=1,2 = 0.0001 in the sectoral adjustment cost model.
To sum up, it is hard to calibrate or even identify the adjustment cost parameters in a model with
capital adjustment costs. And the cost reverses the correlation of interest because the key channel is
dominated by either the income effect or the effect of service TFP shocks. In order to re-establish the
desired results, more structures ignored in my model are required to amplify the negative correlation
generated by the production substitution effect.
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Figure 2.9: IRFs to an export price shock in the model with inter-sectoral capital adjustment costs,
ψi=1,2 = 0.0001
Notes: Solid black (dashed blue) for the IRFs to a one standard-deviation export price shock in the baseline (sectoral
capital adjustment cost) model. Variables in percentage change from trend except for service employment ratio, which is
in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228,
and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. Capital adjustment cost parameters are ψi=1,2 = 0.0001.

Table 2.13: Model’s standard deviations and correlations (model with inter-sectoral capital adjustment costs)
Variables
Real service output
Real manufacturing output
Real investment
Real land price
Export price

Simulated
standard deviations
0.0136
0.0270
0.0377
0.0188
0.0117

Simulated correlation
with real investment
0.192
0.969
0.204
0.442

Simulated correlation
with real land price
0.998
0.439
0.2044
-0.306

Notes: All variables are logged and hp-filtered. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land
income share is 1 − φ = 0.228, and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. The covariance between shocks to log
export price and log manufacturing TFP is σe p x , e2 = 0.0563 ∗ σ2 ∗ σpx . The covariance between shocks to log sectoral
TFPs is σe1 , e2 = 0.3 ∗ σ1 ∗ σ2 . The capital adjustment cost parameter ψ = 5000.
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Figure 2.10: IRFs to an export price shock in the model with inter-sectoral capital adjustment costs
Notes: Solid black (dashed blue) for the IRFs to a one standard-deviation export price shock in the baseline (inter-sectoral
capital adjustment cost) model. Variables in percentage change from trend except for service employment ratio, which is
in absolute value. The capital income share of the service sector is α1 ∗ φ = 0.267, the land income share is 1 − φ = 0.228,
and the labor income share is (1 − α1 ) ∗ φ = 0.505. Capital adjustment cost parameter is ψ = 5000.
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2.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, I document the negative correlation between real land price and investment in
China and use a two-sector real business cycle model to explain it. A positive shock on the export
(industrial) price leads to a higher demand for industrial goods than service goods and the reallocation of resources to the industrial sector. As a result, the aggregate investment increases
because the industrial sector is more capital-intensive while the commercial land, which is used only
by the service sector, sees its price decline.
In contrast to previous papers on either a positive or a negative correlation between real estate
price and investment, my explanation for the negative correlation is no longer causal. Also, whether
it is the collateral, the speculation, or the crowding out channel, certain friction or misallocation
exists, and the allocation of resources is inefficient, leaving room for policy intervention. In my
paper, however, the re-allocation of resources is efficient, and there is no need for policies.
Last but not least, I hope my paper can turn researchers’ eyes from an already smaller and still
shrinking industrial sector to a larger and rapidly growing service sector when they study China. The
interaction between these two sectors and their relationship with other macro variables of interest,
i.e., investment, land price, and employment, are worth more future works.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A

Data

This appendix describes the details of the construction of the data used for the empirical evidence of
Section 1.2. Some of them are also used in the indirect inference estimation of Sections 1.5 and 1.6.

A.1

FactSet Revere database and firm-level supply chain

The industry-level supplier number is constructed using the FactSet Revere database. This database
is currently the most comprehensive database for customer-supplier relationships among US firms.
The relationship information25 are collected systematically from public sources such as SEC 10-K
annual filings, investor presentations, and press releases reported by either the customer or supplier
firms. Compared to the commonly used Compustat Customer Segment database which only includes
major customers that contribute to more than 10% of a firm’s revenue26, FactSet Revere provides
a much less truncated set of suppliers. The broader coverage results in more accurate numbers of
suppliers with more substantial variation across firms/industries and over time, which are important
for the analysis of adjustments on the extensive margin.
The FactSet supply chain dataset gathers 871,547 customer-supplier relationship records between
596,678 pairs of firms from 2003-2019. Each relationship record includes the start and end dates
of the relationship. For industry-level analysis, I need firms’ industry classifications. I use the first
six digits of firms’ Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) numbers to
merge with Compustat Capital IQ Historic Segment data to obtain firms’ NAICS classifications. I
classify firms into fifteen two-digit NAICS industries, which include Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
25. I use the FactSet Revere dataset subscribed by the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
26. Public-traded companies are required to report their major customers in accordance with Financial Accounting
Standards No. 131.
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and hunting, Mining, Utilities, Construction, Manufacturing, Wholesale trade, Retail trade, Transportation and warehousing, Information, Finance and insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing,
Professional and business services, Educational services, Health care and social assistance, Arts,
entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services, Other services, except government,
and Government.
In terms of sample coverage, I focus on supply chain relationships among US firms because
my paper is about domestic production networks. Also, FactSet collects historical information only
back to 2011 for European firms, 2013 for Japanese firms, and 2015 for other Asian firms. I avoid
sample truncation by focusing on US firms. Furthermore, the reasons for the exit of a firm from
their database include but do not limit to bankruptcy. Thus, I exclude the drop of suppliers due to
reasons other than producers’ choices. I drop the entire record of a customer-supplier relationship
if its termination year coincides with the exit year of either the customer or the supplier side of this
relationship. I also merge my supply chain dataset with the SDC Platinum dataset and exclude those
relationships which terminate due to a merger or an acquisition of either the customer or the supplier
firm. For the same pair of customer and supplier firms, some relationship records overlap or seem
consecutive. I consider these records to be consecutive and combine them into one relationship if
the gap between them is less than one year. The above selection of the sample leaves me with 61,937
customer-supplier relationships between 58,254 pairs of firms, involving 5246 customer firms and
5148 supplier firms.

A.2

Numbers of suppliers, input expenditures, and supply chain management costs

With the relationship records in hand, I construct industry-level and firm-level numbers of suppliers.
On the industry level, I construct the panel data of supplier numbers between each pair of industries.
In each year and for each pair of customer industry A and supplier industry B, I count the number of
relationships in which the customer and the supplier firms belong to industries A and B, respectively.
The fifteen industries I use lead to 256 inter-industry observations in each year. I denote by vind,ns,t
the number of suppliers that customer industry n sources from in industry s in year t. Denote
Í
customer industry n’s total supplier number by vind,n,t = s0 vind,ns0 ,t . On the firm level, I count
each firm i’s total number of suppliers in year t and denote it by v f ir m,i,t .
The industry-level intermediate input expenditures, real output, and capital input data are from
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the BEA. I calculate industry-by-industry input expenditures based on the BEA Input-Output (before
redefinition) Make and Use tables. The annual Use tables are commodity-by-industry, which show
industry n’s use of commodity s in dollars for each pair of industry n and commodity s. The annual
Make tables are industry-by-commodity, which show industry m’s production of commodity s in
dollars for each pair of industry m and commodity s. Since the mapping between industries and
commodities is not one-to-one, I use the Make tables to convert commodity-by-industry intermediate
input expenditures to industry-by-industry following Tian (2019). Denote by pxvind,ns,t industry
Í
n’s use of industry s good as intermediate inputs in dollars at t and by pxvind,n,t = s0 pxvind,ns0 ,t
industry n’s total intermediate input expenditures. I deflate intermediate input expenditures using the
GDP deflator. On the other hand, real output, and capital and labor inputs by industry are obtained
from the BEA Industry Accounts. Chain-type quantity indexes for gross output by industry are used
as real output and denoted by qind,n,t for industry n in year t. Chain-type quantity indexes for the
net stock of private (government) fixed assets by industry are used as capital inputs and denoted by
k ind,n,t for industry n in year t. The number of hours is computed using the Industry Hours and
Employment data of the BLS Industry Productivity and Costs database. Hours include those of paid
employees, the self-employed (partners and proprietors), and unpaid family workers. The number of
hours by industry from the BLS is used as labor input and denoted by lind,n,t for industry n in year t.
On the firm-level, there is no intermediate input expenditure data between customers and suppliers. Thus, I use a firm’s cost of goods sold (i.e., “all costs directly allocated by the company to
production, such as material, labor, and overhead," and denoted by cogs f ir m,i,t for firm i at t) and its
number of employee l f ir m,i,t (Compustat code emp) from CRSP/Compustat Merged Fundamentals
Annual to construct intermediate input expenditures similar to Keller and Yeaple (2009). Firm i’s
real intermediate input in period t is xv f ir m,i,t = (cogs f ir m,i,t − l f ir m,i,t ∗ wind,n,t )/pind,n,t . wind,n,t
and pind,n,t are the BEA wages and salaries per full-time equivalent employee and the chain-type
intermediate input price index of firm i’s (up to four-digit) NAICS industry n, respectively. Firm
i’s sales (Compustat code sale) at period t is deflated by the BEA chain-type gross output price
index of firm i’s (up to four-digit) NAICS industry n to construct the real sales sales f ir m,i,t . I
construct investment and capital stock using the gross plant, property, and equipment (Compustat
code ppegt) and the net plant, property, and equipment (Compustat code ppent) following Ottonello
and Winberry (2018). In particular, I set the first value of k f ir m,i,t+1 to ppegt f ir m,i,t in the first
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period in which this variable is reported in CRSP/Compustat since 1950. From this period onwards,
I compute investment (net of depreciation) as inv f ir m,i,t = ppent f ir m,i,t − ppent f ir m,i,t−1 and capital
stock as k f ir m,i,t+1 = k f ir m,i,t + inv f ir m,i,t . The initial capital stock and investment each period
are both deflated by the (up to four-digit) NAICS industry-level (fixed asset) investment price index. This investment price index is constructed as the ratio of the BEA historical-cost price to the
chain-type quantity indexes for investment in private fixed assets. If a firm has a missing observation of inv f ir m,i,t located between two periods with nonmissing observations, I impute the missing
observation using a linear interpolation.
In addition to input expenditures, the supply chain management cost (i.e., the cost of managing
suppliers) also affects the choice of supplier numbers. Supply chain management is an internal
operational process, for which there is no direct data on the dynamics of the cost. Thus, I utilize the
OES dataset to construct a proxy for supply chain management costs. The OES includes a semiannual
survey on occupational employment and wage rates for workers in US nonfarm establishments. This
dataset provides occupational estimates of employment and wages by industry. The estimates are
based on six panels of survey data collected over a three-year cycle. As a result, the estimate at
any point depends on the survey data in the past three years. For example, data collected in May
2016 are combined with data collected in November 2015, May 2015, November 2014, May 2014,
and November 2013 to provide an estimate for May 2016. I use the two-digit NAICS industrylevel employment estimate of the occupation “Purchasing Agents, Except Wholesale, Retail, and
Farm Products" (in the May of each year) to proxy the supply chain management cost, and denote
it by purch_empind,n,t for industry n in year t. The definition of this occupation by the BLS is
“purchasing machinery, equipment, tools, parts, supplies, or services necessary for the operation of
an establishment, and purchasing raw or semi-finished materials for manufacturing.” This occupation
excludes "Buyers and Purchasing Agents, Farm Products" and "Wholesale and Retail Buyers, Except
Farm Products," which involve purchases for resale. Thus, the occupation “Purchasing Agents,
Except Wholesale, Retail, and Farm Products" is only related to the production process. The OES
survey spans 1988 to 2018. However, its estimates by NAICS industry started in 2002. Also, the
data for the occupation “Purchasing Agents, Except Wholesale, Retail, and Farm Products" ended
in 2016. As a result, I focus on the period from 2003 to 2016.
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A.3

Weighted industry-level total number of suppliers and input quantity

Because different supplier industries’ shares in customer industry n’s input expenditures are different,
extensive margin adjustments in different supplier industries by the customer industry vary in the
importance. Therefore, I weight a customer industry’s number of suppliers and input quantity per
supplier in each supplier industry by the intermediate input shares. I define extensive and intensive
margin adjustments as dlnvind,n,t and dlnxind,n,t , respectively. The adjustments on the two margins
are computed as follows:
dlnvind,n,t =

Õ ωind,ns,t−1 + ωind,ns,t
2

s

dlnxind,n,t =

Õ ωind,ns,t−1 + ωind,ns,t
2

s

where ωind,ns,t = pxvind,ns,t

Í
s

0

d ln vind,ns,t

d ln xind,ns,t

pxvind,ns0 ,t is the share of industry s’ goods in industry n’s total

intermediate input expenditures in year t. In particular, I use the average input shares of two adjacent
years t − 1 and t because some input shares change a lot from year to year.

A.4

Estimate the return to variety using Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin methods

In Olley-Pakes estimations, I use investment lninv f ir m,i,t to proxy for the unobserved time-varying
productivity shock (not due to extensive margin adjustments). lninv f ir m,i,t is constructed as the
share of current period’s investment (net of depreciation) in the capital stock at the beginning of
the period, i.e., lninv f ir m,i,t = ln k f ir m,i,t+1 − ln k f ir m,i,t . I deviate from Olley and Pakes (1996) in
constructing this proxy because net investment better reflects firms’ decisions after observing the
productivity shock. Moreover, I use the share of net investment in capital stock rather than the
log investment because the net investment can be negative sometimes. I also control for four-digit
NAICS industry-level dummies because the price indexes used for different industries’ firms are not
comparable, leading to different intercepts for different firms. In Levinsohn-Petrin estimations, I
follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to use real intermediate inputs ln xv f ir m,i,t as a proxy for the
unobserved time-varying productivity shock. Because ln xv f ir m,i,t is used as a proxy, its coefficient
is not identified, and there is no estimate for it. I use the R package prodest of Rovigatti (2018) to
estimate the production functions.
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B

Alternative motivation behind extensive margin adjustments

In this section, I describe possible alternative motivations behind extensive margin adjustments.
Then, I provide evidence that these motives are not the driving forces behind EMAs.
An immediate motivation behind pro-cyclical adjustments of supplier numbers is the capacity
constraint. During booms, firms expand their input purchases, which may hit the capacity constraints
of individual suppliers’. As a result, firms are forced to source from more suppliers. Although
capacity constraint is unobservable, this story has an implication which can be tested. We know
the capacity constraint is more likely to be hit when input expenditures increase than when they
decrease. As a result, firms’ supplier numbers increase more in expansions than they decrease in
contraction if extensive margin adjustments are mainly driven by the capacity constraint. Thus,
although input expenditures (sales) per supplier increase when input expenditures (sales) rise, the
increase should be less than the decrease when input expenditures (sales) fall. This implication is
tested by estimating the following two equations:

d ln(
d ln(

pxvind,n,t
) = β101 d ln(pxvind,n,t ) + β102 dummy pxv d ln(pxvind,n,t ) + 10,n,t , (B.1)
vind,n,t

sales f ir m,i,t
) = β111 d ln(sales f ir m,i,t ) + β112 dummysales d ln(sales f ir m,i,t ) + 11,n,t , (B.2)
v f ir m,i,t

where dummy pxv and dummysales are equal to one when input expenditures (sales) increase, and
are zero otherwise. β102 and β112 are expected to be positive if the capacity constraint is the major
reason behind extensive margin adjustments.
Columns (a) and (b) of Table A1 show the results of regressions B.1 and B.2. Unsurprisingly,
when the total input expenditures (of a customer industry) and the sales (of a customer firm) increase
by 1%, input expenditures and sales per supplier increase by 0.5% and 0.88%, respectively. The
coefficients of the two interaction terms, on the other hand, are insignificantly and significantly
positive in columns (a) and (b), respectively. The positive coefficients indicate that the rise in
suppliers in expansions is larger than the fall in contractions. The asymmetry of extensive margin
adjustments is in the opposite direction of what the capacity constraint story implies. As a result,
I argue that the capacity constraint is not the driving force of extensive margin adjustments in the
data.
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Table A1: Input expenditure (sales) per supplier vs. input expenditure (sales)

VARIABLES
pxvind,n,t
dummy pxv *pxvind,n,t

(a)
Input Expenditure per Supplier
0.507***
(0.190)
0.496
(0.367)

sales f ir m,i,t
dummysales *sales f ir m,i,t
Observations
R2

195
0.181

(b)
Sales per Supplier

0.875***
(0.024)
0.0763**
(0.034)
14,627
0.289

Note: Data are annual from 2003 to 2016. The dependent variables are industry’s input expenditure per supplier and firm’s
sales per supplier in columns (a) and (b), respectively. pxvind,n,t is the industry’s total intermediate input expenditure,
and sales f ir m,i,t is the firm’s sales. dummy pxv and dummysales are equal to one when input expenditures and sales
increase, respectively, and are zero otherwise. All variables except the dummies are log-differenced. Input expenditures
and sales are deflated using the GDP deflator. Industry and firm fixed effects are controlled in columns (a) and (b),
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.

Another motivation for using more suppliers is to increase competition among suppliers and
reduce costs. If this motivation is the driving force of extensive margin adjustments, I should find
pro-cyclical markups due to the pro-cyclical adjustments of supplier numbers in the data. However,
Bils, Klenow, and Malin (2018) found that price markups estimated using intermediate input shares
are counter-cyclical. Thus, I rule out the possibility that increasing competition to lower cost is the
driving force of extensive margin adjustments.
The other reason for extensive margin adjustments can be risk mitigation. Firms are worried
about supply chain disruptions, which can result in operation and production interruptions and
significant losses. For example, Carvalho, Nirei, Saito, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2016) documented a
1.2% decline in Japan’s gross output due to supply chain disruptions in the year following the 2011
Great East Japan Earthquake. However, if the risk concern is the driving motive of adjustments
in supplier numbers, the adjustments are more likely to be counter-cyclical due to a higher risk in
downturns.
With the above reasonings, I assume a productivity gain of more input suppliers (varieties) in
my model.

91

C

Math appendix

This appendix presents the definition of the competitive equilibrium in Section 1.4.3, the simplified
multi-industry model in Section 1.4.4, and the proof of the propositions in the main text.

C.1

Competitive equilibrium definition of the full model


Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium is composed of firms’ output prices pn,i,t (st )

n,i

, consump-

tion and capital good prices PtC (st ) and PtK (st ), the wages of production and management labors

wt (st ) and {wmng,n,t (st )}n , and the capital rental rate rt (st ); allocations Lt (st ),Ct (st ),Kt+1 (st ),CtP (st ),KtP (st ) ,



P (s t ), k
t
t
t
{Lmng,n,t (st )}n , xn,i,s,t (m)(st ) n,i,s,m , Vn,i,s,t (st ) n,i,s , cn,i,t (st ), k n,i,t
n,i,t (s ),ln,i,t (s ),qn,i,t (s ) n,i
∀ t and st such that:
1. Given consumption and capital good prices, wage, and capital rental rate,


Ct (st ),Kt+1 (st ), Lt (st )

t,s t

and {Lmng,n,t (st )}n solve the representative household’s problem in

equation 1.35.

Given other firms’ prices, the wages, and the capital rental rate, xn,i,s,t (m)(st )

,
s,m

Vn,i,s,t (st ) s , k n,i,t (st ), ln,i,t (st ), pn,i,t (st ) solve firm’s problem in equation 1.29 ∀ n, i, t, and st .

 P
3.
Given all firms’ prices, cn,i,t (st ) n,i and k n,i,t
(st ) n,i solve consumption and capital
2.

good producers’ problems in equations 1.32 and 1.33 ∀ t and st .
4. The market of each firm’s goods clears, i.e., ∀ n, i, t, and st
Í ∫1
P (s t ) + c
t
t
qn,i,t (st ) = k n,i,t
n,i,t (s ) + s ∈S 0 1 {i ∈ Vs,m,n,t }xs,m,n,t (i)(s )dm.
5. Consumption and capital good markets clear, i.e., ∀ t and st
∫
Í
Ct (st ) = CtP (st ), KtP (st ) = Kt+1 (st ) − Kt (st ) + n δn i ∈[0,1] k n,i,t (st )di.
6. Capital rental and labor market clear, i.e., ∀ t and st
Í∫
Í∫
Kt (st ) =
k
(st )di and Lt (st ) =
l
(st )di.
i ∈[0,1] n,i,t
i ∈[0,1] n,i,t
n∈S

n∈S

7. Supply chain management labor markets clear, i.e., ∀ n, t, and st
∫ 1Í
Lmng,n,t (st ) = 0 vn,i,s,t (st )di.
s
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C.2

A simplified multi-industry model

The problem of industry n representative firm is
πn =

max

pn ,ln , {x ns ,vns } s

(pn − mcn )qn − wmng,n

Õ

vns

s

Zn Xnα ln1−α ≥ qn

s.t.

"
Õ

Xn =

γ−1

x −1) #  x
! γ(
 −1
(γ−1)
x

x

(C.1)

1+ϕ
ωns vns s xnsγ

s ∈S

"
=

Õ

1+ϕ s γ
γ−1

ωns vns



vns xns



!  x −1 #   x−1
x

x

,

s ∈S

where all industries share the same intermediate input share α. Notice that (as if) facing a monopolistic competitive demand, firms’ choose prices pn = γ/(γ − 1)mcn . I still make the Assumption
1 that industry representative firms take as given the prices of other industries and the wages of
production and management labors. The marginal cost of industry n firm is
mcn = Zn−1

hÕ

 1+ϕ s γ  1− x i 1−α
x
x
ωns
w 1−α · constantmc0
vns1−γ ps

(C.2)

s ∈S

where constantmc0 = αα (1 − α)1−α .
On the household side, there is a representative household who combines goods from all industries into the aggregate consumption good and consumes. Assume that the representative household
incurs only disutility from supplying management labor, then its problem is:

max

{cn ,L mng , n } n , L

s.t.



Õ
η
log C −
Lmng,n
n∈S

PC C = wL +

Õ

(πn + wmng,n Lmng,n )

n∈S

C=

N
Õ

 c −1
c

ξnc cn

n=1
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!   c−1
c

(C.3)

where the price of the aggregate consumption good price is27

P =
C

N
Õ


c
ξnc c p1−
n

! 1−1

c

(C.4)

n=1

I further assume total production labor supply is fixed and L = L̄ = 1. Prices are normalized so that
the wage of production labor w = 1.

C.3

Proof of the propositions

Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium which satisfies
equilibrium definition 1, and all firms behave symmetrically such that,
1. Firms choose the same input quantity and number of varieties, price, and production and
management labor, i.e., xi (m) = x ∀ i,m ∈ Vi and vi = v, pi = p, li = l ∀ i.
2.

The consumption good producer uses the same quantity of goods from each firm, i.e.,

ci = c ∀ i.
Proof. Under Assumption 3, firms are randomly chosen as suppliers. Thus, they have no incentive
to lower prices to be selected. Then under the monopolistic competition assumption in Assumption
2, the demand for firm i’s goods is
qi (pi ) = pi /P

C  −γ

C+

∫

1

1{i ∈ Vm }vmϕγ pi /Φm

 −γ

Xm dm

0

=

−γ
pi

h

P

C γ

C+

∫

1

1{i ∈ Vm }vmϕγ Φγm Xm dm

i

0

∫ 1
i
C +E
1{i ∈ Vm }vmϕγ Φγm Xm dm
0
∫ 1
i
h

γ
−γ
= pi
PC C +
E{i ∈ Vm }vmϕγ Φγm Xm dm
0
∫ 1
h
i

γ
ϕγ γ
−γ
Pr {i ∈ Vm }vm Φm Xm dm
= pi
PC C +
0
∫ 1
i
h
γ
1+ϕγ γ
−γ
−γ
= pi
PC C +
vm Φm Xm dm = pi D̃,
−γ

= pi

h

P

C γ

(C.5)

0

∫ 1 1+ϕγ γ
γ
where aggregate demand for firm i’s goods is defined as D̃ ≡ PC C + 0 vm Φm Xm dm, Φm =
27. In computation, I normalize {vns }n,s , {xns }n,s , and {cn }n with their steady-state values so that {ωns }n,s is the
long-run share of industry s goods in the intermediate input of industry n, and ξnC is the long-run share of industry n
good in the aggregate consumption good.
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ϕγ 1−γ

∫

 1/(1−γ)

 −γ
is the composite intermediate input price of firm m. pi /PC C is firm
∫ 1 1+ϕγ γ
i’s consumption demand while 0 vm Φm Xm dm is the intermediate input demand. The second
Vm

vm pi

di

equality holds due to the law of large numbers and the fourth one holds due to random selection for
∫ 1 1+ϕγ γ


γ
suppliers. Due to these two assumptions, PC C + 0 vm Φm Xm dm is unaffected by pi and the
subscript of D̃ can be omitted.
Now I derive the marginal cost of firm i from the cost minimization problem 1.15 under
Assumption 1. The Lagrange function of the problem is
∫



pm xi (m)dm + wli + wmng vi + mci qi − Z Xiα li1−α
m∈Vi
#
"
∫
γα
 γ−1
∫
γ−1
ϕ
1−α
li
,
=
pm xi (m)dm + wli + wmng vi + mci qi − Z
vi xi (m) γ dm

L=

m∈Vi

m∈Vi

where mci is the Lagrange multiplier and thus the shadow price of output, or the marginal cost.
First-order conditions w.r.t. li and xi (m) yield

li :
xi (m) :

w = (1 − α)mci Z Xiα li−α,
pm =

mci ZαXiα−1 li1−α

(C.6)

∫

ϕ

m∈Vi

vi xi (m)

γ−1
γ

! γ/(γ−1)−1

ϕ

vi xi (m)−1/γ .

dm

(C.7)

ϕγ

Raise both sides of equation C.7 to the power of 1 − γ, then multiply by vi , and integrate over Vi ,
we have
∫
Vi

ϕγ 1−γ
vi pm dm

(

= mci ZαXiα−1 li1−α

h∫
m∈Vi

γ−1
ϕ
vi xi (m) γ dm

i γ/(γ−1)−1

) 1−γ ∫
Vi

ϕ

vi xi (m)(γ−1)/γ dm
(C.8)

Raise both sides of equation C.8 to the power of 1/(1 − γ), we have
∫
Vi

Denote Φi ≡

∫
Vi

ϕγ 1−γ

vi pm dm

ϕγ 1−γ

vi pm dm

 1/(1−γ)

= αmci Z Xiα−1 li1−α .

(C.9)

 1/(1−γ)
, which is the price of the composite intermediate input used by

firm i. Raise both sides of equations C.6 and C.9 to the powers of α and 1 − α, respectively, combine
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them, and rearrange, we have
mci = Z −1 Φiα w 1−α α−α (1 − α)α−1,

(C.10)

which is exactly equation 1.16.
Using the envelope theorem, we derive the optimal price set by firms.
∫ 1
−γ
i
∂πi ∂(pi − mci )pi h C  γ
1+ϕγ γ
=
P C+
vm Φm Xm dm = 0
∂pi
∂pi
0
−γ

−γ−1

⇔

(1 − γ)pi = −γmci pi

⇔

pi =

γ
mci ,
γ −1

which is equation 1.19.
Now we derive the optimal choice of input varieties. Denote

∂y
∂m

as the partial effect of adding

input variety m on any variable y, and use the envelope theorem, we have
∂πi
∂mci
=−
qi − wmng
∂m
∂m
∂mci
⇔ −wmng =
qi ,
∂m
∫
∫
 −1 1 

ϕγ 1−γ
ϕγ 1−γ
ϕγ−1 1−γ
vi pm + ϕγ
= αmci qi
vi
pm dm .
vi pm dm
1−γ
Vi
Vi

(C.11)

Integrate both sides of equation C.11 on the set Vi and rearrange, we have
∫

∫
 −1 1  ∫

ϕγ 1−γ
ϕγ 1−γ
wmng vi = −αmci qi
vi pm dm + ϕγ
vi pm dm ,
1 − γ Vi
Vi
Vi
∫
1 + ϕγ
1 + ϕγ
=
αmci qi =
pm xi (m)dm.
(C.12)
γ −1
γ − 1 Vi
ϕγ 1−γ
vi pm dm

Now we derive the optimal choices by the household. Write down the Lagrange function of
household’s problem 1.17
L = log
= log



η
C − Lmng

" ∫


1



γ−1
γ

ci



+ λ wL +

di

γ
 γ−1

∫

1

πi di + wmng Lmng − PC C
0
#
"
∫

η
− Lmng

1

+ λ wL +

0

0
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πi di + wmng Lmng − P

C

∫
0

1

γ−1
γ

ci

di

γ
 γ−1

#
,

= log

" ∫


1

γ−1
γ

ci

di

γ
 γ−1

η
− Lmng

#

"
+ λ wL +

∫

0

1

πi di + wmng Lmng −

∫

0

1

#
pi ci di .

(C.13)

0

First-order conditions of equation yield

ci :



η
C − Lmng

 −1  ∫

γ−1
γ

1

ci

di

1
 γ−1

−1
ci γ

= λpi = λP

C

∫

0

Lmng :



η

C − Lmng

 −1

1

γ−1

ci γ di

1
 γ−1

−1

ci γ ,

(C.14)

0

η−1

ηLmng = λwmng .

(C.15)

From the second equality of equation C.14, we have the price of the aggregate consumption

P =
C

∫

1

1
! 1−γ

1−γ
pi

.

(C.16)

0

Combine equations C.14 and C.15, we have
η−1

wmng = PC ηLmng .

(C.17)

Now I prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium by constructing such an equilibrium that
satisfies equilibrium conditions C.5, C.6, C.7, C.9, C.10, C.12, C.14, C.15, C.17, 1.19, and market
clearing conditions, and all variables (except Vi which differ in the elements but share the same
measure vi = v) take the same value for each firm.
First, I show that in a symmetric equilibrium, any individual firm has no incentive to deviate from
the symmetric solutions. Suppose in an equilibrium, all firms set the same price pi = p ∀i ∈ [0,1].
According to the first-order condition w.r.t. input quantity, C.7, xi (m) = xi ∀m ∈ Vi & ∀i ∈ [0,1].
Also,
Φi =

∫
Vi

ϕγ

vi p1−γ dm

 1/(1−γ)

1+ϕγ

= vi 1−γ p,
α 1+ϕγ
1−γ

mci = Z −1 w 1−α α−α (1 − α)α−1 vi

(C.18)

pα .

(C.19)

Replace the mci and qi in equation C.12 with equations C.5 and C.19, we have
wmng vi =

α 1+ϕγ
vi 1−γ

 1−α α−γ h C  γ
1 + ϕγ −1 1−α
Z w
α/(1 − α)
p
P C+
γ −1
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∫

1

1+ϕγ

vm
0

γ

Φm Xm dm

i

⇔

1−α 1+ϕγ
vi 1−γ

=

−1 1 + ϕγ −1 1−α
wmng
Z w

γ −1

α/(1 − α)

 1−α

p

α−γ

h

P

C γ

C+

∫

1

1+ϕγ

vm

i
γ
Φm Xm dm , (C.20)

0

where the left hand side of the second equation is the same for all firms. As a result, vi = v ∀i ∈ [0,1].
In turn, according to equations C.18 and C.19, Φi = Φ and mci = mc for all i ∈ [0,1]. From equation
1.19, we confirm that pi = γ/(γ − 1)mc = p ∀i ∈ [0,1]. Thus, given that all suppliers set the same
price, the marginal costs of all firms will be the same, so do their prices, which is intrinsically
coherent. In turn, xi (m) = x, ∀ i ∈ [0,1] & m ∈ Vm according to equation C.12. In other words, given
that other firms in the economy choose the same price, the optimal solution to a firm’s problem is
to set the same price, use the same number of input varieties, and use the same input quantity from
each chosen variety as other firms. Thus, each individual firm will not deviate from the symmetric
equilibrium solution.
Because q = Z Xiα li1−α = Z Xi /li

α

li , and combined with equation C.6, we have

wli
(1 − α)mc
(1 − α)mc · q
⇔ li =
≡ l,
w
q=

∀ i ∈ [0,1],

(C.21)

and in turn
Xi =
Because X = v

γ(1+ϕ)
γ−1



 1/α
w
l ≡ X,
(1 − α)mc · Z

∀ i ∈ [0,1].

(C.22)

xi , xi (m) = xi = x ∀m ∈ Vi & ∀i ∈ [0,1]. Then equation C.5 becomes

h
i
γ
qi (p) = p−γ PC C + Φγ Xv 1+ϕγ = q,

∀ i ∈ [0,1],

(C.23)

The symmetric equilibrium can be constructed as and must be a set of 15 different groups of
variables
xi (m) = x
vi = v,

∀ i ∈ [0,1] & m ∈ Vi ,

qi = q,

pi = p,

mci = mc,

Xi = X,

and w, wmng, Lmng, C, PC , λ
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li = l,

ci = c,

Φi = Φ ∀ i ∈ [0,1],

which satisfy the following 15 equations: first order conditions,
Φ = αmc · q/X,
1 + ϕγ
px,
γ −1
γ
p=
mc,
γ −1

wmng =

w = (1 − α)mc · q/l,
η−1

wmng = PC ηLmng,
η

C − Lmng

 −1

= λPC ,

(C.24)
(C.25)
(C.26)
(C.27)
(C.28)
(C.29)

market clearing conditions,
l = L̄ = 1,

(C.30)

q = c + vx,

(C.31)

v = Lmng,

(C.32)

and aggregators and the production function,
X =v
Φ=v

(1+ϕ)γ
γ−1
1+ϕγ
1−γ

x,

p,

(C.33)
(C.34)

C = c,

(C.35)

PC = p,

(C.36)

w = 1,

(C.37)

q = Z X α l 1−alpha .

(C.38)

According to the proof of Proposition 3, the solution of q is unique, v = (1 + ϕγ)αq/(ηγ)

 1/η

is

unique, and x = α(γ − 1)q/γ is also unique. As a result, the other variables in the equilibrium also
have unique solutions. Thus, we can conclude that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. 
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, ∀n,s ∈ S and in the (symmetric) equilibrium, the number
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of input varieties used satisfies
1 + ϕγ
pxv = PC ηv η .
γ −1

(1.20)

Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium, combine equations C.12, C.28, and C.32, we have
1 + ϕγ
pxv = wmng v = PC ηv η .
γ −1

Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 to 3 and in the (symmetric) equilibrium, the aggregate output
and consumption in the economy, Q = q and C can be represented as functions of only the productivity
Z,
1

Q =Z

1−α−α

1+ϕγ
η(γ−1)

· constantq ,

(1.24)

1+ϕγ
γ − 1  1−α−α η(γ−1)
C = 1−α
Z
· constantq ,
γ
1



where constantq =



1+ϕγ
α η(γ−1)

1+ϕγ 
 α η(γ−1)

γ−1
γ α

α

!

(1.25)

1
1−α−α

1+ϕγ
η(γ−1)

.

Proof. Using Proposition 2 and PC = p,
1 + ϕγ
1 + ϕγ
γ − 1 1 + ϕγ
pxv =
αpq
=
αpq,
γ −1
γ −1
γ
γ
 1 + ϕγ  1/η
⇔v =
αq
.
ηγ
pηv η =

(C.39)

On the other hand,
γ −1
pq,
γ
γ −1
⇔v x = α
q.
γ
pxv = α

(C.40)

Replace the v x and v in the production function C.38 with equations C.39 and C.40, we have
q = Z X α l 1−α = Z(vx)α v
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1+ϕγ
γ−1 α

,

1+ϕγ
 γ − 1  α  1 + ϕγ  η(γ−1)
α
.
=Z α
q
αq
γ
ηγ

Rearrange, we have
q1−α− η(γ−1) α = Z X α l 1−α = Z(vx)α v
1+ϕγ

1+ϕγ
γ−1 α

,

1

⇔Q = q = Z

where constantq =



1+ϕγ
α η(γ−1)

1+ϕγ 
 α η(γ−1)

γ−1
γ α

α

!

1−α−α

1+ϕγ
η(γ−1)

· constantq ,

1
1−α−α

1+ϕγ
η(γ−1)

.

According to the market clearing condition for goods, C.31,
C = c = q − vx = q − α


γ −1
γ −1
q,
q = 1−α
γ
γ

1+ϕγ
γ − 1  1−α−α η(γ−1)
Z
= 1−α
· constantq .
γ
1




Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5, there is a symmetric equilibrium which satisfies
equilibrium definition 1, and all firms within an industry behave symmetrically such that ∀ t and st ,
1. Firms within an industry choose the same input quantity and number of varieties, price, production and management labor, and capital input, i.e., xn,i,s,t (m)(st ) = xns,t (st ) ∀n, i, s & m ∈ Vn,i,s,t ;
and vn,i,s,t (st ) = vns,t (st ) ∀n & i; pn,i,t (st ) = pn,t (st ), ln,i,t (st ) = ln,t (st ), k n,i,t (st ) = k n,t (st ) ∀n and i.
2. The consumption good producer uses the same quantity of goods from each firm in an industry
P (s t ) = k P (s t ) ∀n and i.
n, so does the capital good producer, i.e., cn,i,t (st ) = cn,t (st ), k n,i,t
n,t

Proof. Under Assumption 5, firms are randomly chosen as suppliers from an industry. Thus, they
have no incentive to lower prices to be selected. Then under the monopolistic competition assumption
in Assumption 4, the demand for industry n, firm i’s goods at time t is
(
−γn
qn,i,t (pn,i,t ) =pn,i,t

h

PtC

1


CtP  c ξnC

∫ 1
0

1− x
x

c

γ n −1
γn
n,i0 ,t

αx,s mcs,m,t qs,m,t Xs,m,t ωsn
(
−γn
=pn,i,t

h

PtC

1


CtP  c ξnC

∫ 1
0

di

0



γ n  c −1
γ n −1  c −1

Vs , m, n, t

γ n −1

"
+

Õ∫ 1
s

∫

γn
0
cn,i
0 ,t di

i γn



1{i ∈ Vs,m,n,t }

0

γ n −1
ϕn
vs,m,n,t
xs,m,n,t (i 0 ) γ n di 0

γ n  c −1
γ n −1  c −1
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i γn

+



γ n  x −1
γ n −1  x −1

ϕn
vs,m,n,t

! γn

#)
dm

"

Õ∫ 1
s

1+ϕ n γn
vs,m,n,t

1− x
x

αx,s mcs,m,t qs,m,t Xs,m,t ωsn

∫
Vs , m, n, t

0

γ n −1
ϕn
xs,m,n,t (i 0 ) γ n di 0
vs,m,n,t



γ n  x −1
γ n −1  x −1

−γ

n
≡pn,i,t
D̃n,t ,

! γn

#)
dm

(C.41)

where aggregate demand for industry n, firm i’s goods is defined as D̃n,t . The first term in the
braces is firm i’s consumption demand while the second term is the intermediate input demand. Due
to random selection for suppliers and the law of large numbers, D̃n,t is unaffected by pn,i,t and also
the subscript i can be omitted following the derivation of equation C.5.
Now I derive the marginal cost of industry n, firm i from the cost minimization problem 1.30
under Assumption 1. The Lagrange function of the problem is
L=

Õ∫
s ∈S

m∈Vn, i , s , t

ps,m,t xn,i,s,t (m)dm + (rt + δn )PtK k n,i,t + wt ln,i,t + wmng,n,t

Õ

vn,i,s,t +

s



αx , n αk , n 1−αx , n −αk , n
mcn,i,t qn,i,t − Zn,t Xn,i,t
k n,i,t ln,i,t
,
where mcn,i,t is the Lagrange multiplier and thus the shadow price of output, or the marginal cost.
First-order conditions w.r.t. k n,i,t , ln,i,t , and xn,i,s,t (m) yield

k n,i,t :

(rt + δn )PtK = αk,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t /k n,i,t ,

(C.42)

ln,i,t :

wt = (1 − αx,n − αk,n )mcn,i,t qn,i,t /ln,i,t ,
∫
1− x
x
ωns
ps,m,t = αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Xn,i,t

(C.43)

xn,i,s,t (m) :

ϕ

Vn,i , s , t

ϕ

− γ1s

s
· vn,i,s,t
xn,i,s,t (m)

s
vn,i,s,t
xn,i,s,t (m)

γ s −1
γs

dm

 γγ s−1  x −1 −1
s

x

.

(C.44)
ϕ γ

s s
Raise both sides of equation C.44 to the power of 1 − γs , then multiply by vn,i,s,t
, integrate over

Vn,i,s,t , and raise both sides to the power of 1/(1 − γs ), we have
∫
Vn,i , s , t

1−γ
ϕ s γs
dm
ps,m,ts vn,i,s,t

! 1−γ1

s

1− x
x

= αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Xn,i,t ωns

∫
Vn,i , s , t

γ s −1
ϕs
vn,i,s,t
xn,i,s,t (m) γ s dm

! − γγ s−1 1
s

.
(C.45)

x
Raise both sides of equation C.45 to the power of 1 − x , multiply by ωns
, sum up by s, and raise
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x

both sides to the power of 1/(1 − x ), we have
(
Õ
s

x
ωns

∫
Vn, i , s , t

1−γ
ϕ s γs
ps,m,ts vn,i,s,t
dm

x
 1−
1−γ

) 1−1

x

1− x

−

1

x
x
−1
= αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Xn,i,t
Xn,i,t
= αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Xn,i,t
≡ Φn,i,t .

s

(C.46)
Φn,i,t is the price of the composite intermediate input used by firm i in industry n. Raise both sides
of equations C.42, C.43, and C.46 to the powers of αk,n , 1 − αx,n − αk,n , and αx,n , respectively,
combine them, and rearrange, we have
α

1−αx , n −αk , n

x,n
−1
mcn,i,t = Zn,t
Φn,i,t
wt

(rt + δn )PtK

 αk , n

αx,nx , n (1 − αx,n − αk,n )αx , n +αk , n −1 αk,nk , n , (C.47)
−α

−α

which is exactly equation 1.31.
Using the envelope theorem, we derive the optimal price set by firms.
−γ

n
∂πn,i,t ∂(pn,i,t − mcn,i,t )pn,i,t
=
D̃n,t = 0
∂pn,i,t
∂pn,i,t

−γn

⇔

(1 − γn )pi

⇔

pn,i,t =

−γ −1

n
= −γn mcn,i,t pn,i,t

γn
mcn,i,t ,
γn − 1

which is equation 1.38.
Now we derive the optimal choice of input varieties.

∂y
∂m

is still the partial effect of adding input

variety m on any variable y, and use the envelope theorem, we have
∂πn,i,t
∂mcn,i,t
=−
qn,i,t − wmng,n,t
∂m
∂m
∂mcn,i,t
⇔ −wmng,n,t =
qn,i,t ,
∂m
=

1
x −1  x
αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Φn,i,t
ωns
1−γ
ϕ γ

s s
· ps,m,ts vn,i,s,t
+ ϕs γs

1−γ

∫

∫
s

Vn,i , s , t
ϕ γ −1

ϕ γ

x
 1−
1−γ −1
s

s s
ps,m,ts vn,i,s,t
dm .

1−γ

Vn, i , s , t

1−γ

s s
dm
ps,m,ts vn,i,s,t
!

(C.48)

Integrate both sides of equation C.48 on the set Vn,i,s,t and rearrange, we have
x −1  x
wmng,n,t vn,i,s,t = −αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Φn,i,t
ωns

1 + ϕs γs 
1 − γs
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∫
Vn, i , s , t

1−γ

ϕ γ

s s
ps,m,ts vn,i,s,t
dm

x
 1−
1−γ

s

.

(C.49)

Multiply both sides of equation C.44 by xn,i,s,t (m) and integrate over Vn,i,s,t , and combine with
equation C.49, we have
1 + ϕs γs
1 − γs
 1−  ∫

x −1  x
wmng,n,t vn,i,s,t = −αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Φn,i,t
ωns


1− x
x
· αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Xn,i,t
ωns

x

Vn, i , s , t

ϕ

s
vn,i,s,t
xn,i,s,t (m)

γ s −1
γs

dm

 γγ s−1  x −1
s

x

∫
 γγ s−1  x −1
γ s −1
1 + ϕs γs
s
x
ϕs
γ
s
vn,i,s,t xn,i,s,t (m)
=
αx,n mcn,i,t qn,i,t Xn,i,t ωns
dm
γs − 1
Vn, i , s , t
∫
1 + ϕs γs
=
ps,m,t xn,i,s,t (m)dm.
(C.50)
γs − 1 Vn,i , s , t
1− x
x

Now we derive the optimal choices by the household. Write down the Lagrange function of
household’s problem 1.35
!
t )1+ L
Õ
L
(s
t
η
−
Lmng,n,t (st ) +
βt log Ct (st ) − ψ
L=E
1
+

L
n∈S
t=0
"
∞
Õ
Õ∫
Õ
t
t
t
t
K t
t
t
t
λt (s ) wt (s )Lt (s ) + rt (s )Pt (s )Kt (s ) +
wmng,n,t (s )Lmng,n,t (s ) +
(

∞
Õ





− PtC (st )Ct (st ) − PtK (st ) Kt+1 (st ) − Kt (st )



πn,i,t (st )di

n∈S 0

n∈S

t=0

1

#)
.

(C.51)

Normalize the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraints λt (st ) = βt , first-order conditions
of equation yield ∀ t & st
Ct (st ) : Ct (st )−1 = PtC (st ),

(C.52)

ψLt (st ) L = wt (st ),
h
 K t+1 i
PtK (st ) = βEt rt+1 (st+1 ) + 1 Pt+1
(s ) ,

Lt (st ) :
Kt+1 (st ) :

η−1

ηLmng,n,t = wmng,n,t .

Lmng,n,t (st ) :

(C.53)
(C.54)
(C.55)

Solve the consumption and capital good producers’ cost minimization problems, 1.32 and 1.33
similar to solving the aggregate consumption price of C.16, we obtain the prices of the consumption
and capital goods
"
PtC

=

Õ
n∈S


ξnC c

∫

1

0
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1−γ
pn,i,tn di

1− c
 1−γ

n

# 1−1

c

,

and
"
PtK

=

Õ


ξnK k

∫

1

1−γ
pn,i,tn di

1− k
 1−γ

n

# 1−1

k

,

0

n∈S

as in equations 1.36 and 1.37.
Now I prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium by constructing such an equilibrium that
satisfies equilibrium conditions C.41, C.42, C.43, C.44, C.46, C.47, C.52, C.53, C.54, C.55, 1.36,
1.37, 1.38, and market clearing conditions, and all variables (except Vn,i,s,t which differ in the
elements but share the same measure vn,i,s,t = vn,s,t ) take the same values for firms within the same
industry.
First, I show that in a symmetric equilibrium, any individual firm has no incentive to deviate
from the symmetric solutions. Suppose in an equilibrium, all firms within an industry set the same
price pn,i,t = pn,t ∀ n & i ∈ [0,1]. According to the first-order condition w.r.t. input quantity, C.44,
−γ

xn,i,s,t (m) = xn,i,s,t ∀m ∈ Vn,i,s,t & ∀ n,s & i ∈ [0,1]. According to equation C.41, qn,i,t = pn,tn D̃n,t =
qn,t & ∀ n & i ∈ [0,1]. According to the last equality of equation C.50,
xn,i,s,t (m) =

γs − 1
wmng,n,t /ps,t = xn,s,t
1 + ϕs γs

∀m ∈ Vn,i,s,t & ∀ n,s & i ∈ [0,1],

(C.56)

which are identical for each pair of industries n and s. Also,
(
Φn,i,t =

Õ

(1+ϕ s γ s )(1− x )
1−γ s

 x 1− x
ωns
ps,t vn,i,s,t

) 1−1

x

,

(C.57)

s
α

1−αx , n −αk , n

x,n
−1
mcn,i,t = Zn,t
Φn,i,t
wt

(rt + δn )PtK

 αk , n

αx,nx , n (1 − αx,n − αk,n )αx , n +αk , n −1 αk,nk , n .
−α

−α

(C.58)
Replace the mci and qi in equation C.50 with equations C.41, C.46, and C.47 and rearrange, we have
1− x
 x −1
Õ γs0 − 1
x
x
−1
−1
vn,i,s0 ,t = wmng,n,t
αx,n mcn,i,t qn,t Xn,i,t
Xn,i,t
= wmng,n,t
αx,n mcn,i,t qn,t
0 γs0
1
+
ϕ
s
s0

α

−α

x,n
−1
−1
= wmng,n,t
αx,n Zn,t
Φn,i,t
wt x , n k , n (rt + δn )PtK
x,n
(
) α1−
(1+ϕ s 0 γ s 0 )(1− x )
x
Õ
1−γ s 0
 x 1− x
= Tn,t
ωns0 ps0 ,t vn,i,s0 ,t
.

1−α

s0
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 αk , n

α

−γ

x,n
cstmc,n pn,tn D̃n,t ≡ Tn,t Φn,i,t

(C.59)

Using equation C.50, we can write vn,i,s0 ,t ∀ s 0 as functions of vn,i,s,t :

vn,i,s0 ,t (1 + ϕs0 γs0 )(γs − 1)ωns0 xn,s0 ,t
=
vn,i,s,t
(1 + ϕs γs )(γs0 − 1)ωns xn,s,t
"
⇔ vn,i,s0 ,t =

!  x −1

(1 + ϕs0 γs0 )(γs − 1)ωns0 xn,s0 ,t
(1 + ϕs γs )(γs0 − 1)ωns xn,s,t

x

(1+ϕ s 0 )γ s 0 ( x −1)
(γ 0 −1) x

vn,i,s0s,t

(1+ϕ s )γ s ( x −1)
(γ s −1) x
vn,i,s,t
!  x −1 # 1/T̃s0
x

T̃ /T̃

T̃ /T̃

s s
s s
vn,i,s,t
≡ Õn,s0 ,s,t vn,i,s,t
,
0

0

(C.60)



where T̃s = (γs − 1)x + (1 + ϕs )γs (1 − x ) /(γs − 1) > 0 ∀ s and Õn,s0 ,s,t > 0. Put equation C.60
into equation C.59, we have
x,n
) α1−
(
(1+ϕ s 0 γ s 0 )(1− x )
x
Õ
Õ γs0 − 1
1−γ
0
 x 1− x
s
vn,i,s0 ,t = Tn,t
ωns
0 ps0 ,t vn,i,s0 ,t
1 + ϕs0 γs0
s0
s0
x,n
(
) α1−
γ s 0 )(1− x )
x

 (1+ϕ s01−γ
Õ
Õ γs0 − 1
T̃s /T̃s 0
T̃s /T̃s 0
 x 1− x
s0
= Tn,t
ωns
Õn,s0 ,s,t vn,i,s,t
Õn,s0 ,s,t vn,i,s,t
⇔
. (C.61)
0 ps0 ,t
1 + ϕs0 γs0
s0
s0

Define a function of vn,i,s,t
x,n
) α1−
(
γ s 0 )(1− x )
x
 (1+ϕ s01−γ

Õ γs0 − 1
Õ
T̃s /T̃s 0
T̃s /T̃s 0
 x 1− x
s0
0
−Tn,t
.
fv f un (vn,i,s,t ) =
Õn,s0 ,s,t vn,i,s,t
ωns
p
Õ
v
0 s0 ,t
n,s ,s,t n,i,s,t
1 + ϕs0 γs0
s0
s0
(C.62)

The first term is strictly increasing in vn,i,s,t while the second term is strictly decreasing in vn,i,s,t . As
a result, fv0f un (vn,i,s,t ) > 0. At the same time, fv f un (0) = −∞ and fv f un (∞) = ∞, and fv0f un (vn,i,s,t )
is continuous in vn,i,s,t .28 Thus, fv f un (vn,i,s,t ) has a positive solution and it is unique. Because
the unique solution only depends on the industry pair n and s, vn,i,s,t = vn,s,t ∀ i ∈ [0,1]. In turn,
according to equations C.57 and C.58, Φn,i,t = Φn,t and mcn,i,t = mcn,t for all i ∈ [0,1]. From
equation 1.38, we confirm that pn,i,t = γn /(γn − 1)mcn,t = pn,t ∀i ∈ [0,1]. Thus, given that all
suppliers within an industry set the same price, the marginal costs of all firms within an industry
will be the same, so do their prices, which is intrinsically coherent. In other words, given that other
firms in the same industry choose the same price, the optimal solution to the problem of a firm in
this industry is to set the same price, use the same number of input varieties, and use the same input
quantity from each chosen variety as other firms in this industry. Thus, each individual firm will not
deviate from the symmetric equilibrium solution.
28. In computation, {vn,i,s,t }n,i,s,t are normalized to be in (0,1).
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Under equation C.56, Xn,i,t = Xn,t ∀ i ∈ [0,1]. Combine equations C.42, C.43 with C.46, we
have
αk,n Φn,t Xn,t
= k n,t ,
αx,n (rt + δn )PtK
(1 − αx,n − αk,n )Φn,t Xn,t
= ln,t .
=
αx,n wt

k n,i,t =

(C.63)

ln,i,t

(C.64)

The symmetric equilibrium can be constructed as and must be a set of 21 different groups of
variables
xn,i,s,t (m) = xn,s,t
vn,i,s,t = vn,s,t ,
k n,i,t = k n,t ,

∀ i ∈ [0,1] & m ∈ Vi & n,s,

qn,i,t = qn,t ,

cn,i,t = cn,t ,

pn,i,t = pn,t ,

P
P
k n,i,t
,
= k n,t

mcn,i,t = mcn,t ,

Φn,i,t = Φn,t

Xn,i,t = Xn,t ,

ln,i,t = ln,t ,

∀ i ∈ [0,1] & n,

and wt , rt , wmng,n,t , Lt , Lmng,n,t , Ct , Kt , KtP , PtC , PtK .

which satisfy the following 21 equations: first order conditions,
ps,t xn,s,t vn,s,t =

(1+ϕ s )γ s ( x −1)  x −1
1− x
γn − 1
x
,
αx,n pn,t qn,t Xn,t x ωns vn,s,t(γ s −1) x xn,s,t
γn

wt = (1 − αx,n − αk,n )mcn,t qn,t /ln,t ,
(rt + δn )PtK = αk,n mcn,t qn,t /k n,t ,

(C.66)
(C.67)

1 + ϕs γs
pn,s,t xn,s,t ,
γs − 1
γn
mcn,t ,
=
γn − 1

wmng,n,t =
pn,t

(C.65)

(C.68)
(C.69)

ψLt L = wt ,

(C.70)

η−1

wmng,n,t = ηLmng,n,t ,

(C.71)

Ct−1 = PtC ,
h
i
K
PtK = βE (rt+1 + 1)Pt+1
,

(C.72)
(C.73)

cn,t = ξnC

 c

pn,t /PtC

 −c

CtP ,

(C.74)

P
k n,t
= ξnK

 k

pn,t /PtK

 −k

KtP ,

(C.75)
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market clearing conditions,
Õ

ln,t = Lt ,

(C.76)

k n,t = Kt ,

(C.77)

n

Õ
n

KtP = Kt+1 − Kt +

Õ

δn k n,t ,

(C.78)

n
P
qn,t = cn,t + k n,t
+

Õ

vs,n,t xs,n,t ,

(C.79)

s

Õ

vn,s,t = Lmng,n,t ,

(C.80)

s

and aggregators and the production function,

Φn,t =

Õ

(1+ϕ s γ s )(1− x )
1−γ s

 x 1− x
ωns
ps,t vn,s,t

! 1−1

x

,

(C.81)

s
α

α

qn,t = Zn,t Xn,tx , n k n,tk , n ln,t x , n
! c
 c −1  c −1
Õ
,
ξsC cs,t c
CtP =
1−α

−αk , n

,

(C.82)
(C.83)

s ∈S

KtP =

Õ

 k −1
k

!   k−1

ξsK k s,t

k

,

(C.84)

s ∈S

Xn,t =

Õ

(1+ϕ s )γ s ( x −1)
(γ s −1) x

ωns vn,s,t

 x −1
x

xn,s,t

!   x−1
x

,

(C.85)

s ∈S


Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5 and in the (symmetric) equilibrium, and normalize
the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint in household’s problem 1.35 to be βt in each
period t. ∀n,s ∈ S, the number of input varieties used satisfies
Õ
 η−1
1 + ϕs γs
ps,t xns,t vns,t = η
vns,t
vns,t .
γs − 1
s

(1.39)

Proof. Combine equations C.50, C.55, and market clearing condition C.80, and enforce symmetry,


we prove the theorem.
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D

Indirect inference estimation

This appendix describes the indirect inference estimation method used in Sections 1.5 and 1.6, as
well as the algorithm to implement it. Also, I explain how I calibrate industry productivities within
the estimation.
The indirect inference method I use is the partial indirect inference (PII), as advocated by
Dridi, Guay, and Renault (2007). Because it is hard to assume such a complicated multi-industry
model to be true, I keep my estimation parsimonious with respect to the evidence of extensive
margin adjustments, which I would like match. To do so, I estimate only the parameters which
can be identified by regression coefficients in my motivational facts while calibrating the others. A
parsimonious instrumental model has a lower risk of capturing what goes wrong in the simulated
paths due to the misspecification about the parameters not of the most interest.
Based on the identification strategy, the auxiliary model I use in the indirect inference estimation
is composed of the following two regressions
Õ
Õ
d ln( vns,t ) = β1 d ln( ps,t xns,t vns,t ) + 1,ns,t ,
s


 p x v
s,t ns,t ns,t
= β2 d ln ps,t + 2,ns,t .
d ln Í
ps0 ,t xns0 ,t vns0 ,t
s

(D.1)

s

(D.2)

0

The binding function is
β = (β1, β2 ) = b(η,x ).

(D.3)

The indirect inference estimators {η̃, ˜x } are defined as the solution to the two-equation system
β̂1 = β̃1 (η,x ),

(D.4)

β̂2 = β̃2 (η,x ),

(D.5)

where { β̂1, β̂2 } and { β̃1, β̃2 } are the regression coefficients of equations D.1 and D.2 using observed
data and model-simulated data, respectively. The observed data used for regressions are described
in Appendix A.1.
The motivation of using indirect inference estimation is the mis-specification of the regressions
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used for identification. As mentioned in Section 1.5.1, the identifications of the parameters governing
the return to variety and the management cost curvature depend on each other. Also, the identification
of the intermediate input elasticity of substitution is affected by the other two parameters to be
identified. It follows that the observed data cannot be used to directly identify the parameters. As a
result, I use indirect inference with mis-specified regressions for identification. To be more specific,

Í 1+ϕs0 γs0 
Í
Í 
s γs
0
/
in equation 1.46 with observed pxvns,t and use
I replace s 1+ϕ
p
x
v
s,t
ns,t
ns,t
s
γs −1
γ 0 −1
s

s

regression D.1 to identify η. Notice that in observed data, input expenditures are pxvns,t instead
of ps,t xns,t vns,t . I also leave out the unobserved Φn,t in equation 1.48 and use regression D.2 to
identify x . I also exclude the term d ln(vn,s,t ) to make the regressions parsimonious in the indirect
inference. And ignoring this term does not change much the regression coefficient for identifying
x . As a result, 1,ns,t and 2,ns,t in equations D.1 and D.2 include those left-out variables and
the biases due to mis-specification. The advantage of indirect inference estimation is that I can
estimate the key parameters even though the two regressions in the auxiliary model are mis-specified
(Smith, 2008). In other word, the densities in the two regressions need not accurately describe the


Í
Í
conditional distributions of d ln( vns,t ) and d ln ps,t xns,t vns,t / ps0 ,t xns0 ,t vns0 ,t determined by
s

s

0

the true optimality conditions 1.46 and 1.48.
To implement indirect inference estimation, I need to simulate the model, which in turn requires
industry productivity processes to be calibrated. The calibration must take into consideration
extensive margin adjustments because they enter the productivities and thus the conventional total
factor productivity. It follows that calibrated industry productivities depend on the key parameters to
be estimated. Also, the BEA intermediate input quantity index is a chain-type Fisher index. It does
not measure the contribution of intermediate inputs to production because it ignores both the nonunity elasticity of substitution and the extensive margin. As a result, I calibrate industry productivity

processes within the estimation. Given a guessed pair of {ϕs }s ,η,x , I compute log-differenced
industry n’s productivity as follows


d ln Zn,t = d ln qt,n − ζn αx,n d ln Xn,t + αk,n d ln k n,t + (1 − αx,n − αk,n )d ln ln,t

(D.6)

where ζn is the return to scale. Some industries use factors which have almost fixed supply. (e.g.,
Agriculture uses land.) As a result, these industries have a strong decreasing return to scale. For
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example, the estimated return to scale of Agriculture is between 0.3 and 0.4. When ζn is significantly
smaller than one, even if total inputs fluctuate significantly, the output will be relatively stable. As
a result, allowing a non-constant return to scale prevents the variations of the calibrated total factor
productivities from being entirely driven by variations in the inputs. In implementation, I follow
Basu et al. (2006) and Huo et al. (2019) to regress d ln qn,t on αx,n d ln Xn,t + αk,n d ln k n,t + (1 −
αx,n − αk,n )d ln ln,t , and take the residuals as the log-differenced industry productivities. Then I
construct the industry productivity processes using these log-differenced series,
Within the industry productivity calibration above, the composite intermediate input Xn,t is
"
Xn,t =

Õ

(1−ϕ s γ s )( x −1)
(γ s −1) x

ωns vns,t



vns,t xns,t

 ( x −1)

#   x−1
x

x

s ∈S

"
=

Õ
s ∈S

ωns 
Í

s )( x −1)
! (1−ϕ(γs γ−1)

s γs
pxvns,t 1−ϕ
γs −1

1−ϕ s 0 γs 0
0
s
γs 0

pxvns0 ,t

s

 η−1
η

x

 pxv

ns,t

ps,t

 ( x −1)
x

#   x−1

(D.7)

x

,

and it is affected by the values of parameters η and x to be estimated. As a result, the calibration of
industry productivity processes must be incorporated into the indirect inference estimation.
Some intermediate input expenditures among industries are quite volatile. At the same time, their
shares in the total intermediate inputs of the customer industry and the total supply of intermediate
inputs by the supplier industry are both small. To prevent these volatile input expenditures from
dominating the calibration of composite intermediate inputs and industry productivities, I use secondorder Taylor expansion to approximate d ln Xn .
I use data from the 1997-2017 BEA Input-Output Tables and Industry Accounts to calibrate
the industry productivity processes. Industry-level capital stock and labor are the quantity index
of net private (government) fixed asset stock and the number of hours, respectively. Industry-level
chain-type gross output price indexes are used for ps,t . These data are introduced in Section 2.1.
Besides the three key parameters and the industry productivity processes, the other parameters
of the model are calibrated as follows. I set the value of the discount factor β to 0.9709 such that the
steady-state real interest rate (i.e., net capital rental rate) is 3%. For the elasticities of substitutions
between industries in the production of consumption and capital goods, c and k , I set both to 0.8.29
29. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) argue that “the observed positive correlation between employment growth and relative
price inflation across two-digit sectors” supports a low (smaller than 1) substitutability between consumption goods
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I set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to 2.0. The intermediate input weight matrix Ω = {ωns }n,s
is calibrated to its corresponding values in the 2012 BEA Input-Output Accounts because 2012 is
the base year of the comprehensive update of industry chain-type indexes. Similar to that in Section
2.1, I combine the BEA Input-Output Make and Use tables to construct the input weight matrix
following Tian (2019). The calibration of the other parameters is discussed in Appendix E.
With the calibration and estimation of all parameters introduced above, the complete algorithm
of indirect inference estimation and industry productivity calibration is as follows.

Productivity-Calibration-Incorporated Indirect Inference Algorithm
Step 1: Calibrate parameters other than the three key parameters.
Step 2: Search for a pair of η, X .
Step 3: Calibrate ϕs to match the steady-state management cost share with that in the data.
Step 4: Given η, X and the BEA data, compute industry productivities according to equations D.6
and D.7 and use them to calibrate AR(1) industry productivity processes (persistency ρ and
covariance matrix of industry productivity shocks).
Step 5: Simulate the model for H ∗ 15 periods using the calibrated productivity processes.
Step 6: Use regressions D.1 and D.2 to estimate β̃1, β̃2 with simulated data.
Step 7: Repeat steps (2)-(6) until β̂1 = β̃1 (η̃, ˜X ) and β̂2 = β̃2 (η̃, ˜X ).
Step 8: Save estimated η̃, ˜X and the corresponding industry productivity processes.

E

Calibration

This appendix describes the calibration of industry-specific capital depreciation rates, labor, capital,
intermediate input shares, and markups. To calibrate these parameters, I first compute some moments
using the BEA Input-Output Tables and Industry Accounts spanning 1997 to 2017. ∀s ∈ S, define:

Compensation Shares

=

1
21

Í2017

t=1997

Compensation o f employeess , t
,
Gr oss Out puts , t

produced by different industries. Also, the preference elasticity of substitution across two-digit manufacturing
industries is estimated to be between 0.8 and 1.1 by Oberfield and Raval (2014).
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=

T otal Intermediate Shares

1
21

Í2017

t=1997

T ot al I nter mediates , t
,
Gr oss Out puts , t

V ariable Cost Shares = Compensation Shares + T otal Intermediate Shares ,
=

Fixed Asset Shares
Depreciation o f Fixed Asset Shares

=

1
21

1
21

Í2017

t=1997

Í2017

t=1997

Fixed Asset Stock s , t
Gr oss Out puts , t ,

Depr eciation o f Fixed Asset Stock s , t
Gr oss Out puts , t

.

Industry-specific capital depreciation rates are calibrated as
δs =

2017
1 Õ Depreciation o f Fixed Assets,t
21 t=1997
Fixed Assets,t

I define profit shares as
Pro f it Shares = 1 − rss Fixed Asset Shares − V ariable Cost Shares
− Depreciation o f Fixed Asset Shares
I calibrate γs as the inverse of Pro f it Shares , and the markup of industry s is 1/(1− Pro f it Shares ).
As can be seen from the formula of industry markups, allowing industry-specific capital depreciation
rates is critical for the accurate calibration of industry markups. I calibrate long-run labor and
intermediate input cost shares αL,s and αX,s as
αL,s =
αX,s =

γs
Compensation Shares
γs − 1

γs
T otal Intermediate Shares
γs − 1

Then long-run capital cost share is αK ,s = 1 − αL,s − αX,s .
Long-run consumption and capital good input weights {ξsC }s and {ξsK }s are calibrated as
ξsC =

2017
Per sonal consumption expendituress,t
1 Õ
Í
,
21 t=1997 s0 Per sonal consumption expendituress0 ,t

ξsK

2017
Private f ixed investments,t
1 Õ
Í
.
=
21 t=1997 s0 Private f ixed investments0 ,t
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F

Under-estimated amplification effects of EMAs in the BEA data

In this appendix, I describe how the BEA calculates real GDP and industry-level real output, and
explain how their calculation leads to an under-estimated return to variety compared to that in the
model. Due to this under-estimate, the BEA data could only partially reflect the extensive margin’s
amplification effects on the volatility of real GDP.
The BEA calculates real GDP and industry outputs by deflating their nominal counterparts with
various price indexes. The price indexes used include the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Producer
Price Index (PPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI), the personal consumption expenditures (PCE)
price indexes from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs), which are based on the BLS
PPI and CPI, and so on.30 While the GDP is deflated mainly using the CPI and the PPI, industry
outputs are deflated mainly using the PPI and the NIPA PCE prices.
The BEA real GDP and outputs reflect the quality changes of some goods and services (potentially
due to extensive margin adjustments) whose corresponding deflators are adjusted for the quality.
Some changes in the prices of goods and services surveyed by the BEA or BLS are associated with
the changes in the characteristics or quality (e.g., adding remote start or new gear revision to improve
fuel economy in vehicles). In some of these cases, quality adjustments are made to the price indexes,
allowing them to measure the changes in price levels while holding quality constant. If certain
components of the GDP are deflated by quality-adjusted price indexes, the real GDP will embed the
quality changes in these components. In the example of Section 1.1, when Ford introduces a new
navigation supplier and makes a car with higher quality and price, its sales value increases. On the
other hand, the number of cars sold may not change much. In such a case, using the unadjusted higher
price index as the deflator leads to little change in the real GDP. However, the return to variety does
lead to productivity gains and a better product for consumers. To account for these improvements,
the price needs to be adjusted downwards to measure the price of a car with unchanged and lower
quality. As a result, the real GDP calculated using the quality-adjusted car price will be higher than
that with an unadjusted price, which in turn correctly measures the quality improvement and the
productivity gain due to more input varieties (extensive margin adjustments).
30. For detailed price indexes used to deflate GDP and industry output, see “Updated Summary
of NIPA Methodologies” and “The 2019 Annual Update of the Industry Economic Accounts” at
https://apps.bea.gov/scb/2019/11-november/pdf/1119-nipa-methodologies.pdf and https://apps.bea.gov/scb/2019/11november/pdf/1119-industry-update.pdf, respectively.
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Various methods are used for quality adjustments to the prices. For the CPI, the direct quality
adjustment, which includes hedonic regressions and cost adjustments, and the imputation are used
by the BLS. The hedonic quality adjustment is used frequently for the CPI (and for some of the PPI).
This method decomposes an item into constituent characteristics, obtains estimates of the values of
each characteristic, and uses these estimates to adjust the prices.31 For the PPI, the explicit quality
adjustment, which adjusts for the production cost differences (marked up to the selling price) of a
change to an item, is the preferred method of quality adjustment.32
Unfortunately, only a limited proportion of GDP components are adjusted for quality changes.
Groshen, Moyer, Aizcorbe, Bradley, and Friedman (2017) find from 2013 to 2014, only 2% of
the items in the CPI were quality-adjusted for their prices. (There are no similar figures for the
PPI.) Groshen, Moyer, Aizcorbe, Bradley, and Friedman (2017) also reported that about 33% of
the total expenditures in the CPI are eligible for quality adjustments with the hedonic method in
2017. However, most of them are housing-related expenditures. Wasshausen, Moulton et al. (2006)
echoed Groshen, Moyer, Aizcorbe, Bradley, and Friedman (2017) in their 2016 updated appendix
that around 17.4% to 20.5% of GDP components were deflated with hedonic-type price indexes.
However, around 70% of these components deflated by hedonic prices were structures and rent.
The BLS survey method for CPI further reveals that a large proportion of real GDP does not
account for quality changes. When calculating the CPI, the BLS surveys 211 item strata (in each of
the 87 primary sampling units/areas), each of which includes one or more entry-level items (ELIs).33
These ELIs are sampling units which are sampled within each sample outlet. Then in each outlet
that the BLS visit, they randomly select a specific item from among all the items the outlet sells
that falls within the ELI definition. A match with higher price and quality will be treated as the
same item as other items with lower prices and quality in the same item strata. Apparently, the 211
item strata are small relative to the number of differentiated products. As a result, when a match is
found for an item stratum, there is still a high probability that its price may ignore the overall quality
change in that strata. According to Groshen, Moyer, Aizcorbe, Bradley, and Friedman (2017), in
31. More information on hedonic methods in the CPI and the PPI can be found at https://www.bls.gov/cpi/qualityadjustment/questions-and-answers.htm and https://www.bls.gov/ppi/ppicomqa.htm.
32. For all the quality adjustment methods used in the CPI and the PPI, see Chapter 17,
https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/cpi-20180214.pdf, of the BLS https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/ and “Quality Adjustment in the Producer Price Index” at https://www.bls.gov/ppi/qualityadjustment.pdf, respectively.
33. For detailed information on the construction of the CPI, see Chapter 17, https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/cpi20180214.pdf, of the BLS https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/.
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2014, matches were found for 73% items in the CPI, the prices of which are not quality-adjusted. In
turn, the components of GDP and outputs deflated by the prices of these matched items are highly
likely to miss the change in quality.
With a large share of real GDP unadjusted for quality, the BEA data under-estimates the quality
improvement and productivity gain from the return to input variety. Consequently, the amplification
effects of extensive margin adjustments on the fluctuations of real GDP are under-estimated in the
published data compared to those in my model.
Meanwhile, it is hard to know how much the amplification effect is under-estimated in the BEA
data. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the return to variety may affect output in two ways. First, changes
in the number of input varieties lead to changes in the efficiency of producing the same goods due to
the division of labor as in Ethier (1982); Second, changes in the number of input varieties result in
quality changes. In the first case, because the quantity rather than the quality changes, real GDP will
reflect the productivity change. In the second case, however, real GDP will possibly miss quality
changes. Since there is no data on either the relative weights of the two cases in the return to variety
or the proportion of quality changes in the real GDP that is missed in the BEA data, I cannot conclude
how much the BEA data can reflect the true amplification effects of extensive margin adjustments.
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Appendix for Chapter 2
G

Data

This appendix describes the details of the construction of the data used for the empirical evidence
in Section 2.2.

G.1

Transaction-based commercial land price series of China

For each land transaction entry, there is information on the land transaction date, value, area, sale type
(including bid invitation, auction, and listing for sale), and the type of land (including manufacturing,
commercial, transportation, and residential lands). I calculate the price of each transaction as the
ratio of its land transaction value to its area. The top and bottom 0.5% transactions in terms of price
are dropped to exclude outliers due to input errors when uploaded online.
I divide each quarters’ total land sale value by total land sale area to construct the nominal
quarterly land price series in Yuan / Square meters on both the national and provincial levels.
Both series are then deflated using China’s quarterly GDP deflator from the database "China’s
Macroeconomy: Time Series Data" (CMTSD) of FRB of Atlanta maintained by Chang, Chen,
Waggoner, and Zha (2016).34 Finally, the series are seasonally adjusted to obtain the real commercial
land price series Land pricey, q . I use SAS procedure "proc X12", which is applied to other seasonal
adjustments in this paper.

G.2

Real capital investment of China

The aggregate capital investment series I use also comes from the CMTSD, which has already
been seasonally adjusted. The quarterly nominal gross fixed capital formation (NGFCF) for state34. www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/china-macroeconomy.aspx?panel=1, version September 17, 2016.
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owned enterprises (SOE) excluding government, private enterprises, and other non-SOE enterprises
(CMTSD tickers NominalSOEexGovtGFCF, NominalPrivGFCF, and NominalNonSOEGFCF) are
added up to construct the nominal quarterly aggregate investment series NomInvy, q . The series
is then deflated using the GFCF price index (CMTSD ticker GFCFPriceIndex) to obtain the real
quarterly aggregate investment series Investmenty, q from 2005 to 2015.
At the province level, annual NGFCF data for 31 provinces spanning 2006 to 2015 are deflated
by the national GDP deflator to construct the annual real capital investment series. I do not filter the
time series due to the short length of the panel. Instead, I control for year fixed effects in regressions.

G.3

China’s export value index series

Since 2005, China’s General Administration of Customs publishes monthly year-on-year export
value, quantity, and price indexes of the manufacturing sector, E xVyoy, y, m (CEIC tickers CJAOXV,
CJAOXT, and CJAOXR). In addition, month-to-month indexes can be found for (and only for) 2006,
E xVmom, 2006, m from the 2006 “China’s External Trade Indices Monthly” journal published by
China’s General Administration of Customs. These indexes are Fisher indexes, so multiplicity can
only be applied to value indexes instead of quantity and price indexes.
Firstly, I multiply month-to-month value indexes to obtain the monthly value indexes of 2006,
E xV2006, m,

M.

E xV2006, m,

M

=

E xVmom, 2006, m ∗ E xVmom, 2006, m−1
100

∀ m = 2,..,12,

Then the year-on-year value indexes allow me to further construct the whole monthly series of export
value index from 2005 to 2015, E xVy, m,

E xV2005, m,
E xVy, m,

M

=

M

E xVy oy ,

=

M.

E xV2006, m, M
E xVy oy , 2006, m ∗100

y , m ∗E xVy−1, m, M

100

∀ m = 1,..,12,

∀ y ≥ 2007 & m = 1,..,12.

Quarterly export value indexes E xVy, q, Q are the last month’s monthly indexes of each quarter, i.e.,
E xVy, q, Q = E xVy, (3∗q),
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M.

Because all the value indexes are in US dollars, the quarterly indexes are multiplied by the quarterly
US Dollar/Chinese Yuan exchange rate, deflated by the GDP deflator, and seasonally adjusted to
obtain the real quarterly export value indexes E xport valuey, q, Q .
At the province level, monthly export values spanning 2006 to 2015 are summed annually and
deflated by the GDP deflator to construct the annual real export value series.

G.4

Other data

The construction of quarterly service employment shares in the aggregate uses the sector-level
employment data published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), the details of which
can be found in Appendix H.3. The NBS also publishes annual province-level GDPs and fixed
asset investments for both the manufacturing and the service sectors. These two series are used to
compute the manufacturing’s shares of GDP and fixed asset investment at the province level.

H

Quarterly sector-level TFP series

This appendix describes the details of the construction of the quarterly TFP series for both the
industrial and the service sectors used in Section 2.4 and 2.5. In this appendix, I first discuss the
annual and quarterly FAI series by sector. Then, with the sector-specific FAI depreciation values
in the Input-Output Tables of 2005 and 2007, I calculate the sector-specific depreciation rates as
well as the FAI stocks by sector. Next, with sector-specific labor income shares pinned down by the
average proportion of remuneration of employees in the value-added from 2002, 2007, 2010, and
2012’s Input-Output Tables, capital and commercial land income shares are estimated, and quarterly
industrial and service sector TFP series are constructed. Finally, AR(1) processes, as well as the
covariance matrix of the residuals corresponding to the model, are estimated for the two TFP series.

H.1

Fixed asset investment by sector

The NBS started publishing annual FAI by sector in 2003 (CEIC tickers COMA and COCBMRCOCBNB). I classify aggregate FAI into seven industries, agriculture, industrial (mining, manufacturing, and electricity, gas & water production and supply), construction, real estate, financial
intermediation, transport, storage, and postal service, and service. The reason to separate transport,
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storage and postal service from service is that the former uses special lands rather than commercial
lands and is far more capital-intensive than normal service. I focus on the industrial and service
industries, which correspond to the two sectors in my model.
In terms of quarterly FAIs by sector, the NBS published ytd monthly urban (non-farm) FAI by
sector since 1996. And most sector-level data I need started in 2004. Annual rural (and rural farm)
FAIs by sector can also be found until 2015.35 Using ytd monthly series, quarterly urban (non-farm)
FAIs can be calculated as follows
F AIur ban, i, y, q = F AIur ban, i, yt d, y, 3∗q

∀ i, y, and q,

where F AIur ban, yt d, y, 3q is the urban (non-farm) FAI of industry i in the (3 ∗ q)th month of year
y, and F AIur ban, i, y, q is the urban (non-farm) FAI of industry i in the qth quarter of year y.
Then, I assume for each industry, urban (non-farm) and rural (farm) FAIs have the same quarterly
fluctuations within a year. Thus, I interpolate the annual total FAIs F AIi, y using F AIur ban, i, y, q
to construct the quarterly FAI series by sector F AIi, y, q .
F AIi, y, q = F AIi, y, 4 ∗

H.2

F AIur ban, i, y, q
F AIur ban, i, y, 4

∀ i, y, and q.

Fixed asset stock by sector

As an important variable for empiric works, the capital stock of China has been calculated by many,
and most of them are on the aggregate or provincial capital stock (Chow, 1993; Zhang and Zhang,
2003; Shan, 2008). Xu, Zhou, and Shu (2007) estimate the fixed capital stock by sector (primary,
secondary, and tertiary) and province from 1978 to 2002. However, annual fixed capital formation
by province and industry they used are no longer published after 2002. Yang (2008), Xu, Duan,
and Yang (2010), and Xue and Wang (2007) calculate the capital stock series of China’s service
sector, sub-industrial sectors, and 17 industries including services, respectively. All of these papers
research annual capital stocks because they focus on a longer horizon and early years when quarterly
investment series by sector are not available.
35. Before 2011, the ytd monthly FAI series published by the NBS include only urban units. Since 2011, these ytd
monthly FAI series include both urban units and rural non-farm households, which are essentially the non-farm FAIs.
As a result, since 2011, rural farm rather than rural FAIs by sector should be added to the non-farm FAIs to obtain the
total FAI series by sector.
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Almost all of the papers in this literature adopt the perpetual inventory method (PIM), which is
used by the OECD to measure capital. The basic idea is that capital stock in period t
Kt = It + (1 − δt )Kt−1,
where It and δt are the investment and capital depreciation rate in period t. My paper follows this
routine in the calculation.
In the PIM, capital stock in the base year and capital depreciation rates can greatly affect the
results. Many papers use 1952 as the base year. Chow (1993) estimates non-farm capital stock in
1952 to be 58.267 billion yuan, and total capital stock to be 175 billion yuan (at the price of 1952).
Zhang and Zhang (2003) use industrial firms’ data and Shanghai’s FAI price index to calculated
capital stock to be 80 billion yuan (at the price of 1952). The disagreement among researches on the
base-year capital stock is mainly due to their different definitions of capital and investment. Chow
(1993) uses the “accumulation” goods in the material product system (MPS) as the capital. Zhang
and Zhang (2003) e.t.c use gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), and Huang and Ren (2002) e.t.c
use fixed asset. According to the NBS, the major difference between GFCF and FAI relating to my
paper is that FAI includes the purchasing fees of land use right, old buildings, and old equipment
and instruments while GFCF does not. The focus period of my paper spans 2005-2015 when fixed
capital formation data was no longer published, and only FAI data is available. Thus, whatever
definition I use for and whatever method I use to adjust capital/investment data, the source could
only be FAI data. As a result, I stick to FAI data first to be consistent with the FAI price index and
the depreciation of fixed assets in the Input-Output Tables I use. After constructing the quarterly
series of fixed asset stock (FAS), I try to separate the (commercial) land use right purchase fees from
the capital stock.
Besides the base-year capital stock determination, the choice of capital depreciation rates is also
worth serious consideration. The “accumulation” definition used by Chow (1993) already avoids
the depreciation problem. Wang and Fan (2000) adopt an annual depreciation rate of 5% based on
the GFCF definition. Song, Liu, and Jiang (2003) use the official nominal annual depreciation rate
of 3.6% plus the economic growth rate as the annual capital depreciation rate. If the base year is
1952, and even if the base year capital stock is accurate, a small change in the depreciation rate can

121

still lead to a huge difference in 2005’s FAS. The results can be even more controversial if different
industries have different capital depreciation rates, and we care about their individual capital stocks.
To minimize the effects of base-year FAS and depreciation rates on the results, I use data around
my base year 2005 and allow depreciation rates to be sector-specific and endogenous during the
calculation following Xu, Duan, and Yang (2010) and Xue and Wang (2007). The idea is as follows.
The Input-Output Tables of 2005 and 2007 published by the NBS include the depreciation
of fixed asset Di, 2005 and Di, 2007 for each industry i. Denote δi, t,
depreciation rate of industry i in year t and PF AI , t,

A

A

as the annual fixed asset

the FAI price index of year t. I normalize the

FAI price index of 2004 to be one. Then the FAS of industry i at the end of 2004 and 2006 are

Further denote ψi, t,

A

Di ,

2005, A ∗δi , 2005, A

F ASi, 2006 =

PF AI ,

D2007
2007, A ∗δ i , 2007, A

2007

2007, A ∗δ i , 2007, A

h

A = δ̃i, A

PF AI ,

2005

,
.

= 1 − δi, t, A, according to the PIM,

PF AI ,

Assume δi, t,

Di ,

F ASi, 2004 =

F AIi , 2005
PF AI , 2005, A

= F ASi, 2006 =

+ ψi, 2005,

F AIi , 2006
PF AI , 2006, A

A PF AI ,

D2005,

i

+ ψi, 2006,
i

A

2005, A ∗δ2005, i , A

is constant from 2005 to 2007 for each industry i and so does ψ̃i,

A = 1 − δ̃i, A.

With the annual FAI series mentioned above, we can solve for the sector-specific annual fixed asset
depreciation rates δ̃i, A, which are around 0.0661 for the industrial sector and 0.051 for service.
When there are multiple roots, we take the real root which is between zero and one. Then the FAS
of industry i at the end of my base year 2004 can be calculated. I use the same method as above to
calculate the depreciation rates of 2008-2010 and 2011-2012 with the Input-Ouput Tables of 2007,
2010, and 2012, assuming constant depreciation rates in these two periods. I use the 2008-2010
depreciation rates for 2008-2010 and the 2011-2012 depreciation rates for 2011 and on.
Next, with the quarterly FAI series by sector F AIi, y, q constructed above and quarterly FAI
price index series PF AI , y, q published by the NBS, quarterly FAS by sector from 2005 to 2015 can
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be recursively calculated as
F ASi, y, q =

F AIi, y, q
+ (1 − δ̃i, Q )F ASi, y, q−1,
PF AI , y, q

where I assume that FAS depreciates evenly in each quarter of a year, i.e. δ̃i, Q =
F AIi , 2005, 1
PF AI , y , 1

In particular, F ASi, 2005, 1 =

+ (1 − δ̃i, Q )F ASi, 2004 and F ASi, y, 1 =

δ̃i , A
4

F AIi , y , 1
PF AI , y , 1

∀i.

+ (1 −

δ̃i, Q )F ASi, y−1, 4 for the first quarter of each year. I normalize the FAI weighted quarterly FAI price
index of 2004 to be one.

H.3

Employment by sector

The NBS publishes annual employment of primary, secondary, and tertiary industries (CEIC tickers CGAJAV-CGAJAX) since 1952 (L pri, y, 4 , Lsec, y, 4 , and Lter , y, 4 ), as well as quarterly urban non-private employment by sector (CEIC tickers CGBB-CGBL and CGAIFE) since 1994
(Lur ban_non_private, i, y, q ). The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the PRC
reports annual employment of private enterprise and self-employed individual by sector (CEIC
tickers CGCJBP-CGCJBV) since 1993 (L private, i, y, 4 ). For the secondary industry, the sum of
annual private enterprise and self-employed individual and urban non-private employment accounts
for 46%-68% of the total employment, and this proportion is even higher for the tertiary industry,
which is around 54%-92%.
For each of the primary, secondary, and tertiary industries, I first interpolate the annual (end of
year) employment with the sum of of annual private enterprise and self-employed individual and
urban non-private employment of the seven industries to obtain the fourth quarter employment by
sector from 2005-2015.
Li, y, 4 = Lsec, y, 4 ∗ Í

Lur b a n_non_pr i v at e,

i , y , 4 +L pr i v at e, i , y , 4

i∈{s e c ond ar y i ndu st r i es} (L ur b a n_non_pr i v at e, i , y , 4 +L pr i v at e, i , y , 4 )

,

∀y and i ∈ {secondar y industries}.
Li, y, 4

= Lter , y, 4 ∗ Í

Lur b a n_non_pr i v at e,

i , y , 4 +L pr i v at e , i , y , 4

i∈{t er t i ar y i ndu st r i es} (Lur b a n_non_pr i v at e, i , y , 4 +L pr i v at e, i , y , 4 )

,

∀y and i ∈ {tertiar y industries}.

Then for each industry and each quarter within a year, I assume the economy-wide quarterly
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employment as a proportion of the fourth quarter employment to be the same as that of urban nonprivate employment. Under this assumption, I construct the quarterly employment series by sector
as
Li, y, q = Li, y, 4 ∗

H.4

Lur ban_non_private, i, y, q
Lur ban_non_private, i, y, 4

∀ i, y, and q.

Sector-level factor income shares and TFP processes

Capital income shares and the two TFP processes can greatly influence the relationship between
aggregate investment and the land price. However, as we mentioned above, the available data for
capital, the FAI, is different from GFCF in land purchasing fees. As a result, I need to infer the capital
income share in the service sector indirectly. For the industrial sector, industrial land prices are
much lower than those of commercial lands and not the focus of my paper. Thus, I treat industrial
lands as part of the industrial sector capital (FAS), i.e., the capital stock of the industrial sector
KSind, y, q = F ASind, y, q .
The Input-Output Tables of 2005, 2007, 2010, and 2012 include remuneration of employee
for each industry, the average of which as a proportion of value-added are used to pin down the
sector-specific labor income shares, (1 − α1 )φ = 0.505 and 1 − α2 = 0.342. For the industrial sector,
as I assume a constant return to scale production function, the capital income share is α2 . Then the
quarterly log TFP for the industrial sector can be calculated as
log(T FPind, y, q ) = log(RGDPind, y, q ) − 0.658 ∗ log(F ASind, y, q ) − 0.342 ∗ log(Lind, y, q ).

Here I use the Producer Price Index (PPI) to deflate the nominal GDP of the industrial sector.
The NBS publishes monthly PPI (previous month=100) since 2003. I construct monthly industrial
sector price index as Pind, y, m,

M

=

P PIy ,

m ∗Pi nd , y , m−1, M

100

or Pind, y, 1,

M

Quarterly industrial sector price index is then Pind, y, q, Q = Pind, y, (3∗q),

=

P PIy , 1 ∗Pi nd ,
100

y−1, 12, M

.

M.

For the service sector, I only have FAS series, which includes both the purchasing fees of
commercial lands and capital. In addition, a subset of quarterly nation-wide commercial land values
can be constructed from the land transaction data. As massive commercial land transactions started
in 2002 after the government of China required all commercial lands to be publicly traded through bid
invitation, auction, and listing. Transactions before 2002 are negligible compared to those after 2002.
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I assume that commercial land purchase fees started in 2002, and the quarterly purchasing values of
commercial lands by service sector units as a proportion of the total quarterly purchasing values of
commercial lands is constant. I further assume that the quarterly purchasing values of commercial
lands in my land transaction sample is also a constant proportion of nation-wide quarterly purchasing
values of commercial lands. I use an endogenous scalar m to adjust the quarterly purchasing values
of commercial lands by service sector units, i.e., the capital stock of the service sector
KSser , y, q = F ASind, y, q − m ∗

y,
Õq

NomComLanV alty , tq

ty =2002, tq =1

PF AI , ty , tq

∀ i, y, and q,

where NomComLanV alty , tq of quarter tq , year ty in my land transaction sample. Its value is
adjusted by PF AI , ty , tq because when the transaction happens, it is counted as FAI.
In order to calculate the TFP of the service sector, I also need to know the total areas of
commercial land in the country, about which there is no official data at all.36 As a result, I have
to use the construction land areas (which includes the commercial land areas) in the annual survey
for the commercial land areas. I assume that the construction land areas increase evenly within a
year and construct the quarterly construction land area Landcon, y, q . Given the scalar m, I run the
following regression
log(RGDPser , y, q ) = α + βK log(KSser , y, q ) + βL log(Lser , y, q ) + βLand log(Landcon, y, q ) + y, q .
I adjust the scalar m carefully until βL = 0.5053, i.e., the labor income share is anchored by the
remuneration of employees as a percentage of value-added in the service sector. The final choice of
m is 0.603, corresponding to an average commercial land value proportion in FAS of 36.85%. The
capital income share of the service sector is then α1 φ = 0.267 according to the regression result.
Commercial land income share is then 1 − φ = 1 − 0.505 − 0.267 = 0.228.The quarterly log TFP of
the service sector is
log(T FPser , y, q ) = log(RGDPser , y, q ) − β̂K log(KSser , y, q ) −
β̂L log(Lser , y, q ) − β̂Land log(Landcon, y, q ).
36. Commerical lands purchased after 2002 are only a small part of the total stock of commercial lands, most of which
were allocated to firms by the government for free before 2002.
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